AFFORDABLE NON-STATE SCHOOLS IN CONTEXTS OF CRISIS AND CONFLICT

Prepared for the USAID Education in Crisis and Conflict Network by Results for Development

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FOREWORD

Worldwide, there are an estimated 121 million school-age primary and lower secondary children out of school, of which an estimated 36 percent live in conflict-affected countries. Although there are a myriad of reasons why these 121 million children are out of school, one of the most significant is that there are no schools or places within schools to accommodate them. The opportunities for children and youth to attend school are often hampered by the limited public resources to build new schools or pay teachers. These limited resources are further strained in contexts coping with additional refugee and internally displaced children. In many countries affected by crisis and conflict, the government education system is broken or not fully functional. This provides fertile ground for the proliferation of non-state schools to meet the demand for education and provide opportunities to meet the shortfall in public supply. In places such as Democratic Republic of Congo and Haiti, upwards of 90 percent of primary and secondary enrollment is in non-state schools. While these schools, often supported by the community, can provide a safe learning environment and assist children and society to return to normalcy, the instability of the context can make it difficult for them to provide high-quality education.

In 2011, USAID commissioned a six-country study to assess the growth trends and needs of private primary and secondary schools, debates surrounding nongovernment schools, and recommendations with regard to the approach that national and international public agencies should take regarding this sector. The study concluded that in order to achieve Education for All goals, governments and donors need to seriously engage and further capitalize on the growing number of non-state schools instead of ignoring them.

USAID’s education strategy focuses on increased education equity and positive educational outcomes for crisis and conflict-affected children and youth. Toward that end, USAID decided to build on the 2011 study by performing a deeper analysis of the role of affordable non-state schools (ANSS) in contexts of conflict and crisis. USAID contracted with Education Development Center and Results for Development to conduct this study.

This report addresses how to best leverage and capitalize on the ANSS sector as the government builds its education system in post-conflict contexts. It discusses the role of the affordable non-state education sector in a post-conflict context and the trade-offs of working with this sector as compared to the public sector in conflict-affected environments. The study provides a literature review from which a conceptual framework was developed to describe the key factors of conflict and ANSS and their interaction to produce educational outcomes. Two country case studies—one in El Salvador and the other in Kaduna State, Nigeria—were conducted to validate the conceptual framework. These components were then used to formulate recommendations for donor and government engagement with ANSS.

I hope this study will contribute a better understanding on the important role that ANSS can play in conflict contexts for governments and donors. We also hope that this study will encourage additional research in this sector in order to give the international community a greater depth of understanding for engaging with ANSS, with the hope that equitable, quality education can be delivered to all children and youth, especially those in challenging conflict-affected contexts.

Robert Burch, USAID Director of Education in the Economic Growth, Education and Environment Bureau
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## ABBREVIATIONS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AECID</td>
<td>Spanish Agency for International Development Cooperation</td>
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<td>ANSS</td>
<td>affordable non-state school</td>
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<td>APS</td>
<td>affordable private school</td>
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<td>BBG</td>
<td>basket of basic goods</td>
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<td>BIA</td>
<td>Bridge International Academies</td>
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<td>CDE</td>
<td>Consejos Directivos Escolares (School Leadership Councils)</td>
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<tr>
<td>CECE</td>
<td>Consejo Educativo Catolico Escolar (Catholic Education School Council)</td>
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<tr>
<td>CSO</td>
<td>civil society organization</td>
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<td>DFID</td>
<td>UK Department for International Development</td>
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<td>DRC</td>
<td>Democratic Republic of the Congo</td>
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<td>ECCN</td>
<td>Education in Conflict and Crisis Network</td>
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<td>EFA</td>
<td>Education for All</td>
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<td>ESSPIN</td>
<td>Education Sector Support Programme in Nigeria</td>
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<tr>
<td>GDP</td>
<td>gross domestic product</td>
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<td>GHSP</td>
<td>General Household Survey Panel</td>
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<td>GNP</td>
<td>gross national product</td>
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<td>GREAT</td>
<td>Gang Resistance Education and Training</td>
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<tr>
<td>IDP</td>
<td>internally displaced person</td>
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<td>IMN</td>
<td>Islamic Movement of Nigeria</td>
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<td>IQTE</td>
<td>Islamiyyah, Qur’anic, and Tsangaya</td>
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<tr>
<td>LGA</td>
<td>local government area</td>
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<td>MINED</td>
<td>Ministry of Education of El Salvador</td>
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<td>NCE</td>
<td>Nigeria Certificate in Education</td>
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<td>PESS</td>
<td>Plan El Salvador Seguro (Plan Safe El Salvador)</td>
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<td>PPP</td>
<td>public-private partnership</td>
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<tr>
<td>PSB</td>
<td>Private Sector Board</td>
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<td>PSL</td>
<td>Partnership Schools for Liberia</td>
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<td>PTA</td>
<td>parent-teacher association</td>
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<tr>
<td>PTR</td>
<td>pupil-teacher ratio</td>
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<tr>
<td>SABER</td>
<td>Systems Approach for Better Education Results</td>
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<tr>
<td>SAME</td>
<td>State Agency for Mass Literacy</td>
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<td>SMoE</td>
<td>State Ministry of Education, Science, and Technology</td>
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<td>SUBEB</td>
<td>State Universal Basic Education Board</td>
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<td>UBE</td>
<td>Universal Basic Education</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNESCO</td>
<td>United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization</td>
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<td>UNHCR</td>
<td>United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees</td>
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<td>USAID</td>
<td>United States Agency for International Development</td>
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I. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

BACKGROUND

In 2016, over 109 million children were living in countries affected by violent conflict or other crises, and nearly a quarter of these children were not attending school (UNICEF, 2016b). Between 2000 and 2014, the number of education institutions affected by violent conflict increased by a factor of 17 (GEM, 2017). Such conflicts and crises hold the potential to trigger a range of cascading, negative effects on education systems, whether by destroying school infrastructure, endangering student safety, sapping government resources, depleting household resources, or displacing populations.

The consequences of conflict and crises can therefore severely hamper the ability of governments to provide education. In these settings, non-state education providers often respond to the unmet demand for schooling. And even when governments maintain education provision in the face of conflict and crises, non-state providers account for a significant and growing proportion of enrollment—in the last 20 years, the share of primary enrollment in non-state schools in low-income countries has doubled, from 11 to 22 percent (Baum, Lewis, Lusk-Stover, & Patrinos, 2014; Heyneman & Stern, 2014).

While significant research has been performed on both non-state education and education in crisis and conflict-affected countries, little has been written on their intersection. This study, performed by Results for Development (R4D) with support from the USAID Education in Crisis and Conflict Network (ECCN), examines the role of affordable non-state schools (ANSS) in conflict and crisis settings, with a focus on basic education. In this report, ANSS are defined as formal and non-formal education institutions that are owned or operated by non-state entities such as private citizens, faith-based organizations, or NGOs, and that target lower-income or marginalized populations. The report offers a number of contributions to the scarce body of literature on this topic, including a synthesis of existing literature on the themes of conflict and crisis and non-state education, a new conceptual framework for understanding the role of ANSS in crisis and conflict-affected settings, and case studies of non-state education in El Salvador and Kaduna State, Nigeria. These components were then used to formulate recommendations for donor and government engagement with non-state schools in these settings.

EL SALVADOR

BACKGROUND

Education in El Salvador takes place within a context of pervasive gang activity in both rural and urban areas. The territorial nature of gangs severely affects students, particularly when school boundaries are not aligned with gang boundaries—entering another gang’s territory to reach school can be deadly. Over a quarter of schools report that their internal security is compromised by gangs (MINED, 2016a). When faced with the real threat of violence, many parents, especially those with limited means, may choose instead to withdraw their children from school. For many students, schooling is also interrupted by internal displacement or international migration driven by threats of violence. For those students who remain in school, violence and insecurity have a detrimental impact on the quality of education.

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1 Various estimates around this figure exist. For example, Nicolai et al. (2016) calculated that over 75 million children and youth between the ages of 3 and 18 are out of school in 35 crisis-affected countries.
received. Within schools, students face bullying, sexual violence, assault, and physical abuse (Cuéllar-Marchelli & Góchez, 2017).

ANSS account for 21 percent of basic and upper secondary enrollment nationally, with most enrollment being concentrated in urban areas. In some conflict-affected urban municipalities, non-state schools account for 30 to 60 percent of enrollment. In these areas, enrollment in private schools is increasing, even as enrollment is dropping in public schools. Roughly a quarter of non-state enrollment is in subsidized Catholic schools, while the remainder is in fully private schools that receive no government support and are owned by individual proprietors, churches, foundations, or businesses. Interactions between government and private schools are limited to accreditation. Stringent registration requirements make the process and up-front investment required to open a school very costly, meaning that few ANSS enter the market.

SELECT FINDINGS

Our analysis finds that governments, donors, and NGOs are largely unaware of an affordable non-state school sector; the general perception is that non-state schools serve middle- and upper-class students, are profitable, and are profit-driven. As a consequence, schools rarely access NGO, donor, or government assistance. In actuality, a large number of non-state schools are driven by social missions and serve low-income households. These schools are largely self-funding, primarily through low fees that cover operational expenses and are affordable to many, although not all, low-income urban households. Schools maintain financial solvency by relying on community support, paying teachers at or below minimum wage, and absorbing losses.

Moreover, non-state schools are seen as much safer than government schools, which can be attributed to investment in security infrastructure, smaller and better-controlled spaces, and exclusive entry requirements. Schools associated with congregations or faith-based organizations are also more respected by gangs than secular schools, affording them additional protection. Families are attracted to ANSS principally because they offer safe environments—in some cases, they are the only schools that children can reach without crossing gang lines. Parents also appreciate the values-oriented instruction—many schools are either affiliated with a faith-based organization or offer some sort of religious instruction.

KADUNA STATE, NIGERIA

BACKGROUND

The nature of conflict and violence in Kaduna is complex and multifaceted. It includes political, religious, communal, gender-based, tribal, and ethnic-based violence (Coinco, 2014). These forms of violence often interlink and rarely occur in isolation. Clashes between farmers and herders, for example, are based on a deep-rooted mistrust along tribal and religious lines. Education in Kaduna takes place within this complex state of conflict and as a representation of the cultural profile of the community, schools are at the center—or caught in the crossfire—of conflict. The immediate impact of conflict on education includes, but is not limited to, destruction or damage of school infrastructure, school closure, and the use of schools to accommodate IDPs. The long-term impact of violence on education includes migration
of teachers to safer communities, increased school dropouts, and segregation of schooling along tribal and religious lines.

The World Bank estimates that non-state schools account for 18 percent of primary and lower secondary enrollment in Kaduna (World Bank, 2015). Non-state schools are either Islamic or Christian, and formal religiously affiliated non-state schools that incorporate the basic education curriculum are considered “private” by the Kaduna state government. Tsangayas, non-formal Islamic schools, remain popular among the lowest-income groups, and it is estimated that four-fifths of out-of-school children in Northern Nigeria attend some form of religious education, including Tsangaya schools (Antoninis, 2014). Christian and Islamiyyah, formal Islamic schools, account for most of the formal non-state schools in Kaduna.

SELECT FINDINGS

Although state authorities recognize the complementary role of non-state schools, our analysis found that they are largely unaware of the specific needs and conditions of non-state schools. State policies on registration, accreditation, and taxation of non-state schools are unclear and burdensome. ANSS are not profit-driven and are often not profitable. Financial sustainability is jeopardized by low and variable revenue flows. However, non-state schools are deeply rooted in their local communities, with parents, teachers, and school head teachers extensively involved in ensuring the well-being of schools. Community donations, either financial or in-kind, are critical sources of support for non-state schools.

Reflecting the localized and faith-based nature of non-state schools, their student bodies are largely of the same religion or tribe. Enrollment in ANSS is driven not only by religion, but also by the perceived quality that a values-based education offers. Conflict can perpetuate the homogeneity of non-state schools as students, parents, and teachers of different religions or tribes relocate away from violent-torn locations. At the same time, non-state schools are somewhat insulated from conflict and can respond proactively to imminent violence because they are rooted in their community network.

CROSS-CUTTING FINDINGS

While Kaduna State and El Salvador represent distinct crisis and conflict-settings, a number of common findings nevertheless emerged, as described below:

1. **Affordable non-state schools (ANSS) play an important role in education provision in crisis and conflict contexts.** ANSS account for a significant proportion of enrollment in conflict-affected areas. Furthermore, ANSS provide education and other services to many marginalized students, including students who are not being served by government schools.

2. **ANSS are frequently religious in nature, which may mitigate or exacerbate the impact of conflict on education.** All of the schools sampled as part of this study were religious in nature or included religious instruction or values in the curricula. If the school is religiously aligned with the aggressor or a violent group, the school will be somewhat insulated from violence. However, if the school is not religiously aligned with the aggressor, it may face a greater risk of attack.

3. **Governments have limited awareness of the ANSS sector.** Misperceptions and a lack of high-quality data result in restrictive regulations and a lack of support for ANSS from NGOs, donors, and the government.
4. Caregivers choose ANSS over government schools out of a concern for safety, as well as an interest in values, culture, religion, and proximity. Non-state schools are perceived to be safer than government schools. Caregivers also have an intense interest in the religious and values-oriented education provided by ANSS. Caregivers feel that ANSS more effectively create a sense of community, foster a sense of belonging for students, and have a superior school environment.

5. ANSS are motivated by service rather than profit. Given household-level financial constraints and the risks of entering a market operating under conflict and crisis, it is unclear whether a for-profit model would be viable to profit-seeking enterprises. Instead, sampled ANSS are primarily driven by social missions. In neither El Salvador nor Kaduna State were schools found to be profit-seeking or profitable.

6. Fees charged by ANSS often do not cover school costs. Sustainability in the absence of additional financing from alternate sources is a challenge for schools. Virtually all schools charge some sort of enrollment fee to students. Schools that rely exclusively on user fees generally face chronic financial shortages. Schools that receive external financial support are better resourced and have fewer concerns for sustainability.

7. ANSS may exclude certain students or communities, which may promote inequality and contribute to societal divides. Some schools institute entry requirements, ensuring that only higher-achieving students enroll. Enrollment fees may also prevent the lowest-income students from enrolling. Some ANSS cater to specific populations, usually along religious lines. Religiously segregated schools may radicalize students or foment suspicion of outside groups.

8. Conflict imposes additional costs on ANSS and may lead to displacement, which lowers enrollment. However, conflict may also increase demand for ANSS. Demand for schooling in ANSS is driven by perceptions of increased safety over government schools. However, conflict may displace students, thereby lowering school revenue. Household resource shortages could also lead to missed payments. Some schools are also targeted by direct attacks, threats of violence, or extortion.

RECOMMENDATIONS

Based on these findings, we present nine recommendations for how governments and donors might productively engage with ANSS in contexts of crisis and conflict.

MINISTRIES OF EDUCATION SHOULD:

1. Map and define the variety of non-state actors and their target group, including where schools are present, what fees are charged, and how many students are served. This mapping may confer recognition upon non-state actors and serve as a catalyst for brokering dialogue.

2. Conduct regular surveys and assessments of non-state schools to inform evidence-based decision making. Data on the size and performance of the non-state sector should be regularly collected. To this end, planned surveys should be funded and needs assessments conducted to help identify bottlenecks that non-state schools face. Data collection can be improved in crisis and conflict-affected regions through coordination with community actors and advance outreach.
3. **Integrate the private sector into sector documents and plans.** Sector plans should (a) acknowledge the potential for non-state schools to contribute to sector goals and (b) outline principles for coordination and collaboration at centralized or decentralized levels.

4. **Ensure that the processes for registering, accrediting, regulating, and taxing non-state schools are clear, streamlined, and transparent.** Registration requirements for new schools should be streamlined and based on clear criteria and not unduly restrict the entry of new institutions. Quality indicators should be objective, measurable, and published so as to minimize discretion and limit the potential for corruption. Requirements should also take conflict and crisis scenarios into consideration.

5. **Assess the feasibility of targeted subsidies.** For education ministries weak in capacity, partnering with non-state schools can accelerate progress toward enrollment goals by, for example, buying seats in private schools to accommodate displaced populations when state schools do not have the capacity to respond to a population influx.

**DONORS SHOULD:**

6. **Map the opportunities and risks associated with engaging with non-state actors.** Engagement with non-state schools may enhance the likelihood of meeting strategic goals around access, learning, building resilience and peace, or supporting marginalized communities. However, donors must also analyze the risks of associating with non-state actors. Donor engagement should intentionally take into account political and political-economy considerations.

7. **Invest in efforts to improve data collection practices.** Donors can partner with state agencies in the design, implementation, analysis, and funding of surveys and censuses, which can be resource intensive. Such assistance could improve accountability of non-state schools and enhance the ability of the Ministry of Education to effectively target assistance or investment.

8. **Consider supporting policies that lower the financial burden for certain not-for-profit ANSS.** Examples of such support include advocating for and helping develop tax relief policies and providing governments with technical assistance to define and set up special funds for ANSS that face extreme financial constraints. Before leveraging any financing strategy, donors should carefully consider the potential market shaping implications, externalities, and tradeoffs with public educations spending.

9. **Support government champions where political will is present.** Considerable political will may be necessary to shepherd the development of a meaningful, coherent strategy toward non-state providers or to initiate public-private partnerships (PPPs). Donors can support domestic champions by contributing to dialogue about the role non-state schools may play, building acknowledgement of the role non-state actors play into sectoral strategies, or providing financial support.
II. INTRODUCTION

The United States Agency for International Development (USAID) Education in Conflict and Crisis Network (ECCN) contracted with Results for Development (R4D) to (a) study the role of affordable non-state schools (ANSS) in contexts of crisis and conflict and (b) provide considerations on when and how governments and donors might engage with ANSS in such contexts. In this report, ANSS are defined as formal and non-formal education institutions that are owned or operated by non-state entities such as private citizens, faith-based organizations, or NGOs and that target lower-income or marginalized populations.²

To achieve these objectives, the research focuses on eight key questions developed by USAID:

1. What are the unique features of a crisis and conflict context that might impact the education sector and, within that, the ANSS sector in particular?

2. What is a conceptual framework that describes the key considerations regarding whether and how ANSS can play a viable role within the education sector in situations of crisis and conflict?

3. What are the major constraints and opportunities that ANSS face in contexts of crisis and conflict?

4. What role could ANSS play in conflict and crisis contexts, particularly in rebuilding the country’s education system?

5. What role must the host-country government play in ANSS in crisis and conflict-affected countries?

6. To what extent do ANSS promote equitable access, holistic well-being, sustainability, and social cohesion relative to public schools within the context of crisis and conflict?

7. What are the prerequisites that must be in place within the crisis and conflict-affected countries to ensure sustainable investments in ANSS?

8. Are there exemplary ANSS models that provide insight on how donors and governments can best leverage and capitalize on ANSS in crisis and conflict-affected countries?

Research on these key questions builds on previous work conducted by Heyneman, Stern, and Smith, (2011) and JBS International (2013) by including recent literature; expanding the scope to community, religious, and NGO schools; and strengthening the conflict-sensitive lens used in analysis.

Understanding what role governments and external actors can play within non-state education in contexts of crisis and conflict is complex. Education is not neutral relative to conflict (Haider, 2014; Novelli, 2016). It can serve to both mitigate and exacerbate conflict and to both improve and impede peacebuilding after conflict. Conflict can be worsened or made more likely by exclusionary enrollment and ethnocentric curriculum. Systematic disparities in enrollment along ethnic or religious lines increase the likelihood of conflict (Ostby & Urdal, 2011). Education can promote peacebuilding through restoring enrollment and normalcy, but this is insufficient to foster peace and stability post-conflict (Novelli, 2016).

² A more complete discussion regarding the classification of ANSS is provided in Section IV.
and needs to be supplemented with the promotion of principles such as unity, citizenship, and social justice (Haider, 2014).

Similarly, non-state schools can both exacerbate conflict and promote peacebuilding. Mitigation of conflict can result from increased inclusive enrollment and exacerbation can result from the proliferation of ethnic and religious non-state schools that do not promote tolerance. The conditions under which non-state schools are expanded during and after conflict is thus a crucial aspect of this study. Excessive reliance on the non-state sector can lead to questions about the public sector’s legitimacy, subservience to external actors, and inability to rebuild (Novelli, 2016).

The subject of non-state education is contentious, and more so when placed in the context of crisis and conflict. The goal of this study is not to advocate for non-state providers but to explore potential contributions (negative and positive) non-state schools can have on education outcomes in crisis and conflict-affected contexts.

This study is organized into eight sections. Following the executive summary and introduction, we summarize the literature on non-state schools in contexts of crisis and conflict. A conceptual framework to understand the role of ANSS is presented in the subsequent section, which is followed by two case studies of El Salvador and Kaduna State, Nigeria. We present cross-cutting findings and recommendations in the last two sections.
III. LITERATURE REVIEW

INTRODUCTION

In recent years, conflict and crisis have had a significant impact on education. Between 2000 and 2014, there has been a 17-fold increase in the number of education institutions affected by violent conflict (GEM Gender Review, 2016). Refugee education has become of increasing concern, as the number of refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs) worldwide increased from 37.3 million in 1996 to 65.3 million in 2015, with the greatest increase occurring since 2011 (UNHCR, 2015).

At the same time, non-state education’s share of primary enrollment in low-income countries has doubled in the last 20 years, from 11 to 22 percent (Baum, Lewis, Lusk-Stover, & Patrinos, 2014; Heyneman and Stern, 2014). In middle-income countries, 13 percent of primary school children attend a private school (World Bank, 2017). Concurrently, international agencies and non-traditional donors have shown greater willingness and interest to support non-state education, such as through the UK Department for International Development’s Girls Education Challenge, the Education Cannot Wait fund, and the World Bank’s work on engaging the private sector as part of its Systems Approach for Better Education Results.

Private education is a topic of considerable and often heated debate. Proponents argue that non-state schools provide greater efficiency and adaptability than resource-scarce and low-quality government education systems (Bold, Kimenyib, Mwabuc, & Sandefurd, 2013; Tooley et al., 2010; French & Kingdon, 2010). Critics counter that private schools are neither affordable to the poor, nor do they provide education of superior quality, and that attention and resources should be dedicated to improving government schools (Srivastava, 2008; Härma, 2011b). However, the literature on non-state schools is dominated by studies of private schools. Little attention has been given to understanding the contributions of other types of non-state schools, such as NGO, community, and religious schools.

This literature review incorporates evidence from both sides of the non-state education discussion and seeks to provide an impartial background on the intersection of conflict and non-state education. It serves to discuss the current state of literature as a means to better understand the role of non-state schools in conflict and crisis settings. The review builds on previous work conducted by Heyneman et al. (2011) and JBS International (2013) by including recent literature; expanding the scope to community, religious, and NGO schools, including non-formal institutions; strengthening the conflict lens used in comparison and analysis; and including additional sources specific to non-state schools in crisis and conflict-affected settings.

ROAD MAP

We begin by describing the methodology used to develop the literature review, followed by a description of findings regarding the role of education in conflict and crisis scenarios and the effects that conflict and crises have on education. The landscape of affordable non-state schools (ANSS) is described, highlighting the variation that exists among non-state education providers. Our review of ANSS contributions to education outcomes are presented in the final section under four lines of inquiry: (1) access and inclusion; (2) quality, holistic well-being, and safety; (3) finance and sustainability; and (4) accountability. These four lines of inquiry refer to the dominant areas of education sector analysis (UNESCO, World Bank, & UNICEF, 2014). Although we separate findings along these four lines, we
acknowledge that these categories are neither mutually exclusive nor collectively exhaustive, and that considerable interaction occurs across them. Issues of school affordability, for example, are closely related to themes of equity and inclusion.

METHODOLOGY

Literature for this review was gathered from a variety of sources, including the following:

- Journal repositories, resource centers, and databases of development agencies
- Systematic reviews
- Gray literature
- Donor and government reports
- Academic articles that examined non-state schools in both stable and crisis and conflict-affected contexts

Although the focus was on literature published since 2010, highly relevant literature published before 2010 was also included. No geographic or language restrictions were placed on the selection criteria.

In addition, a call for evidence was posted in the ECCN newsletter and shared with recipients of the Inter-Agency Network for Education in Emergencies bi-weekly bulletin to identify additional gray literature.

LIMITATIONS

A significant limitation of this research is the lack of specific literature on ANSS in crisis and conflict-affected contexts. While there is literature on non-state schools in general and on the role of education in crisis and conflict, little exists covering their overlap. Few studies explicitly explore the various types of non-state schools within specific crisis and conflict-affected contexts. It is rare, for example, to find studies on the role of affordable private schools (APS) in settings with acute natural disasters. By contrast, considerable literature is available on the role of community schools in post-conflict settings.

The two most prominent systematic reviews of non-state schools and private schools (Day Ashley et al., 2014; Wales, Aslam, Hine, & Rawal, 2015), which heavily informed this study, also have limitations.

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3 Gray literature refers to documents that are not published commercially or are not generally accessible. Documents considered grey literature may include but are not limited to the following types of materials: preliminary, progress, evaluation, technical, statistical, market research, annual, and feasibility reports produced by government, donors, implementing agencies, businesses, academics, and consultants, among others.
Their authors highlighted several problems with the available literature that affected their ability to draw conclusions about the true impact of non-state providers of education, including the following:

- Lack of rigorous quantitative studies.
- Poor geographic variety – The literature on non-state provision in developing countries is primarily concentrated in several African and South Asian countries.
- Little explicit consideration of the various types of non-state schools.
- Small sample size of schools – Most unregistered non-state schools are not included in sampling.

We therefore focus primarily on APS in conflict-affected situations. We supplement this with the limited information that is available on other types of non-state schools and on crisis situations. To prevent conflating different types of schools under one label, we distinguish findings by specific non-state school provider type and conflict and crisis setting whenever possible.

It is also important to note that this review does not examine literature on early childhood development programs, technical and vocational education and training, upper secondary education, or higher education.

**THE ROLE OF EDUCATION IN CRISIS AND CONFLICT**

Education is first and foremost a basic human right stipulated under the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UN General Assembly, 1948). As with other human rights, education provision must not be halted, even under conditions of conflict or crisis. Moreover, education has a uniquely important role to play in times of conflict or during crises. Continued education provision can limit loss in economic growth, provide safe spaces for protection and psychosocial support, and promote social cohesion. However, education can also be a source and driver of conflict. We explore these themes in the following sections.

**LIMITING THE LOSS IN ECONOMIC GROWTH**

Conflict frequently interrupts education, and displacement can keep children out of school for months or years. According to a 2016 UNICEF report, nearly 24 million children living in countries affected by conflict and crisis are out of school (UNICEF, 2016b). Every year spent out of school reduces a child’s future economic prospects (Montenegro and Patrinos, 2014). At the macroeconomic level, the effects of not educating out-of-school children can cause significant and long-term harm to a country’s economic prospects, with the costs significantly outweighing the price of necessary investments for providing universal primary education (Thomas and Burnett, 2013). For some countries, these costs exceed the value of an average year of economic growth—perhaps as much as five to six percent of GDP—as a result of the out-of-school population. In Mali and Nigeria, the cost of not educating children is estimated to be more than two years of their average GDP growth (Thomas and Burnett, 2013).

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4 Various estimates around this figure exist. For example, Nicolai et al. (2016) calculate that over 75 million children and youth between the ages of 3 and 18 are out of school in 35 crisis and conflict-affected countries.
Ensuring access to education to children in conflict-affected countries can limit the damaging long-term effects conflict and crisis have on economic growth.

**PROVISION OF PHYSICAL PROTECTION AND PSYCHOSOCIAL SUPPORT**

The role of education is more than just service delivery. Especially in contexts of conflict and crisis, schools can provide physical protection for children (Winthrop & Matsui, 2013; Smith, 2010; Novelli, 2016; Burde, Guven, Kelcey, Lahmann, & Al-Abbad, 2015). As demonstrated in USAID’s rapid assessment of Borno State, Nigeria, schools doubled as shelters for IDPs following approval from community leaders (Creative Associates, 2015a). Education can also help protect children and youth from recruitment into fighting forces, forced labor, prostitution, criminal activities, and drug use (UNESCO, 2017). Teachers can monitor students’ well-being and alert community members if a child is distressed or in danger, which can help mitigate some of the risks young people face in conflict and crisis, such as kidnapping, exploitation, sexual violence, and separation from family members (Nicolai & Triplehorn, 2003).

In addition to physical protection, education can bring a sense of normalcy that can help mitigate the negative psychosocial effects of conflict and crises. By providing children with the routines of schooling, education in contexts of conflict and crisis provide some day-to-day consistency for students to build resilience (Burde et al., 2015). Creative art and play therapy programs can increase well-being among young children living in environments affected by conflict and crisis. A quasi-experimental study in Northern Uganda found that students who participated in such education programs were safer, more able to form healthy relationships with others, and better able to cope with their circumstances than children who did not (Kostenly & Wessells, 2008). Schooling and other forms of non-formal education can play an essential role in supporting children’s psychosocial well-being (Winthrop & Matsui, 2013).

**EDUCATION AS A CONTRIBUTOR TO PEACE AND PEACEBUILDING**

As a means of socialization and identity development, education can play a key role in peacebuilding efforts. According to Novelli (2016), schools are ideal venues to teach violence prevention and conflict resolution. Education can strengthen messages within society about the negative impacts of violence, inform children about non-violent ways of responding to conflict, and introduce concepts of truth and reconciliation. It can also promote social transformation by conveying messages regarding policing, justice, and political processes (Smith, 2010).

Education can reduce the likelihood of conflict. Econometric studies have demonstrated a negative relationship between levels of education and the risk of violent conflict (Winthrop & Matsui, 2013). After analyzing education and conflict data from 160 countries between 1980 to 1999, Thyne (2006) concludes that an increase in enrollment can significantly reduce the risk of large-scale violent conflict. Similarly, Østby & Urdal’s (2011) review of 30 statistical studies on conflict found that higher average levels of education, particularly primary and secondary education, reduce the risk of armed conflict.

However, it is important to note that simply providing education is insufficient to building peace and stability. In the West Bank and Gaza, for instance, higher levels of education do not decrease support among Palestinians for violent attacks such as suicide bombings (Krueger & Maleckova, 2003), nor does access to education mitigate participation in violence, including terrorism (Buer, 2014). Simply providing access to school may not be enough to foster peace and decrease the likelihood of violent
conflict. The quality and substance of education may play a role in its ability to prevent violent conflict (Burde et. al., 2015). In order to build stable and peaceful societies, Haider (2014) recommends incorporating principles such as unity, citizenship, and social justice within school curricula.

EDUCATION AS A DRIVER OF CONFLICT

As a transmitter of knowledge, values, and attitudes across generations, education can be either a driver of conflict or a contributor to peace. This “double-faced” feature of education has been widely studied (Bush & Salterelli, 2000; Smith & Vaux, 2003; Davies, 2004; Haider, 2014; Novelli, 2016). Education has the potential to reinforce inequities and identify grievances; fuel stereotypes and xenophobia; and promote militarism, radicalization, or terrorism. It can also be used to prolong or aggravate violence and instability. Non-state schools are not immune to the potential to drive conflict or exacerbate tensions, particularly those based on identity factors such as language, religion, or tribe. While the evidence covering the effects of segregated schooling based on identity factors on conflict is contested and highly context-dependent, there is consensus that such divisions are detrimental to social cohesion (Gallagher, 2010; Smith 2005).

Box 1: Adopting a conflict-sensitive approach

Because of the bidirectional relationship between education and conflict, it is fundamental to adopt a conflict-sensitive approach to education programs, data collection processes, policies, research, sector review processes, and education planning (Novelli, 2016; INEE, 2013; IIEP Policy Brief, 2017). This recognition has resulted in the publication of various approaches and toolkits to guide thinking on (1) understanding the context, history, and dynamics of conflict; (2) analyzing the two-way interaction between conflict and education; and (3) acting to minimize adverse impacts and maximize positive impacts of education in contexts of conflict and crisis (Haider, 2014; INEE 2017, Novelli, 2016). It is argued that conflict sensitivity should be applied continuously to all phases of conflict and at all levels of education (Novelli, 2016).

THE EFFECTS OF CRISIS AND CONFLICT ON EDUCATION

The effects of conflict and crisis on education are numerous and complex. Conflict can impede access to quality education through the destruction or occupation of schools, decrease funding for education, and diminish the teaching workforce (Omoeva, Hatch, & Moussa, 2016). School attendance decreases when students feel unsafe; schools are targets of violent attacks; or travel to school increases the likelihood of attack, kidnapping, or sexual assault (UNESCO, 2011; Justino, 2010; UNICEF, 2017a). Households also struggle with the cost (or opportunity cost) of sending a child to school during conflict and crisis. When food insecurity is brought on by crisis or conflict, children may suffer from malnutrition, which significantly limits their cognitive development in both the short- and long-term (Omoeva et al., 2016). These and additional implications of crises on education are presented in greater detail below.
ATTACKS ON STUDENTS, TEACHERS, AND SCHOOLS

In 2017, the United Nations documented over 500 attacks on schools or education-related personnel in 18 conflict-affected countries (UN, 2017). Motives for attacking schools vary. Government schools may be seen as embodying local authorities, values, or cultures that insurgent groups oppose (UNESCO, 2011). In some cases, private schools have also been targeted for ideological reasons. In Nepal, ideologically driven attacks on and intimidation of private schools by Maoist groups caused many private schools to shut down (Caddell, 2007).

In contexts of conflict and crisis, students and teachers can be attacked or caught in the crossfire at school or on their way to school. As a result, parents may decide to withdraw their children from school. In Nigeria’s northern Borno state, a USAID assessment found that parents chose not to send their children to school for fear of attacks, kidnappings, and abductions by Boko Haram (Creative Associates, 2015a). Teachers face many of the same challenges. In conflict and crisis contexts, teachers are unable to confidently attend school due to fear of violent attack (Zakharia & Bartlett, 2014). In El Salvador, teachers experience extortion and threats from gang members in schools. In 2014, 10 teachers were assassinated by gangs (USAID/ECCN, 2016).

REDUCED EDUCATION ATTAINMENT

Conflict and crises harm educational attainment. Not only are conflict-affected children disproportionately unable to enroll in primary school, their attainment rates are lower than children who were not conflict-affected. Alderman, Hoddinott, & Kinsey (2006) find that Zimbabwean children affected by the civil war in the 1970s completed fewer grades of schooling than those not affected by conflict. Similarly, Justino (2010) finds lower education attainment rates among individuals affected by conflict in Rwanda (Akresh & de Walque, 2008) and Bosnia (Swee, 2009). Justino (2010) notes that these effects are more severe for girls, in part because of the widespread incidence of sexual violence that accompanies war.

WEAKENED STATE CAPACITY TO PROVIDE EDUCATION

In contexts of conflict and crisis, the government’s ability to deliver quality education can be significantly weakened (Novelli, 2016). This is especially the case in developing country contexts, where public service provision and capacity may already be low. In active armed conflict or in acute crises, the government may be overwhelmed by public needs for basic services (such as water, food, and shelter) and therefore provide limited or no support to schools and educators (JBS International, 2013). The breakdown of bureaucratic systems and a lack of available resources can lead to gaps in payment of teacher salaries, delays in distributing teaching and learning materials, or a complete halt in state education provision. In some countries, such as Somalia, Haiti, and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), governments may be weakened to such an extent that they lack the capacity to provide education to most or all of their population (European Commission, 2009).

In instances where the government is not able provide education, schooling is often only available from non-state providers, which propagate to fill the gap left by the state (Titeca & De Herdt, 2011; Novelli, 2016; Burde et al., 2015). When host communities are not able to provide education to refugee populations, non-state, non-formal, unregulated education programs run by refugee communities or NGOs proliferate (Deane, 2016). A pattern seen among displaced populations in countries such as...
Sudan, Honduras, Zimbabwe, Lebanon, and Turkey is for refugees to initiate schools and then later receive financial and pedagogical support from the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) or other international organizations (Dryden-Peterson, 2011; Deane, 2016). However, weakness in state provision of education brought about by conflict and crisis can be further exacerbated by excessive reliance on the non-state sector, which can lead to a questioning of the state sector’s legitimacy, dependence on external actors, and inability to rebuild (Novelli, 2016).

THE LANDSCAPE OF NON-STATE SCHOOLS
Non-state education is characterized by a diversity of providers, each with distinct ownership, management, financial structures, and levels of state involvement. Non-state education providers also differ in the extent to which they are formal or non-formal institutions. Precisely defining and classifying non-state education providers, therefore, presents a significant challenge. Within the literature itself, there is no typology that is widely agreed upon which captures the diversity of providers and modalities.5

In the following sections, we describe the general categories of formal and non-formal education providers that emerge from the literature.

FORMAL PROVIDERS
Formal education providers are institutionalized, intentional, and planned organizations that are recognized by relevant education authorities of a country (OECD, 2016). Formal providers can be both state and non-state actors. The four main categories of formal non-state education providers include the following:

Affordable Private Schools
“Low-fee” private schools or “low-cost” private schools are conventional ANSS and have been the subject of multiple studies in Nigeria, Ghana, India, and Pakistan (Rose, 2002; Rose 2003; Tooley & Dixon, 2003; Andrahi et al., 2010). These schools are typically owned and operated by a local individual and charge affordable school fees. The proprietor of APS are often former teachers, local leaders, or entrepreneurs. These schools are also described as local “mom and pop” schools. They are non-elite schools that may be mission- or profit-driven.

Affordable Private School Chains
Affordable private school (APS) chains have proliferated in a number of developing countries, including Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Kenya. The emergence of these chains has become a contentious topic within the education community. While advocates of APS chains claim their market-based approach can lead to cost reductions, improved learning, and more inclusive education at scale, opponents argue that these chains undermine state provision, absolving the government of its responsibility to deliver education. (Day Ashley et al., 2014).

5 UNESCO (United Nations Education, Science, and Cultural Organization) considers an educational institution to be “non-state” if it is controlled and managed by an NGO, a religious group, an enterprise, or if it has a governing body that primarily consists of members not hired by a public agency (UNESCO 2015). UNESCO groups non-state schools under the term private education. According to Steer et al. (2015), the categorization of religious, NGO, and community schools under private education “may have unintentionally contributed to the lack of clarity around the role and impact of non-state engagement in education.”
Popular APS chains include Omega Schools, the Rising Academy Network, and Bridge International Academies (BIA). Of these APS chains, BIA is the most well-known and well-studied. Originally designed to reach students in urban slums, BIA develops their school infrastructure and personnel from scratch, working with local communities to build classrooms, hire and train cohorts of previously uncertified school managers and teachers, and develop standardized curricula based on national standards. BIA schools charge roughly $7 per month per child, although supplemental fees for food, uniforms, and books can be prohibitive for the lowest-income households (Kwauk & Robinson, 2015). Teachers are recruited from local communities and trained to deliver scripted lessons from tablets (Stanfield, 2012).

Religious Schools

Religious or faith-based schools are non-state education centers that include religious teachings and are managed by or affiliated with a religious institution (JBS International 2013). The most common forms of religious schools in the literature are madrasas, other Islamic schools, Catholic mission schools, and schools affiliated with Protestant organizations.

NGO and Foundation Schools

These schools are managed by national or international NGOs or charitable foundations. These types of schools are also considered philanthropic schools that tend to be mission- and service-driven (Wales et al., 2015).

NON-FORMAL MODALITIES

In addition to falling along the state and non-state continuum, ANSS can also be categorized across a formal to non-formal spectrum (Wales et al., 2015). In contrast to formal education models, such as APS and religious schools, non-formal education is a broader category of models that serve out-of-school children, youth, and adults. It is often thought of as an addition, an alternative, or a complement to formal education and is characterized by the variety, flexibility, and speed with which it responds to educational needs.

Non-formal programs serve a wide range of purposes, including providing education for out-of-school children; teaching literacy, life skills, or vocational skills; and promoting social and cultural development (Yasunaga, 2014). Non-formal education can take the form of afterschool programs, accelerated learning programs, literacy and numeracy programs, and vocational trainings. These modalities may be delivered in a classroom or other physical setting or via radio, computers, and other technology. Models are implemented by a variety of non-state providers, including communities, philanthropic organizations, NGOs, religious entities, and private institutions. Because these programs are less formalized and face less regulation, they often do not provide qualifications officially recognized by national or sub-national authorities (Yasunaga, 2014).
THE CONTRIBUTION OF ANSS TO EDUCATION OUTCOMES AND GOALS

This section presents evidence from the literature on the impact of ANSS on education outcomes, divided into the following categories:

1. Access and inclusion
2. Quality, holistic well-being, and safety
3. Finance and sustainability
4. Accountability

These four themes are frequently used to evaluate and compare public and private education (UNESCO et al., 2014) and are the same outcomes used in this study’s Conceptual Framework (Section 4). These outcomes are also components of the Learning Framework used in a previous USAID study on ANSS (Heyneman et al., 2011).

ACCESS AND INCLUSION

ANSS account for a growing proportion of primary and secondary enrollment around the world (Baum, Lewis, Lusk-Stover, & Patrinos, 2014; Heyneman and Stern, 2014), including countries affected by conflict and crisis. In Pakistan, enrollment in private institutions at the primary level increased from 32 percent in 2009 to 38 percent in 2015 (World Bank, 2017). In India, the number of APS has more than doubled since 1993, and in Kenya, it has tripled since 1997 (Bold et al., 2013). In the DRC, Catholic and other religious schools continue to dominate education provision (Wales et al., 2015). In northeastern Nigeria, Islamic schools are the preferred education institution of parents (Antoninis, 2014). Affordable non-state chain schools have also expanded in recent years. BIA has grown from eight academies in 2010 to more than 450 schools across Kenya, Nigeria, and Uganda (Kwauk & Robinson, 2015). Despite the chronicling of the sector’s growth, the understanding of the exact prevalence of

Box 2: Community schools

Community schools (sometimes referred to as village schools) are intended to serve students living in close proximity (Burde and Linden, 2013) and can range from stand-alone spontaneous learning centers to NGO-run school networks managed by community members (JBS International, 2013). Their connection to the community, as well as their understanding of the local context in which they operate, allow them to play an important role during or immediately following periods of conflict or crisis (JBS International, 2013)

Box 3: School-in-a-box models

In humanitarian crises, schools-in-a-box are often leveraged to provide short-term education services for displaced children. For example, UNICEF’s Teacher Emergency Package has been implemented in several post-crisis and post-conflict settings to reestablish basic education activities. The kit comprises educational resources for teachers and up to 80 students, including basic classroom materials (slates, exercise books, pencils, chalk, etc.) as well as a teaching guide with structured lesson plans for untrained teachers (UNICEF, 2017b).
ANSS relative to state schools in many countries is limited by poor-quality data. Frequently, non-state schools are not registered and therefore are not captured in official government figures.

Whether the growth of ANSS has resulted in increased access and inclusion is disputed. Access may be expanded by ANSS to the extent that they fill gaps in state education provision, but ANSS growth may also be a result of shifts in enrollment from state to non-state schools. Furthermore, certain populations may be excluded from enrollment in ANSS, for example, because of an inability to pay school fees. However, some socially motivated ANSS specifically target and reach marginalized populations.

**Filling Gaps in Public Provision of Education**

In contexts of conflict and crisis, where public provision of basic education services is not available, ANSS can serve as a valuable substitute (Oketch et al., 2010). In the short-term, ANSS can ensure education is not disrupted, especially if opposition or warring groups hold favorable views and attitudes toward philanthropic, religious, and community education providers. For example, during Sudan’s civil war in the late 1980s, education was provided by communities, NGOs, and faith-based organizations to fill gaps in public provision (Echessa, Ayite, & Wahome, 2009). Similarly, community-managed schools in Somaliland provided basic services for children where otherwise there would have been none (Berry, 2009). In the DRC, the International Rescue Committee supported religious schools to supplement public provision (Bender, 2010). In these cases, international donors played a key role in supporting ANSS to fill in gaps in education provision.

It is equally important to consider the perspective of the state in contexts of conflict and crisis, especially when state systems lack authority or legitimacy. Wales et al. (2015) provide evidence that in some cases governments in developing countries view non-state providers as competitors for resources and legitimacy (Wales et al., 2015). Experiences in Afghanistan and the DRC demonstrate that state legitimacy can be further eroded in conflict or post-conflict settings when services are provided by non-state actors with little connection to local actors or institutions (Carlson et al., 2005).

**Reaching Marginalized Groups**

Wales et al.’s (2015) systematic review found strong evidence that faith-based schools, particularly madrasas, promote education equity by serving the poor and marginalized within their communities. In Bangladesh, Sommers (2012) found that 86 percent of madrasas were in rural areas and that two-thirds of households with students in those schools were classified as the absolute poor. There is consistent evidence that some NGO-run schools are purposely located in areas that enable them to reach marginalized groups (Wales et al., 2015). Batley and Mcloughlin (2010) also cite evidence from South Asia that unregistered non-state schools serve poor families.

The evidence is mixed, however, as to whether APS reach marginalized groups. One study by Tooley, Dixon, and Schagen (2013) found that APS in Nairobi were more likely than government schools to be located within slums. However, APS are infrequently located in rural areas (Mcloughlin, 2013), and fees often prevent the lowest-income households from enrolling (Akaguri, 2013; Heyneman & Stern, 2014; Härmä 2011c).
Bridging Distance and Supplementing Limited State Capacity

Caregivers frequently choose nearby APS over more distant state schools, even though state schools cost the caregivers less (Day Ashley et al., 2014). Because caregivers must often escort young children to school, proximity may be a more important factor than price (Mcloughlin, 2013). In situations of conflict, when travel to school can be life-threatening, undertaking non-formal education models can be a valuable alternative. During Bosnia’s civil war, children were targeted by snipers on the way to school, and parents and community members created classrooms in non-traditional places, such as homes, cafes, garages, and basements, to enable education to continue (UNESCO, 2011). In another instance, the BBC World Service Trust and the African Educational Trust developed a radio-based distance learning program for literacy and numeracy when schools in Somalia were closed by the civil war. While active, the program reached 10,000 learners (UNESCO, 2011).

Box 4. Remedial education

BRAC’s non-formal primary school model is an example of a non-formal education approach that has been leveraged to provide quality low-cost education in post-conflict settings. Each BRAC primary school serves 25 to 33 students and is led by one teacher, all of whom live in the same community, within walking distance of the school. Teachers receive 10–15 days of training and are supervised by BRAC as well as community-based school management committees (USAID, 2006a).

BRAC’s primary schools have been adapted to northern Uganda, where they have played a valuable role in providing remedial education to students who were affected by conflict. Through their inclusive, community-based model, these “second-chance schools” have contributed to the rebuilding of Uganda’s education system by successfully reintegrating 3,000 students back into government schools (JBS International, 2013). The model’s success in Uganda showcases the potential for non-state providers to deliver supplementary and/or remedial education in cases where children have been denied access due to protracted conflict.

A similar model was applied in Sierra Leone by UNICEF. Known as the Complementary Rapid Education Program, this initiative consisted of 40-pupil max classrooms, where teachers taught an expedited curriculum under the supervision of qualified head teachers, supervisors, and community-teacher-associations. The program then partnered with the Ministry of Education to train teachers and reintegrate most beneficiary students into public primary school (NRC, 2008).

However valuable, these models also face limitations. Neither model is intended as a long-term solution, and both depend on public schools to eventually reintegrate conflict-affected and vulnerable students (JBS International, 2013; NRC, 2008). These programs are also unlikely to be effective if not properly resourced or staffed. Investments in such short-term approaches need to be made concurrent with investments to rebuild the public system. Otherwise, there is a risk that parallel systems may develop, delegitimizing public provision (Novelli, 2016).
Even when state schools are reasonably close to children’s homes, they are often filled beyond capacity. Poor parents are thus either unable to enroll their children in the state schools or fear that they would not receive sufficient attention. Studies in Kenya have found that many parents would prefer enrollment in fee-free state schools, but their children are crowded out into APS (Dixon et al., 2013; Oketch et al., 2010).

**Gender Parity**

The evidence is mixed on the effect of APS on gender parity. One study in India found that the gender gap in APS was twice that in public schools (Maitra Pal, & Härmä, 2011). Studies in Uttar Pradesh, rural Kenya, and Pakistan found gender disparities in APS, although no comparison was made with government schools (Day Ashley et al., 2014). Conversely, studies in Nigeria and India found that girls and boys are equally likely to attend APS (Srivastava, 2008; Härmä, 2011c; Mcloughlin, 2013), and one Pakistan study found female enrollment to be more likely in APS than in government schools (Day Ashley et al., 2014).

A common argument against APS is that, in resource-constrained environments, parents are unable to enroll all of their children in private schools. If forced to choose among their children, parents will be more likely to enroll boys than girls (Härmä, 2011a). Some parents also prefer to send their “more able” children to private schools, with boys more frequently perceived to be more able than girls (Rolleston & Adefeso-Olateju, 2014). However, when distances to APS are shorter than those to government schools, parents may be more likely to send girls to APS to ensure their safety while commuting (Ohba, 2012).

The evidence for gender parity is stronger for NGO and community-based schools. Us-Sabur and Ahmed (2010) found that NGO, community, and non-formal primary schools achieved gender parity in enrollment in Bangladesh. Burde et al.’s (2015) rigorous review of education in post-crisis contexts found strong evidence that community-based education can increase access to education in conflict settings, particularly for primary school-aged girls. In Afghanistan, non-formal community and home-based schools saw girls’ enrollment increase by 50 percent. These schools also incorporated factors such as shorter school days, use of local teachers who were often women, secure learning environments, and lower student-teacher ratios that attracted girls from more conservative families (USAID, 2013). These community schools were also instrumental in transitioning girls to formal education. Between 2001 and 2004, girls’ enrollment in government primary schools increased to 1.3 million from an official count of zero (Aga Khan Foundation, 2007). Similarly, in Bhutan, the availability of closer community schools and non-formal education centers helped reduce the tension between school and household responsibilities and contributed to the rapid reduction in the number of out-of-school girls (UNESCO, 2011). However, Wales et al. (2015) report that there are still inequalities in gender parity at madrasa schools.

**QUALITY, HOLISTIC WELL-BEING, AND SAFETY**

Education quality encompasses components such as reliable infrastructure; secure and supportive environments; teachers who are well-trained and attend class; and curriculum that effectively teaches literacy, numeracy, and life skills. These factors should work collectively to produce a system in which all students learn core competencies (UNICEF, 2000). In this section, we examine quality as measured by learning outcomes and teacher training and attendance, as these factors have seen the greatest attention.
in the literature. Additionally, we also explore how parents differentially perceive quality between state and non-state schools.

**Learning Outcomes**

Day Ashley et al.’s 2014 analysis explored the issue of quality as measured by APS learning outcomes. Drawing upon 21 studies that met their threshold of evidence, Day Ashley saw the emergence of a moderately strong trend: learning outcomes in private schools tend to be better than those in state schools. This finding is backed by Heyneman at al.’s (2011) meta-analysis comparing APS achievement scores to those from public schools. In most of their case study countries, including Jamaica, Ghana and Pakistan, APS outperformed public schools on national examinations.

As is noted by Desai, Dubey, Vanneman, and Banerji (2008); French and Kingdon (2010); and Goyal (2009), effect size differs considerably across studies. At the upper bound, there are improvements of a full standard deviation, as seen in Bold et al.’s (2013) analysis from Kenya using national primary exam results. In general, however, evidence in Africa is much more varied than in India, from where many of the studies examined in Day Ashley et al. were drawn. For example, Akaguri’s analysis (2011) from Ghana noted no difference in performance between non-state and state schools.

Specific to community, NGO, and religious schools, Wales et al. (2015) found moderate evidence to suggest that ANSS pupils achieve better learning outcomes than state school pupils. Citing nine studies, the authors found that students from ANSS performed better, or at least as well, as state school students. However, the evidence for religious schools is mixed. Us Sabur and Ahmed (2010) presented evidence of lower learning outcomes in madrasa schools from the Bangladesh Education Watch Report 2008. In another study from Bangladesh, Asadullah, Chaudhury, and Dar (2009) found no significant difference in test scores between religious and secular school students, but that madrasa attendance at primary level was found to exert a significant negative effect on test scores at the secondary level, regardless of whether the student attended a madrasa or a secular secondary school.

Moreover, patterns of higher student achievement may not be as positive as they initially appear when confounding factors, such as the socioeconomic background of students, are considered. Introduction of these controls can lead to reduced effect size and or a negation of positive effects altogether (Wadhwa 2009). Singh (2013), for example, found that achievement differences were correlated with home investment and socioeconomic background. In addition, generalizing findings about a very diverse set of non-state schools is problematic, especially when unregistered schools are not included in the sampling (Tooley et al., 2010).

In general, absolute education outcomes in most rural settings remain very low; children in many countries are not acquiring basic competencies, irrespective of whether they are attending non-state or state schools (Day Ashley et al., 2014). Despite the pervasive low levels of achievement from most rural schools, several NGO-operated models have shown considerable success in improving education outcomes, among them Fe y Alegría, BRAC, Escuela Nueva, Egypt Community Schools, and Schools for Life (Osorio & Wodon, 2014; USAID, 2006a; Kline, 2002; DeStefano & Shuh-Moore, 2010).

The evidence for improved learning outcomes among students in APS chains is equally mixed. BIA cites self-reported improvements in education access and learning outcomes. Over the past year, BIA schools have faced increasing pressure from the Kenyan and Ugandan governments, who have halted their
expansion and, in the case of Uganda, worked to shut down over 60 schools. A recent report from Education International and the Kenya National Union of Teachers (2016) found BIA teachers to be overworked, underpaid, and inadequately trained. Almost half of the interviewed teachers claimed that BIA's innovative tablet-based curriculum was not effective in helping learners understand core concepts. The report also found that BIA fees were often higher than advertised; its infrastructure was often viewed as inadequate by parents and teachers; and learning outcomes were inflated by the selective enrollment of high-performing students.

Teaching
While evidence of student achievement in APS is mixed, available evidence on teacher quality is more consistently positive, as noted by Day Ashley et al. (2014). Of 14 studies that examined the question of whether teaching is better in private schools than in state schools, 12 were positive and 2 were neutral. There are several potential explanatory factors for stronger teacher quality, with enhanced accountability being most consistently cited (Aslam & Kingdon, 2011; Kremer & Muralidharan, 2008; R4D, 2016). In general, despite frequently hiring teachers with limited training and qualifications, school proprietors have greater latitude to discipline and remove poorly performing teachers, thus incentivizing positive performance. However, the unchecked ability of proprietors to remove teachers—and associated job stability—can create challenging working conditions for teachers (Day Ashley et al., 2014).

Enhanced teacher accountability contributes to improved quality in several ways. Most fundamentally, teachers in non-state schools tend to have lower rates of absenteeism than those in state schools, though rates differ across studies (Day Ashley et al., 2014). Time on task also tends to be higher in non-state settings. While time spent teaching is a product of multiple factors, Muralidharan and Sundaraman (2013) note that non-state teachers have comparatively less administrative work to complete, which can detract from actual teaching time. In addition, teaching methods such as interactive approaches and pupil testing employed by non-state teachers are perceived to be of a higher caliber than those used by government teachers. Similarly, Heyneman & Stern (2014) found that in Kenya, class length in non-state schools could be extended to reflect parental demand.

While not a function of enhanced accountability, the relative effectiveness of non-state teachers is also aided by more favorable pupil-teacher ratios (Maitra et al., 2011; Goyal & Pandey, 2009). Teachers in NGO and community schools, including BRAC in Bangladesh, Pratham in India, and Escuela Nueva in Colombia, have also been evaluated as having a superior use of innovative pedagogy and greater relevance to community needs, promoting better learning environments, and practicing superior organization and management than state schools (Wales et al., 2015; Epstein & Yuthas, 2012).

Perception of Quality
Student caregivers consistently perceive non-state schools as being superior in quality to government schools, even as differences in student outcomes between schools are small or nonexistent. This perception reliably drives student choice across different geographies (Day Ashley et al., 2014). In the absence of easily available and robust data about quality, these impressions are shaped by “quality proxies” (JBS International, 2013), such as beliefs about the higher quality of teachers, smaller class sizes, and the impact on future earnings. Complementing these perceptions, evidence from India (Srivastava, 2008a; Baird 2009) and Ghana (R4D, 2015) suggests that choice is driven not only by views of non-state schools as being of high quality but also by dissatisfaction with government schools. Factors cited for
dissatisfaction with government schools include unsatisfactory teacher performance, poor infrastructure, and a lack of faith in government capacity.

**Safety**

In conflict-affected settings, faith-based and community schools have shown to have strong ties to local communities (JBS International, 2013). Burde et al. (2015) suggest the greater sense of community ownership in education allows students to feel safe and can lessen security anxieties and increase attendance, particularly for vulnerable populations such as girls and ethnic minorities. (Barakat et al., 2014; Rose & Greeley, 2006). In addition, non-state schools’ demonstrated ability to increase teacher presence (Day Ashley et al., 2014) also adds to a sense of security. Private schools in Pakistan, for example, have been described as promoting security in remote regions by increasing teacher attendance and reducing travel distances for students (UNDP, 2014).

Some observational studies found that NGO schools in conflict settings are less frequently attacked than public schools (Glad, 2009; Rowell, 2014; Burde, 2014). Similarly, UNICEF’s Child-Friendly Schools program was found to increase students’ sense of security (UNICEF 2009). Religious schools’ faith-based connection with their beneficiaries can also foster a sense of community and normalcy in crisis and conflict-affected settings through tailored teaching and adapted curricula (Wales et al., 2015).

In contexts of conflict and crisis, teachers also fear for their safety. In Zimbabwe, as many as 20,000 teachers left the country between 2000 and 2010 due to political tension, targeted attacks on teachers, and the political use of schools (O’Malley, 2010). In Pakistan, district teachers left schools for fear of being attacked (IRIN, 2010). In addition, Burns (2015) writes that teachers in crisis and conflict-affected contexts face some of the most difficult working conditions, including the lack of remuneration, the potential for sexual harassment or abuse, violence, and overcrowded classrooms.

**Social Cohesion**

Limited evidence demonstrates the potential for non-state education providers to foster peace and reconciliation. Some studies point to the role that philanthropic and religious schools can play in supporting local-level stability, particularly where the government is absent or has limited capacity. Catholic-run government schools in the DRC “play an important role in reinforcing social contracts between different groups and enabling social peace to be maintained in an otherwise highly constrained environment” (Wales et al., 2015). Non-state schools may also support post-conflict reintegration. A study of state and non-state schools in northern Uganda found that non-state schools taking a less punitive approach to discipline, most of which were founded by the Catholic Church, made greater progress in re-integrating students back into communities (Biziouras & Birger, 2013). Given the inconclusive nature of religious schools’ impact on peacebuilding, their appropriateness in post-conflict and crisis settings needs to be carefully considered, particularly in instances where religious or ethnic identity may have contributed to the conflict.

There are only a few studies that present evidence that ANSS are exclusive and increase tensions between different groups, and these studies are largely limited to madrasas. Thachil (2009) noted that schools in India run by a Hindu nationalist organization are “deeply politicized.” These schools may help mobilize Hindus for attacks on Muslims, as games in schools were observed to teach students how to riot. Drawing on evidence from almost 800 interviews in Pakistan, Nelson (2009) found that students who attended madrasas full-time were less likely to support concepts of diversity and inclusion.
FINANCE AND SUSTAINABILITY

In this section, we explore themes of affordability, resource constraints, and sustainability of ANSS in contexts of conflict and crisis.

Finance
ANSS face chronic financial constraints due to their dependence on school fees and lack of diverse revenue streams (Aga Khan Foundation, 2007; Tooley, 2009; Heyneman et al., 2011; JBS International, 2013). A needs assessment of APS in Ghana showed that tuition and meal fees accounted for 85 percent of total annual revenue and that most of the revenue was spent on teacher wages, rent, utilities, and school feeding (R4D, 2016). Only 13 percent of the surveyed schools in the same study reported having adequate resources to pay for school improvements. Tulloch, Kramer, and Overbey (2014) report that school fees alone are insufficient to enable APS to reinvest in school quality improvements and grow. The dependence on tuition from low-income families inevitably places non-state schools in additional financial instability (Heyneman & Stern, 2014). Proprietors are equally reluctant to increase fees, fearing that doing so would deter access. Because their revenue base is not diversified and because they lack access to loans, APS proprietors are faced with a difficult choice: increase fees and potentially lose students or forestall much-need school improvement projects. Heyneman & Stern (2014) note that financial stability among APS in Kenya is a result of the business acumen of school proprietors and their ability to attract a sufficient number of students.

For non-state schools, conflict and crises exacerbate the already precarious dependence on school fees as the primary source of revenue. Humanitarian crises may create or exacerbate resource constraints, which make it difficult for parents to afford costs associated with attending school, such as school fees, uniforms, textbooks, and school supplies (Burde et al., 2013). When non-state schools are forced to charge fees in contexts of conflict and crisis, vulnerable populations are the first to be unable to pay for education services. An observational study of the organic emergence of community schools in Somalia found that reliance on private community resourcing for schools was simply not possible for many of the most marginalized communities (Abdinoor, 2008; Burde et al., 2015). The loss of students and school fees can also be accompanied by a loss or devaluation of school assets. Damage to infrastructure via natural disaster or attack can further deteriorate already poor infrastructure or assets (ILM Ideas, 2014). Apart from school fees, access to formal and informal sources of financing is also likely to be restricted during crises, which could have a disastrous impact on the survival of non-state schools (ILM Ideas, 2014). NGO-run schools in Yemen that rely on donor funding can only operate if external financing continues (Berry, 2010).

Sustainability
The sustainability of non-state schools was comprehensively explored by Barakat, Hardman, Rohwerder, & Rzeszut (2014). Despite limitations in data, the authors discerned that the main factor affecting sustainability in stable contexts was the ability of schools to maintain enrollment and charge affordable school fees. In contexts of conflict and crisis, a number of other factors affect sustainability, including flexibility in response to changing environments, concerted community engagement, and appropriate level of support from donors or the government.

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6 We use the term APS because the referenced study focused only on low-fee private schools.
The inability to maintain enrollment has a direct impact on the financial sustainability of APS. Barakat et al. (2014) noted that APS in Afghanistan and Pakistan could not maintain enrollment in the long term because parents could not afford to pay fees. This is more common in rural areas where impoverished parents have less capacity to pay fees and are more reluctant to send their children to school. Rural schools are in general less sustainable in the long term than urban schools (Alderman et al., 2003; Zeitlyn & Härmä, 2011). In rural areas, where the population is smaller and where there are fewer school-aged children, less income is obtained through school fees. It is also more difficult to recruit teachers who are willing to work in remote rural areas. Without a sufficiently large population within their catchment areas, private schools are less able to achieve financial sustainability. For example, Pakistani villages with both private and government schools were on average three times as large as villages with only government schools. (Day Ashley et al., 2014).

Community support is a crucial factor for the sustainability of ANSS (Aga Khan Foundation, 2007; Samoff, Dembélé, & Sebatane, 2011; JBS International, 2013). Community participation, particularly by active women’s groups, bolstered the chance for successful implementation and scale-up of APS in Afghanistan and Pakistan (Barakat et al., 2014). A 2007 report by the Aga Khan Foundation identified strong community engagement as a reason for the continued success of the Aga Khan Education service (AKES) in Pakistan.

Religious schools also face sustainability issues: they often serve marginalized communities who are not themselves able to shoulder the costs associated with teacher salaries and materials. Thus, religious schools are largely dependent on external funding, which can be volatile, particularly within post-conflict settings. Citing perpetual conflict in the DRC, Bender (2010) noted that external donors were often hesitant to commit to long-term engagement when there was a high potential for renewed violent conflict.

For APS that do not have financial or in-kind support from communities, the inability to receive loans and secure land ownership impede progress and financial sustainability (Aga Khan Foundation, 2007; Tooley, 2009; Heyneman et al., 2011; JBS International, 2013). Local banks are hesitant to provide loans to APS because they are viewed as risky clients with little or no capital or collateral (Heyneman et al., 2011; R4D, 2016). Even when eligible, some APS do not apply for loans because of the relatively high interest rates local banks charge (JBS International, 2013).

The literature on the operational longevity of APS is mixed. APS have been seen to have difficulty maintaining solvency in India, where Härmä and Rose (2012) observed that as many as a quarter of APS closed within the 18 months of their study. In contrast, Dixon et al.’s (2013) surveys in Hyderabad, Delhi and Mahbubnagar showed that recognized private schools had been established for an average of 17 years. Similarly, a study in Ghana found that sampled APS had been operating for 14 years on average (R4D, 2016). The same study points to several reasons behind longevity, such as the ability to keep expenses low, primarily through low teacher wages, but most importantly through the application of flexible payment schedules that cater to the financial constraints of households. For example, flexibility in payment schedules, sliding fee scales based on household income levels, and discounts for parents with multiple children enrolled in the same school create environments where total school fees can become more affordable to parents.
For schools that operate in acute crisis or active armed conflict, it is important that they are flexible and able to adapt to changing environments. UNICEF (2009) highlighted the importance for schools to transition from a humanitarian to development approach as contexts shift from acute to post-conflict situations. According to UNICEF (2009), the design and implementation of non-state education programs must identify key transition points to ensure programs are prepared to adapt to changing contexts. Barakat et al.’s (2014) analysis of 19 studies that examined the scale up of APS in conflict-affected countries suggests that successful schools took into account the possibility of changing political contexts (Pick, Givaudan, Fons, Van De Vijver, & Poortinga, 2008; Samoff et al., 2011). Failure to address the local political context and the political dimensions of education leads to the higher likelihood of poor scale-up (Akyeampong, 2009; Alderman et al., 2003; Pick et al., 2008; Samoff et al., 2011).

**Affordability**

There is considerable breadth in how affordability is defined in literature. McLoughlin (2013) puts forward a simple, contextual interpretation—fees are affordable if a family can pay for education without needing to cut spending in other vital areas. Other scholars have offered specific thresholds for affordability. Barakat, Hardman, Rohwerder, & Rzeszut (2012) consider schooling affordable if all school fees for one child are below 4 percent of a family’s income, whereas Tooley (2013) argues that the total of education expenses for all children is affordable if it accounts for less than 10 percent of a family’s income. Regardless of the threshold used, there is consensus that affordability depends on the individual household’s situation, including income level and the number of school-aged children (Psacharopoulos, Arieira, & Mattson, 1997). Fees that are affordable for one family will not necessarily be affordable for another.

It is important to note that the cost of education diverges considerably between various types of non-state schools. Prices at APS that are registered with the government are much higher than at those that are not registered (Heyneman et al., 2011; Day Ashley et al., 2014). A comparison of household education costs by school type in a small sample of four sub-Saharan countries illustrates that education costs are highest in private for-profit schools, followed by private religious schools and public schools (Lincove, 2007).

Even when public schooling is nominally fee-free, supplemental household expenses such as meals, uniforms, and books pose a barrier to affordable access. However, total school expenses at APS almost universally exceed those at government schools (Day Ashley et al., 2014). One study in Ghana found that the total household costs at private schools were roughly three times those charged by government schools (Akaguri, 2013). Even when children attend APS, they frequently miss class or are suspended because variable resource flows lead to an inability of their households to pay school fees. (R4D, 2016; Akaguri, 2013). While fee levels differ from country to country, the poorest members of every community are generally unable to afford even the cheapest APS (Heyneman & Stern, 2014; Härmä, 2011c).

The actual fee levels of APS differ significantly between and within countries. In Lagos State in Nigeria, total yearly fees were equivalent to 11 to 44 percent of the annual minimum wage (Härmä, 2011a). In Malawi, where roughly 65 percent of the population lives below the poverty line, it would require 30 percent of the yearly minimum wage to send one child to the lowest-cost private secondary school (Chimombo, 2009). In Haiti, where roughly 80 percent of children attend private schools, the fees for one child are equivalent to 15 to 25 percent of the average per capita income for the poorest 20
percent of households (World Bank, 2006). In Ghana, estimates differ considerably. One study found that the lowest-income quintile would have to spend 30 percent of its annual income to send one child to an APS (Akaguri, 2013), whereas another study found that the fees from an unregistered APS were equivalent to 12 percent of the minimum wage, compared to 16 percent for a government school (including the cost of meals, uniforms, and other supplemental costs) and 20 percent for a registered private school (Heyneman et al., 2011). In rural Uttar Pradesh in India, school fees are equivalent to 16 percent of the annual income of households in the lowest income quintile. While only 10 percent of the lowest-income quintile in this study attended APS, 70 percent of the highest-income quintile did so, indicating that income plays a large role in determining enrollment at the household level (Härmä, 2015).

Schools operating with a social mission, including religious, NGO, and foundation schools, frequently have access to in-kind contributions that lead to lower operating costs than state schools (Wales et al., 2015). DeStefano and Schuh-Moore (2010) provide the most comprehensive analysis of cost-effectiveness. They concluded that across Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Ghana, and Zambia, faith-based and community school are more cost-effective than state schools, citing working with volunteers or avoiding hiring teachers with higher salaries as reasons for their lower operating costs. However, while community schools may present cost savings for the government, they are not likely to be any more affordable for households. While the operational costs of community schools are lower than those of government schools, household costs are generally higher (DeStefano & Schuh-Moore, 2010).

ACCOUNTABILITY

In this section we examine government policy, school compliance with regulation, cooperation between state and non-state actors, and school responsiveness to households. We also investigate the relationships between parents and schools and schools and governments.

Relationships with Parents

It is assumed that fee-charging ANSS are more responsive to complaints and parental expectations than state schools in order to maintain enrollment and payment of fees (Wales et al., 2015). Although there is evidence to support this hypothesis, it is important to note that the evidence base is small and often anecdotal. Schirmer, Johnston, and Bernstein (2010) found that parents in South Africa felt charging fees made private schools more accountable to parents. Fennell and Malik (2013) compared state and non-state schools in Pakistan and found that the likelihood of complaining increased for boys over girls. There is also some evidence from India that parent-teacher associations were more vocal in private schools than in state schools (Johnson and Bowles, 2010), although this could be attributable to selection bias as fee-paying parents may be wealthier or better educated and thus more likely to complain or have higher expectations than public school parents.

Among NGO and community schools, evidence suggests that parents actively participate in or influence the decision-making process. BRAC schools in Bangladesh use school management committees and parents’ forums (which perform school maintenance and ensure regular school attendance) to build parental involvement (Epstein & Yuthas, 2012). DeStefano and Schuh Moore’s (2010) study of 10 complementary education programs found that ANSS allowed for what they termed greater “political accountability”—the ability of community members to influence education leaders in the formulation of policies and practices to improve educational outcomes (Wales et al. 2015). A study from rural Bangladesh on NGO-run schools delivering non-formal primary education found that Community
Management Centers led to enhanced accountability and strong community participation in school management (Dang et al., 2011).

Relationship with the Government

Along with being accountable to student caregivers, ANSS are accountable to the state. In some cases, however, governments may not be willing to engage with ANSS due to context-specific factors, such as the history of their relationship, mistrust of ANSS motivations, or ideological reasons (Wales et al., 2015). In conflict literature, the restoration of the education sector is a vital component of building state legitimacy, and the management of the education systems by non-state actors may be perceived by the government as a threat to that legitimacy (Novelli, 2016). Governments that strongly oppose ANSS can use intimidation tactics to prevent the establishment or sustainability of non-state schools (Heyneman and Stern, 2014). Intimidation and force directed against ANSS may also be elevated in conflict and crisis scenarios and in situations where ANSS and government schools compete for enrollment, teachers, and funding (Save the Children, 2002; Aga Khan Foundation, 2007; Philippson et al., 2008). However, non-state schools are more likely to be tolerated when they receive external funding and are not seen as a competitor to the government (Wales et al., 2015). In Pakistan and Ethiopia, the government is seen as willing to recognize non-state schools only if it is clear the schools rely entirely on external funding and are backed by international donors (Rose, 2008).

When governments acknowledge and engage with ANSS, government policies and regulation for non-state schools can be intentionally or unintentionally cumbersome and complex. Non-state school registration processes, for example, are often not explicitly articulated and communicated, leaving proprietors in a position of not knowing what documentation is required (Fielden & LaRoque, 2008). Other regulations for APS include requirements that schools own their own land, hold a specific amount of financial reserves, and meet quality specifications for infrastructure and equipment (Fielden & LaRoque, 2008). As a result, newly established private schools may avoid registration with ministries of education, as has been seen in Kenya (Heyneman & Stern, 2014). Relatedly, JBS International (2013) reported the establishment of shadow APS networks that operated outside the regulatory framework. Unrealistically stringent regulation may also offer unintended opportunities for rent-seeking and bribery as non-state schools seek to bypass recognition requirements (Fielden & LaRoque, 2008; JBS International, 2013; Day Ashely et al., 2014). In crisis or conflict environments, where the government does not have the capacity to establish and enforce policies, non-state schools may exist in a laissez-faire state, with little or no restriction on their activities (JBS International, 2013).

Creating an Enabling Environment

Clear, transparent policies that articulate the “rules of the game” for registration and operation of non-state schools are crucial for creating an enabling environment (Steer, Gillard, Gustafsson-Wright, & Latham, 2015). These policies and frameworks must be prioritized and developed through dialogue between state and non-state providers (Rose, 2007). The starting premise to such dialogue must be an agreement from both sides that non-state schools have a complementary role to public education (Rose, 2007; LaRocque, 2011; Heyneman & Stern, 2014).

Regulations are important mechanisms to ensure that the most marginalized have access to a specified level of quality education (JBS International, 2013; Steer et al., 2015). However, governmental capacity constraints can result in inconsistent or ineffective application of regulations. It is particularly difficult for governments in crisis and conflict-affected countries to set up and enforce guidelines and standards
There is a danger that overly stringent or inconsistently-applied regulations may lead private schools to adopt informal mechanisms—bribes—for achieving recognition and avoiding regulation (Day Ashley et al., 2015).

Heyneman and Stern (2014) and Steer et al. (2015) proposed principles for improving the efficacy of regulation. Clumsy and ineffective policies can be avoided by tailoring regulations by school provider type. First, as part of registration policy, non-state schools should be listed under one ministry and organized into categories for schools operated by (1) private proprietors, (2) NGOs, and (3) churches and mosques to allow for more specific partnership contracts and service policies (Heyneman & Stern, 2014). Second, policies should be clearly categorized as entry rules, input (operating) rules, and potential service policies (Steer et al., 2015). The specific kinds of policies under each category are presented below.

**TABLE 1. TYPES OF NON-STATE SCHOOL POLICIES**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ENTRY RULES</th>
<th>INPUT RULES</th>
<th>SERVICE POLICIES</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Accreditation</td>
<td>Teacher qualifications</td>
<td>Transportation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Registration</td>
<td>Curriculum requirements</td>
<td>Textbooks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Licensing</td>
<td>Reporting requirements</td>
<td>Public examinations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Approval to operate</td>
<td>Fees and taxes</td>
<td>Nursing and health</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Technology</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Professional development</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Steer et al. (2015)

**Relationship with Donors**

There is moderate evidence from Barakat et al.’s literature review of APS in Afghanistan and Pakistan that adequate support from government and external actors was an important factor in the successful scale up of APS. Based on Barakat et al.’s (2014) analysis of 19 studies, government and external support came in the form of infrastructure, statutory and regulatory mechanisms, political support, or financial backing (Akyeampong, 2009; Barrera-Osorio & Raju, 2010; Jowett & Dyer, 2012; Samoff et al., 2011).

Us-Sabur and Ahmed (2010) describe that non-state education providers in Bangladesh have become skilled at mobilizing resources, including contributions from communities and external donors. For donors, Sommers (2004) explains that UN agencies often support NGO schools to provide education in crisis and conflict because they can rapidly mobilize and manage resources.

Despite the potential support that international actors may provide, Novelli (2016) warns of the dangers of relying on international support in conflict and crisis contexts. While international funding may be attracted to high-profile areas suffering from crises, this funding is frequently unstable, as it can be withdrawn and redirected to the next high-priority target (Novelli, 2016). Private-sector investment presents a threat of raising expectations and forming new partnerships, only to disappear when positive results are not immediately forthcoming. This can leave states and ANSS without the necessary resources to reconstruct or comply with plans and promises (Novelli, 2016).
Engaging in Public-Private Partnerships

Government engagement with non-state schools may range from a complete prohibition on non-state providers to highly complex public-private partnerships (PPPs) (Verger, 2012; Patrinos, Barrera-Osorio, & Gauqueta, 2009). In crisis and conflict-affected contexts, simple PPPs are generally adopted for pragmatic reasons, such as the urgent need to fill gaps in provision (Verger & Moschetti, 2016). In contexts of active conflict, Verger and Moschetti (2016) recommend that governments partner with community or NGO schools because they can respond faster to humanitarian and pro-poor considerations—assuming a capable government exists to begin with. In this section, we present literature describing various modalities for government engagement with private education providers, with the caveat that evidence on these approaches in the context of conflict and crisis settings is limited.

Contractual Engagement

The evidence on contracting out education provision is mixed, with very little rigorous evidence from developing countries, let alone in contexts of crisis and conflict. Most of the evidence comes from the United States and shows that charter schools improve learning outcomes when held accountable by a strong regulatory body (Cremata et al. 2013; Woodworth et al. 2017). Whether contracting out education can improve education outcomes in crisis and conflict-affected states has yet to be seen.

Liberia’s decision to outsource education, however, provides an interesting case study. Faced with alarming education statistics, the Liberian government created a PPP with non-state education providers named Partnership Schools for Liberia (PSL). Initially intended to outsource all of Liberia’s pre-primary and primary schools to private actors, the agreement was met with significant criticism and downgraded to a three-year pilot, in which 95 public schools are being managed by eight service providers (including BIA) and will be compared with 93 government-run schools, which will serve as a control group. Early analysis of the PSL program’s first-year data show that students in PSL schools scored 0.18 standard deviations higher in English and mathematics compared to students in the control group (Box 5; Romero, Sandefur, & Sandholtz, 2017).

Contracting arrangements to non-state schools in contexts of conflict and crisis may be threatened by the unreliability of government payment commitments and the potential withdrawal of either side from the contract. Despite these risks, such contracting arrangements are likely to be most needed in crisis and conflict-affected contexts because of the lack of government provision (Wales et al., 2015).

Subsidies and Vouchers

Ministries of education may elect to offer subsidies to schools, which may encourage growth in the non-state sector. In Pakistan, public support for private education, in the form of tax exemptions or land subsidies, have been in place since the early 2000s (Novelli, 2016). As a result of these subsidies, the number of private schools increased by 69 percent between 2000 and 2009, and as of 2014, nearly one third of primary and secondary students in Pakistan were attending non-state schools (Aziz et al., 2014; Nguyen & Raju, 2015). Overall, Wales et al. (2015) conclude that state subsidies to ANSS can improve sustainability and some aspects of equity and quality but that it is highly dependent on context.

7 In 2014, net primary enrollment was 38 percent (World Bank Development Indicators website) and only 25 percent of women who completed primary school were able to read a complete sentence (Liberia Institute of Statistics and Geo-Information Services, 2014.)
However, evidence on the effectiveness of vouchers is minimal. A study of Colombia’s voucher program showed a positive impact on educational attainment and academic achievement (Angrist, Bettinger, Bloom, King, & Kremer, 2002). In particular, targeted vouchers to the poor have shown to increase school attendance rates among vulnerable groups. In Chile, targeted school vouchers that provided more money to schools that enrolled low-income students were shown to raise the attendance rates of marginalized groups, as opposed to universal vouchers, which had the disastrous effect of exacerbating social stratification (Baum, 2016).

**Box 5. Partnership schools in Liberia**

Liberia’s recent PPP with BIA and other affordable private school chains shows that governments weakened by crisis and conflict are increasingly turning to non-state providers to fill major institutional gaps in their education system in post-crisis contexts. However, a government system that is too weak to provide education services is also unlikely to have the capacity to monitor APS chains and ensure quality. As Batley and McLoughlin (2010) noted, even a relatively strong state can face capacity constraints in regulating non-state service provision. It is critical that the precise role of the government as the regulator of non-state APS should be carefully delineated in the planning process. As the BIA fall-out with the Ugandan and Kenyan governments illustrates, a lack of early stage monitoring and regulation can lead to systemwide disruptions once APS schools have reached scale.

Though investments in APS chains might be considered in cases where education services need to be quickly re-established post-crisis or post-conflict, the BIA model offers mixed signals about their potential impact. As Novelli and Smith (2011) caution, in fragile settings, public education provision can be a crucial input to reestablishing state legitimacy and a return to normalcy. While investments in APS chains may lead to short-term gains, they can also undermine the state, hindering its ability to create strong institutions in the long-term. In addition, significant international donor investments in these school chains can be problematic: not only do they divert funds from the public sector, but they can eventually lead to tension with the government, which may be wary of external influences within their borders. Lastly, the strict focus of many APS on literacy and numeracy outcomes can overshadow efforts to address social cohesion and citizenship development, which are crucial in post-conflict settings (Novelli 2016).

Aside from vouchers, one quasi-experimental study from a crisis-affected setting found positive effects from the use of unconditional cash transfers. The study by Lehmann and Materson (2014) found that cash assistance to Syrian refugees in Lebanon increased access to school and reduced child labor. Unconditional cash assistance given to Syrian refugee families to encourage school enrollment was associated with a positive difference of six percentage points in school enrollment compared with families that did not receive the assistance.

Conditional and targeted subsidies have shown promise in improving input quality and potentially raising learning outcomes in certain contexts. However, evidence is lacking regarding the potential for subsidies to improve the sustainability of ANSS (Day Ashley et al., 2014).
Increasingly, community-based schemes are being absorbed into the government system following their contributions in post-conflict settings, including community-based schools in Afghanistan, Mali, and throughout Central America (Burde et al., 2015). Examples include multi-grade rural schools in India, which were later implemented by state governments with great success (Blum, 2009), and home-based community schooling in Afghanistan, originally supported by Save the Children, BRAC, and USAID, which has since been adopted by the Ministry of Education (Kirk & Winthrop, 2009). However, challenges related to the financing of these schools arose: both the government and communities themselves were unable to cover the costs required to transition one-teacher community schools into full-fledged primary schools. Similar constraints have been observed in other community school models, such as Schools for Life in Ghana, ACCESS centers in Ethiopia and Tanzania, and Togo’s village schools (Miller-Grandvaux, 2004).

Ideally, government knowledge, capacity, and legitimacy are crucial for the state to effectively support non-state schools in crisis and conflict-affected countries, yet in reality regulatory frameworks are poorly developed, ineffective, or selectively enforced—often due a lack of sectoral knowledge and government capacity (Day Ashley et al., 2014).

In conflict contexts, the role of the state is often contentious. Indeed, in settings of weak governance, the balance of power can swing heavily to non-state actors. Bano (2012) analyzed the legitimacy of the Pakistani state, in relation to elite madrasas, arguing that these schools and associated religious authorities have strong bargaining power relative to the state. A reliance on the non-state sector without investments in the public system can lead to stunted government services or create parallel systems (JBS International, 2013). Weakness in the public provision brought on by conflict and crisis may also make the government particularly vulnerable to external pressure and influence, which can lead to questions about its legitimacy (Novelli, 2016). This dynamic may limit the ability of the state to credibly impose policy frameworks.

Challenges of fragmentation and coordination are also prominent in crisis and conflict-affected contexts (Wales et al., 2015). Branelly, Ndaruhatse, & Rigaud’s (2009) case study of Liberia showed that states may lack the information and capacity to coordinate among the various interests and priorities of national and international stakeholders involved in non-state education provision. In South Sudan, Echessa et al. (2009) also showed low government capacity to effectively implement policies and coordinate among NGOs, international organizations, and non-state schools.

Finally, Wales et al. (2015) emphasize the importance of local governance structures when the central government has little or no presence at the local level. Conflict-sensitive governance of education systems requires careful judgement about the balance between central control and devolution of authority (Haider, 2014). In some instances, decentralization and federal systems of government could leave education open to manipulation by local politics, which could result in ethnic or religious fragmentation (Davies, 2011; UNICEF, 2011; Haider, 2014). In Bosnia and Herzegovina, for example, a minimal federal state presence resulted in three separate curricula for the three ethnic groups that differ for subjects such as history, culture, and language, sometimes in ways that reinforce prejudice (UNICEF, 2011).
SUMMARY

Literature on the topic of ANSS is robust, as is literature on education in conflict, but their intersection has not been examined in depth. This review indicates that there are a variety of non-state education providers, including community, NGO, religious, and private schools, each with its own unique approach to overcoming the effects of crisis and conflict. In general, these approaches can be categorized within three buckets: lowering costs, localizing, and flexibility. These comparative advantages allow ANSS to overcome challenges such as school and household resource shortages, attacks on schools, displacement, and safety in schools as well as in transit to schools. The literature also highlights that education can play not only a role in improving education outcomes, such as access, inclusion, and holistic well-being in contexts of crisis and conflict, but it can also lead to harmful outcomes such as radicalization and exclusionary enrollment. These findings, along with findings from the El Salvador and Kaduna State case studies, are used to present a conceptual framework for understanding the role of non-state schools in contexts of crisis and conflict.
IV. CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK

In this section, we describe a conceptual framework that provides a theoretical basis for understanding the contributions of affordable non-state schools (ANSS) to education at the primary and secondary levels in contexts of conflict and crisis. This conceptual framework is used to guide the organization of the country case studies and cross-cutting findings.

The conceptual framework depicts the relationships between a number of concepts that underpin an understanding of ANSS in contexts of conflict and crisis. While the conceptual framework draws heavily on existing literature and theory from both topics, it is ultimately a product informed by findings from this research, particularly from the case study experiences.

The framework can also serve as a tool that can be adapted by the user. As additional research is conducted, the framework can be updated to reflect advances in the understanding of the relationship between conflict-affected settings, ANSS, and education outcomes. Moreover, the pathways by which ANSS contribute to education outcomes will be different for each country or setting to which the framework is applied, and additional factors may come to light as ANSS are studied in other contexts.

In this section, we describe the various components of the framework and how they may be used by governments and donors to identify ways to engage with non-state schools.

FIGURE 1: CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK
FRAMEWORK COMPONENTS

The following seven steps outline the process for exploring ANSS contributions to education at the primary and lower secondary levels in crisis and conflict-affected environments.

STEP 1. UNDERSTAND THE CONTEXT IN WHICH AFFORDABLE NON-STATE SCHOOLS EXIST.

Key questions: What is the nature of crisis and conflict? What affordable non-state school modalities are present? What is the status of the state education system?

Conflict and Crisis

Context shapes not only the types of ANSS that develop but also the environment within which ANSS operate. Those interested in exploring the role of ANSS in conflict and crisis must develop a clear understanding of the following:

- The nature of the relevant conflict, including the history, root causes, actors, and drivers of conflict
- Whether the conflict or crisis is acute or protracted
- Whether the country is experiencing an ongoing conflict or crisis or is post-conflict

The relationship between conflict and education is cyclical, as education has the potential to exacerbate or mitigate conflict dynamics, which in turn positively or negatively impact education outcomes and goals. There are various conflict analysis frameworks that users can adopt. Examples include the Guide to Conflict Sensitivity by the Conflict Sensitive Consortium (2012), the World Bank’s Conflict Analysis Framework (Shardesai & Per, 2002), USAID’s Conflict Assessment Framework (2012), and Conducting Conflict Assessments: Guidance Notes by DFID (2002).

Status of the State Education System

The process of exploring the role of ANSS in conflict and crisis must necessarily consider the state education system and the status of state schools. The quality, availability, cost, and safety of government schools have a direct relationship with the market demand for and comparative advantages of non-state education. The extent and nature of government education coverage will impact the potential for non-state school growth. An understanding of the state education system is also vital for determining to what degree investments should be directed toward non-state schools, or whether donor and government investment should be exclusively directed toward strengthening the state education system. Important indicators to assess include state school coverage, enrollment, repetition, and retention rates. Themes such as cost and financing, quality of outcomes, and safety should be compared between state and non-state schools.

Modalities and Extent of Affordable Non-state Schools

Knowledge of the context of a conflict informs an understanding of the types of ANSS that exist. There are a considerable number of affordable non-state school models, each with distinct ownership, management, financial structures, and levels of state involvement. For this reason, it is important to begin any analysis of ANSS by defining terms and mapping the various affordable non-state school
modalities. We conceptualize ANSS as varying along a number of axes rather than fitting into a mutually exclusive, collectively exhaustive typology.

First, ANSS can be owned and managed by non-state actors such as faith-based organizations, foundations, NGOs, communities, individual proprietors, private school chains, or the state. The actor that owns the school is not necessarily the actor that manages it. For example, the state may contract out the management of schools to a private actor.

Second, ANSS have various funding streams. Funding may be provided internally by the school owner, as may be seen in a foundation or NGO school. Schools may be funded partially or entirely by household fees or the state. State funding can occur through a variety of modalities, including direct subsidization via capitation grants, payment of teacher salaries, provision of teaching and learning materials, and provision of student vouchers. Schools may receive funding from two or more sources.

Third, ANSS are established and operated for different purposes. A school’s mission may have a profound effect on the curricula, financial models, community and government relations, and populations served. Schools may operate on either a for-profit or a not-for-profit basis. In particular, not-for-profit schools may be, for example, religious, humanitarian, or community schools.

Fourth, the distinction between state and ANSS is not absolute. Rather, ANSS are better characterized as existing along a continuum of state involvement (Figure 2). The state’s role can range from very minor, where its primary activity is regulation, to highly engaged, where the state contracts out management of some schools to private actors.

**FIGURE 2: THE PPP CONTINUUM**

![Continuum diagram](image)

100% Public management

100% Private management

Source: Patrinos et al., 2009

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8 In this study, we define affordable non-state schools as education institutions, both formal and non-formal, that are non-elite and generally targeted toward lower-income or marginalized populations. They are also owned or operated by non-state entities such as private citizens, faith-based organizations, or NGOs.
STEP 2. IDENTIFY THE CONFLICT BARRIERS TO EDUCATION.

**Key question:** What barriers to education do conflict and crisis impose?

There is a large body of literature that identifies ways in which conflict affects the provision of education, ranging from limiting state capacity to fund and deliver education to creating household-level concerns for the safety of students within and in transit to schools. Several of the most significant barriers to education are displayed as examples in the conceptual framework. Some of these barriers are unique to situations of conflict and crisis (e.g., attacks on schools and displacement of populations). Others are factors that sometimes or frequently exist in developing-country contexts but are severely exacerbated by conflict, such as government and household resource shortages, safety in transit to school, and exclusion of certain vulnerable groups.

STEP 3. UNDERSTAND AND CATEGORIZE THE UNIQUE APPROACHES AFFORDABLE NON-STATE SCHOOLS USE TO OVERCOME CONFLICT BARRIERS TO EDUCATION.

**Key question:** What approaches do affordable non-state schools use to overcome the effects of conflict and crisis?

The literature review identified characteristics specific to ANSS that allow them to overcome some of the barriers to education imposed by conflict. These approaches are captured in the conceptual framework and fall into three broad categories:

1. **ANSS may lower the costs of education delivery,** which could lead to expanded access in resource-scarce environments.

2. **ANSS may develop closer connections to communities than government schools,** which may lead to greater responsiveness to need and protection from violence.

3. **The flexibility and adaptability of ANSS provision may be more resilient to conflict and crises and better positioned to reach vulnerable or displaced groups.**

All of these approaches are not necessarily used by all ANSS. Instead, they represent a set of unique, potential approaches ANSS may employ to overcome conflict and crisis barriers to education. The framework can be applied by examining which of the conflict barriers are present and which can be overcome (and to what degree) by employing affordable non-state school approaches. Additionally, some of these approaches may be present in government schools, meaning that an understanding of the state education system is a prerequisite for understanding the degree to which these non-state approaches can complement government schools.
STEP 4. RECOGNIZE THE VARIOUS PATHWAYS IN WHICH AFFORDABLE NON-STATE SCHOOLS CAN INFLUENCE OUTCOMES.

**Key questions:** What are the beneficial and harmful effects of affordable non-state schools?

It is critical to understand the non-neutrality of education and its ability to contribute to violent conflict or peace. The literature review and case studies illustrated ways in which ANSS can either positively or negatively affect education outcomes. In the conceptual framework (Figure 1), this is represented by the two gray arrows, which illustrate the two pathways through which ANSS can affect education and social cohesion outcomes. These two pathways are described below.

The **beneficial** characteristics are comparative advantages that ANSS have over government schools in overcoming conflict barriers to education. These advantages are realized through demonstrating greater resiliency to conflict and crisis via the affordable non-state school approaches (step 3). This segment refers to characteristics that are uniquely relevant to overcoming conflict barriers. These characteristics may also be present in peaceful settings, but in settings of insecurity, they interact with the causes or consequences of conflict. Affordable non-state school resiliency and comparative advantages can positively influence education outcomes and social cohesion. Schools serve not only as a means of socialization, identity development, and transmitter of values, but also as a focal point for the delivery of basic services such as food and shelter. ANSS should maintain these roles even as other institutions weaken or break down in order to promote healthy child development and provide a point of security amid uncertainty.

The **harmful** characteristics are those that have a detrimental effect on educational outcomes and social cohesion. Unregulated schools may provide low-quality education and learning experiences or employ exclusive enrollment practices that reinforce inequity, identify grievances, and xenophobia. As with the beneficial characteristics, literature identifies negative effects of ANSS in peaceful settings, and areas in which ANSS are generally inferior to government schools. However, this framework only considers those that have a relationship with conflict and crisis.

The two potential pathways help evaluate the merits and costs of ANSS. These benefits and costs are often concurrent. Taken together, they can help indicate the potential positive and negative consequences of growth in the ANSS sector. It is important to note that these advantages and harms are not unique to ANSS; they may also apply to state schools. For example, secular state schools may provide an environment free from religious, ethnic, or tribal segregation, which could build social cohesion better than non-state schools. Alternatively, state schools may incorporate inflammatory rhetoric into curricula, which could foster radicalization or lead to the social exclusion of minority or immigrant groups.
STEP 5. IDENTIFY THE ENABLING OR INHIBITING FACTORS THAT AFFECT AFFORDABLE NON-STATE SCHOOL OUTCOMES.

**Key question:** How do environmental and institutional factors enable or inhibit the growth of affordable non-state schools?

A number of environmental or political-economy factors might limit or enhance the scope or impact of the affordable non-state school sector. These factors influence the magnitude by which ANSS can positively or negatively impact education outcomes and social cohesion. It is important to note that these inhibiting factors can also function as facilitators for positive change and vice-versa. For example, a strong regulatory environment may deter new ANSS from entering the market or prevent sector growth. At the same time, government policies can ensure ANSS maintain quality standards and hold schools accountable.

STEP 6. MEASURE THE CONTRIBUTIONS OF AFFORDABLE NON-STATE SCHOOLS TO EDUCATION OUTCOMES.

**Key question:** How do affordable non-state schools positively or negatively impact education outcomes?

Ultimately, ANSS should be evaluated based on their contributions to education outcomes. These contributions can be grouped into four major categories: (1) access and equitable inclusion; (2) quality, safety, and holistic well-being; (3) accountability; and (4) finance and sustainability. These four themes are typically used in education sector analyses and often used to evaluate and compare public and private education. These outcomes are also components of the Learning Framework which was used in a previous USAID study on ANSS. Users may also identify what problem or specific education outcome ANSS seek to address when measuring affordable non-state school contributions. For example, gap filling non-state schools operating in emergency contexts may prioritize access, safety, and holistic well-being over sustainability.

**Access and Equitable Inclusion**
Access and Inclusion include factors such as enrollment, attendance, and completion rates, differentiated by income, gender, and location. This outcome is important because the degree of access to education can either exacerbate conflict between demographic groups or build toward peace and social cohesion.

**Quality, Safety, and Student Well-Being**
Quality refers both to education inputs and outputs. Education inputs that may contribute to quality include infrastructure, teaching and learning materials, and teacher training and attendance. Outputs that are related to quality include student achievement on standardized tests, progression and dropout, and workforce readiness. Holistic well-being incorporates socioemotional learning, psychosocial support for survivors of violence, the guarantee of safe learning environments, and safety in transit to and from school.
Finance and Sustainability
The domain of finance incorporates government, household, and school financing of education:

- Government financing includes funding that is mobilized through domestic sources (e.g., taxes).
- Household financing considers household affordability, utility-maximizing behaviors, and intra-household dynamics.
- School financing considers teacher salaries, school access to financing, financial flows, various sources of financing, partnerships with government, school fees, sustainability, and cost-effectiveness.

Sustainability refers to how schools are able to maintain or increase revenue over the long-run and considers the role of community, government, and international actors in supporting schools. Often, schools rely not only on financial resources but on the cooperation of parents and communities and a supportive policy environment.

Accountability
Accountability examines the following:

- Government transparency, regulation, monitoring, and enforcement in non-state schools
- School compliance with regulation
- Cooperation between state and non-state actors
- The assurance of the right to education
- School responsiveness to households

Accountability also investigates the relationships between parents and schools and schools and governments.

Note that these categories are not mutually exclusive, and imply considerable interaction—progress toward one outcome may adversely affect another outcome. For example, the need for schools to charge fees to ensure sustainability may prevent certain populations from schooling, thus deepening societal inequities.
STEP 7. ASSESS HOW AFFORDABLE NON-STATE SCHOOLS CONTRIBUTE TO EDUCATION GOALS IN CONFLICT AND CRISIS.

**Key question:** How do affordable non-state schools contribute to education goals in conflict and crisis?

The outcome themes described in step 6 fit within two long-term goal categories: student-level and system-level goals, as described below:

- **Student-level goal: All students access safe, high-quality education.** Education provision by ANSS should help ensure that all students have access to high-quality education. This education must take place in a school environment absent from significant dangers. Students must be able to access education regardless of income, geography, race, gender, or religion.

- **System-level goal: A stable and coherent education system.** Non-state schools do not exist in a vacuum; instead, they occupy a place within a national education ecosystem, with linkages to government schools, ministries of education, a national policy and political environment, teachers' unions, civil society organizations, communities, parents/caregivers, and students.

  Although non-state schools can play a gap-filling role in education, they should not create harmful parallel systems. Rather, their activities should be aligned with national education goals and policies. These schools should be integrated and aligned with the education sector, operating as part of a coherent system that contributes to stability and peacebuilding rather than social disruption.

**APPLICATION OF THE FRAMEWORK**

This framework has several possible applications:

- Donors, governments, and researchers can use it to conceptualize (1) the relationship between ANSS and conflict and (2) the potential for ANSS to strengthen education provision within individual countries or regions.

- It can be used as a basis for analyzing a particular modality of ANSS provision or for analyzing the ANSS sector as a whole in a given country.

- Donors and governments can use it to identify whether and how they could constructively interact with the sector (Figure 3).

Each of the framework components represents an important step in identifying affordable non-state school contributions—whether beneficial or harmful—to education provision and the long-term goals of system stability and coherence and education access, quality, and safety. Donors, researchers, and governments can also use the framework as the basis for initiating discussions regarding the activities in Table 2.
The framework can also help to suggest potential roles for government and donors in relation to the affordable non-state school sector. The literature review and case studies tentatively suggest that the primary role of government and donors is not to alter the approaches used by ANSS to overcome conflict barriers. These approaches exist largely absent external involvement.

Instead, the role of intervention should principally be to minimize the harms and to promote enabling policies (Figure 3) if the government determines that ANSS are beneficial to the education system. Harm minimization should be prioritized as governments have a responsibility to ensure that students and communities are not damaged through schooling, whether public or private.
Governments and donors should consider whether benefits of non-state schools outweigh their harms, as well as whether the benefits could outweigh the harms if the harms are mitigated through reasonable intervention. If they evaluate that the national education system could be strengthened by a more robust and sustainable non-state sector, governments should, with the help of donors, work to create a better enabling environment for non-state schools. In both minimizing harms and creating a more conducive environment for non-state school sustainability, governments can leverage regulation and PPPs, while donors can offer financing and technical assistance. NGOs can also provide financial and technical assistance or in-kind support to minimize harms or foster growth.
CASE STUDIES

Along with being based on findings from the literature review, the conceptual framework was developed iteratively with the study’s two country case studies. Case study selection was primarily based on interest on the part of USAID missions. Countries were also selected to ensure a diversity of geographies and conflict contexts, a strong presence of the non-state sector, and the safety of the research team. In particular, El Salvador was selected to gain a better understanding of the dynamics between gang violence and non-state education provision, while Kaduna State was selected to learn more about the relationship between Islamic education and armed conflict. Early versions of the framework guided the methodology and analysis of the case studies. In turn, the findings from the case studies helped guide and validate the conceptual framework. In the following sections, in-depth case studies of ANSS in El Salvador and Kaduna State are presented, which include study methodology; country background; sector mapping; findings; and recommendations for donors, governments, and other system actors.
V. EL SALVADOR

In spite of the significant size of the non-state sector—accounting for 21 percent of basic and secondary enrollment (MINED, 2017a)—no study to date has specifically examined Salvadorian non-state schools,\(^9\) much less the interaction between non-state education and violence. While the recent Rapid Education and Risk Analysis report (USAID/ECCN, 2016) has drawn attention to the intersection of violence and education in El Salvador, this subject has not been studied extensively by government, think tanks, academics, or donors.\(^10\) This case study examines the unique role of affordable non-state schools (ANSS) in a context of decentralized violence and insecurity.

METHODOLOGY

This case study’s methodology centered around two primary tasks. The first task was to map the non-state education sector, which involved identifying primary actors, including the various types of non-state education providers in the formal and non-formal sectors, as well as organizations such as donors, NGOs, and ANSS-support organizations that interact with non-state education providers. The second task was to study non-state school quality, financing, access, and accountability, as well as the relationship between non-state schools and gangs. To complete these primary tasks, data were collected through document reviews, school visits, and key informant interviews.

ANSS SELECTION

Schools in El Salvador’s formal education sector fall into three broad categories of ownership and administration, namely public, private, and Consejo Educativo Católico Escolar\(^11\) (CECE). Public schools are administered by School Leadership Councils (Consejos Directivos Escolares, or CDE),\(^12\) and they make up the vast majority of the formal educational offering, accounting for 79.2 percent of enrollment in 2016. Private schools are owned and operated by private actors, are funded primarily through school fees, function largely independently from the Ministry of Education (MINED), and enroll 15.7 percent of students. CECE schools, which enroll the remaining 5.1 percent of students, are a PPP between Catholic schools and MINED. These schools are owned and operated by Catholic congregations, parishes, or dioceses, but they receive some funding from MINED and charge fees. While MINED classifies CECE schools as public,\(^13\) they are privately owned and operated and are partially self-financed. For the purposes of this study, they are considered non-state.

\(^9\) The one notable exception is a series of studies on EDUCO, the community-led, publicly financed schools which are now defunct.
\(^10\) Studies on this subject are primarily limited to UNDP (2013), Savenije & Van der Borgh (2014), and Cuéllar-Marchelli & Góchez (2017).
\(^11\) Catholic Education School Council
\(^12\) A second modality of public school administration exists in prisons, juvenile detention centers, and public shelters. Only 28 Institutional Education Councils (Consejo Institucional Educativo, or CIE) existed in 2016. Because of their small number and for the sake of simplicity, these schools are aggregated into CDE totals, even though they are in fact administered differently.
\(^13\) Consequently, CECE schools are aggregated with CDE schools in many MINED statistics. To the extent possible, statistics for public schools have been disaggregated into CDE and CECE. Wherever this is not the case, it is noted.
Given the study’s time and resource constraints, it was not feasible to conduct a fully representative sample of violence-affected ANSS in El Salvador. Instead, purposive sampling was conducted in line with several guiding principles:

- **Schools should be affordable to low-income families.** Based on the assumption that a family can affordably spend 4 percent of its household income to educate one child without making significant sacrifices in other areas (Barakat et al., 2012), we find that a family at the poverty line (earning $380 per month) could reasonably afford a monthly fee of $15 per child. While schools were sampled to include a range of monthly fees to provide greater representativeness of the sector, the majority of sampled schools have monthly fees below or near the $15 per month threshold. Elite and high-fee schools were not included in the sample.

- **Schools should be located in violence-affected areas.** Schools were sampled from the 10 highest-priority municipalities under Plan El Salvador Seguro (PESS), which prioritizes government attention on municipalities with the highest rates of violence. PESS focuses its attention on 107 schools within these high-priority municipalities, including several non-state schools. Four schools were sampled from the list of PESS priority schools.

- **Schools should represent a range of the most important provider types.** Schools were sampled from provider types that are most widespread or have the greatest potential to positively impact the sector. Schools were also sampled from organizations with an explicit focus on serving low-income or marginalized populations.

In line with these principles, seven schools were selected from the 2016 School Census (MINED, 2017b). The process for narrowing down the selection of schools is presented in Figure 4. Table 3 provides a brief description of the seven selected schools.

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14 See Annex 1 for a complete methodology and discussion of this threshold.
15 PESS is an inter-sectoral plan, drawn up by the National Council for Citizen Security and Well-being, that focuses on dialogue and consensus to combat violence. Fifty prioritized municipalities were named to implement five central intervention strategies: violence prevention, crime control, rehabilitation, victim care and protection, and institutional strengthening. The 10 highest-priority municipalities under PESS include Colón, Santa Ana, Ciudad Delgado, Mejicanos, Soyapango, San Salvador, Sonsonate, Zacatecoluca, Cojutepeque, and Jiquilisco.
While the sampled LCR Juan Bueno school had higher fees, these fees are used in the cross-subsidization of other LCR Juan Bueno schools, which charge as little as $2 per month.
INTERVIEWS

Each school visit consisted of an interview with the school director, a focus group of two to six teachers, and a focus group of five to seven parents. School directors selected parent and teacher participants, meaning that selection was non-random and potentially not representative. A total of 64 individuals participated in interviews or focus groups held during school visits over the course of the study. During the school visits, general school conditions were also observed.

Individual or group interviews were held with individuals from a wide variety of organizations that work directly with non-state schools in particular or with the education sector in general. In total, 32 informants were included in the individual or group interviews. A description of informant groups is located in Annex 1.

LIMITATIONS

The following limitations should be taken into account when considering this study’s findings:

- The study’s scope primarily focused on basic education. Several sampled schools offered upper secondary levels, and some findings relevant to secondary schooling emerged as a result. Findings from this study may not be applicable to early childhood or tertiary education.

- The sample is heavily weighted toward medium- and larger-sized schools. Roughly half of all private schools have an enrollment with less than 150, but only one school with less than 150 students was included in the sample. Several such schools with appropriately low fees exist in the municipalities of interest, but they were unavailable or unsafe for visits at the time of the study.

- Selection of participants in teacher and parent focus groups was not random and likely not fully representative. Participants were chosen by school directors. In more than one case, the parents selected were also teachers or volunteers at the school, meaning that they likely had higher-than-average levels of commitment, participation, and approval of the school.

- Students were not interviewed as a part of school visits. The study focused on parent decisionmaking, school management, and the relationship between education ministries and the non-state education system. Student perspectives on gangs and violence were incorporated from the recent Rapid Education and Risk Analysis report (USAID/ECCN, 2016).

- Because of time and resource constraints, comparable public schools were not visited as part of the study. Therefore, any comparison between private and public schools is based on the perceptions of participants, views of experts, or existing data and literature. Furthermore, as parents who do not send their children to private schools were not included in the interview sample, the study does not include outside parental perceptions of private schools.

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17 The visit to school 4 consisted of a director interview and teacher focus group. The visit to school 7 only consisted of a director interview.
18 Encompassing grades one through nine. Grades one through six are considered primary, and grades seven through nine are considered lower secondary.
• No truly lay schools were sampled. Four of the seven sampled schools belong to religious associations. The remaining three were not affiliated with a church or faith-based organization, but they did include religious instruction or practices. The study was unable to identify what proportion of private schools—if any—does not incorporate religious instruction.

**CONTEXT**

El Salvador is a relatively small but densely populated country, with a population of 6.6 million within its territory of 8,123 square miles (DIGESTYC, 2017). Approximately 37.3 percent of the population lives in rural areas. The country’s population is very young, with 37 percent under 18 years of age and 22.6 percent between the ages of 10 and 19 (UNICEF, 2014).

Household poverty is measured based on the cost of a basket of basic goods (BBG). Households with total monthly incomes below the cost of the BBG are considered to be in extreme poverty; those earning less than twice the cost of the BBG are considered to be in relative poverty. Table 4 presents extreme and relative poverty lines for average-sized households in urban and rural areas of El Salvador, as well as the proportion of households living below those rates.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>RURAL</th>
<th>URBAN</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Average household size</td>
<td>3.85</td>
<td>3.54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Extreme poverty line</td>
<td>$128.78</td>
<td>$189.85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent living in extreme poverty</td>
<td>10.4%</td>
<td>6.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Relative poverty line</td>
<td>$257.57</td>
<td>$379.70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent living in relative poverty</td>
<td>27.1%</td>
<td>23.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average household income</td>
<td>$368.61</td>
<td>$646.99</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: DIGESTYC, 2017

The following sections outline the context in which non-state schools operate, including the education system, the context of gang violence, and the way in which gangs and insecurity adversely affect the education system.
EDUCATION SYSTEM

Formal education is regulated by the MINED and has five levels: early childhood, preschool, elementary, secondary, and higher education. Both public and private providers exist for all of these levels. Table 5 describes characteristics of each level of formal education.

### Table 5: Description of Formal Education Levels

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Levels</th>
<th>Normative Attendance Age</th>
<th>Grades</th>
<th>Scope</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Early Childhood</td>
<td>0–3</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>Family and community-based care and education (nutrition, stimulation, socialization, socioemotional development, language and cognitive development, etc.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Preschool</td>
<td>4–6</td>
<td>Kinder 4, kinder 5, and kinder 6</td>
<td>School-culture preparation, early literacy and math awareness, social and natural environment awareness</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Basic</td>
<td>7–15</td>
<td>1st to 9th divided in three, 3-year cycles. 1st to 6th composed primary education, and 7th to 9th composed lower secondary.</td>
<td>National curriculum (core subjects), social values</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Upper secondary</td>
<td>16–17</td>
<td>First and second year of high school (10th and 11th grades); a third year for technical diplomas.</td>
<td>National curriculum (core and specialized subjects), social and democratic values</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Higher Education</td>
<td>18+</td>
<td>Technical and university degrees (undergraduate and graduate) provided by universities and technical schools.</td>
<td>Professional-oriented education: technical two-year degrees; three-year teaching degree; licentiate five-year degrees; and some specialized graduate programs</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


**Education Finance**

Important advances have been made in expanding the education budget, which doubled between 2005 and 2015, reaching $914.3 million and representing 3.5 percent of the GNP (Cuéllar-Marchelli, 2015). In the 2001–2011 period, 93.75 percent of funds came from the central government, while 5.81 percent from loans and 0.44 percent from donations (Rivas, 2013). Between 2001 and 2011, MINED allocated on average 58 percent of spending to salaries and remunerations, while 20 percent was assigned directly to schools for expenses, 13 percent to goods and services, and the remaining on capital investments and fixed assets (Rivas, 2013). Following a teacher pay increase, this allocation shifted significantly in the 2014-2015 school year, where salaries of teachers and administrators consumed 73 percent of the operating budget (MINED, 2015c). An additional $80 million, provided as part of the President’s Universal Social Protection System, was invested annually in uniforms, shoes, books, and supplies for students in public schools to encourage enrollment and lower household educational costs (MINED, 2015c).
Teacher Workforce

A total of 57,761 teachers are working in the national education system, of which 77 percent work in the public sector and 20 percent in the private sector. An additional 3 percent work in both private and public schools (MINED, 2017c).

Teacher training is an exclusive responsibility of the state, according to the Constitution, but it has been largely delegated to private institutions. Although the Teaching Career Law demands that the MINED plan and prepare a sufficient and necessary number of teachers to cover educational needs, supply and demand have not been successfully harmonized, leading to an oversupply of teachers. There are 16 different pre-service training institutions which offer a choice of either a three- or a five-year degree. A MINED-compiled list of individuals with teaching certification includes 94,529 individuals (MINED, 2017d), 39 percent of whom are not currently employed as teachers. This figure suggests a large oversupply in the teacher workforce.

Teachers are granted posts in public schools through a centralized process managed by the national selection board, which assigns teachers to schools (Hernández, 2014). Upon graduation, recently trained teachers may have to wait as long as 10 years to be assigned to a position in a public school, as the law gives priority to those who graduated first. In 2013, 57,787 applications were received for a total of 890 teaching positions on a national level (Hernández, 2014). Once a government teaching position is obtained, however, the teacher is guaranteed a stable salary and lifelong job security—by law, teachers are very difficult to fire.

GANG VIOLENCE

Gang violence has become endemic in El Salvador in the post-civil war period. Following the breakdown of the 2012-2014 gang truce, homicide rates spiked, reaching a peak of 102 homicides per 100,000 residents—the highest rate of any country. Beyond the alarmingly high homicide rate, insecurity caused by gangs permeates every element of society and profoundly affects social processes, including education.
The roots of the current gang crisis can be traced to the extensive immigration to the United States during the civil war years from 1980 to 1992, which fostered gang formation in the United States and weakened family and social structures in El Salvador (USAID, 2006b). In the post-war period, historical youth street gangs and school rivalries were nurtured by a weakening social fabric, scarce economic opportunities, and new gang models resulting from mass deportation from the United States in the 1990s (Cruz, 2007; Savenije, 2009). Among the characteristics of this new generation of gangs was their settlement in marginalized, urban communities, extreme violence, access to arms, and participation in other illicit activities, such as drug trafficking (USAID, 2006b). Currently, the primary driver of insecurity and violence is the ongoing warfare between the two predominant gangs, Barrio-18 and Mara Salvatrucha 13, with several other, smaller factions also contributing to the conflict.

The activities and impacts of gangs are inseparable from local geography. Gang identity is closely tied to territorial control, and gang members see themselves as having authority over both their neighborhood and its residents. Gangs consequently see themselves as controlling the schools within their territories and may seek to use them as a source for new recruits (USAID/ECCN 2016). Individuals living in areas under gang control are subjected to harassment, threats of violence, extortion, and abuse (ICG, 2017). Gang members demand respect and deference from neighbors and youth who are not gang members and who are seen as potential recruits. (Cruz, Rosen, Amaya, & Vorobyeva, 2017; Savenije, 2009). Gangs are deeply woven into the fabric of society. For many individuals, gang members are neighbors, cousins, children, or siblings (USAID/ECCN 2016). The estimated 70,000 gang members in El Salvador (out of a total population of 6.5 million) support over 400,000 family and community members with their income (ICG, 2017).
Territorial gang activity deeply affects community life, not only for youth but for families and neighbors as well. The control of public spaces by groups associated with violence forces families to seek refuge in their homes and makes venturing into another gang-controlled territory a potentially life-threatening endeavor (INCIDE, 2016; Savenije & Andrade-Eekhoff, 2003). Gang members are also involved in violent conflict outside of their areas of control, which contributes to a general environment of insecurity (USAID/ECCN 2016). In 2014, 54 percent of Salvadorian households felt that their freedom of movement was restricted by the insecurity caused by gangs (Cuéllar-Marchelli & Góchez, 2017).

**EFFECTS OF GANG VIOLENCE ON EDUCATION**

Given the pervasiveness of gang activity and the desire for territorial control, it is impossible to fully separate gangs from schools and society. In a systemwide survey of public schools, over 63 percent of establishments report being affected by a gang presence in their communities, while nearly 28 percent of schools report that their internal security is compromised by gangs (MINED, 2016a). Between 2010 and 2015, 466 students and 23 teachers, including five school directors, were killed by gangs (Cuéllar-Marchelli & Góchez, 2017).

The territorial nature of gang activity severely affects students, particularly when school boundaries are not aligned with gang boundaries, and it can be dangerous for students to cross boundaries between gangs to reach school. If the school is located within one established gang’s territory, violence is generally less of a problem. If it is in an area disputed by multiple gangs, the threat of violence is greater (USAID/ ECCN, 2016). Some students live in areas where they are unable to reach a school without crossing into an area controlled by another gang, and they drop out rather than risk crossing boundaries. Even if students do not drop out of school, they may stop attending temporarily because of violence in their communities, interrupting the education cycle. Furthermore, some students are perceived as a risk to a school merely because they are from certain neighborhoods. There are reports that schools may be pressured by gangs to refuse enrollment to students because they live in a certain neighborhood, even though they are not affiliated with a gang.

In 2016, 24 percent of schools reported that students dropped out due to gang violence, the third most frequent cause next to internal migration (63 percent) and emigration (55.9 percent) (MINED, 2016a). These reasons are not mutually exclusive, as emigration and internal migration are driven by threats of violence. The influence of gangs in causing dropout could be considerably higher than reported, as these data are self-reported and have not been externally verified. Indeed, schools in municipalities with the highest levels of violence are also those with the highest rates of dropout (USAID/ECCN 2016).

In recent years, progress in expanding education access has been reversed. The primary net enrollment rate increased from 86 to 95 percent between 2000 and 2009 (Rivas, 2013) but had fallen back to 86 percent by 2015. This decline in enrollment can at least in part be attributed to the collapse of the 2012-2014 truce between gangs, which included an agreement to not affect schools (ICG, 2017). Although MINED has been successful in maintaining the operation of schools in gang-controlled territories, the

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19 These figures represent perspectives of school leadership and indicate the proportion of schools experiencing a certain type of dropout, rather than the proportion of students dropping out for a given reason. As student-level tracking is not in place, it is impossible to tell what proportion of students classified as dropping out are actually changing schools or transferring to a private school rather than leaving the school system altogether.
decline in enrollment has been driven by family-level decisions regarding the safety and well-being of children (USAID/ECCN, 2016). Other factors that contribute significantly to dropout include lack of interest on the part of the student, disability, cost of or distance to school, and a student’s need to enter the labor market (DIGESTYC, 2017).

Families are left with few options when confronted by threats of violence in their communities and schools. Some households relocate as an attempt to escape the violence, which may disrupt education continuity. They may also elect to send their children to schools that are closer to home, or that do not involve crossing gang boundaries in order to attend. Families may contract private transportation to ensure safety for their children to and from school, rather than risking transportation by foot or by public bus. However, some of these options require the availability of extra income, excluding much of the population. When faced with the real threat of violence, many parents, especially those with limited means, may choose instead to withdraw their children from school.

For those students who remain in school, violence and insecurity have a detrimental impact on the quality of education received. Within violence-affected public and CECE schools, students face bullying, sexual violence, assault, and physical abuse (Cuéllar-Marchelli & Góchez, 2017). No data are available regarding the nature and prevalence of violence in private schools. Violence affects students’ psychosocial well-being, and teachers are rarely equipped to meet the needs of students who have undergone trauma.

![Aerial view of San Salvador](EDJUENTEGISTOCKPHOTO)

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20 The degree to which demographic trends are also contributing to the decline in enrollment is unclear, as a national population census has not been conducted since 2007.
The presence of gangs makes schools a place of risk and weakens teacher authority (UNDP, 2013). In some cases, teachers cannot exert authority over students who are gang members, as they are afraid of reprisals. Teachers also must confront the threat of violence within and in transit to school and sometimes miss class as a consequence (USAID/ECCN 2016).

**MAPPING**

The education system of El Salvador is organized on three levels: (1) the central Ministry of Education (MINED), (2) departmental offices in each of the 14 departments, and (3) 5,132 individual public and 897 private schools. Decisions on general guidelines for administrative, curricular, and financial issues are determined at the central level and passed down to schools via the departmental structure. The departmental offices house the technical-pedagogical assistants, who are responsible for visiting public schools and conveying information from the central MINED offices. Departmental offices conduct the annual school census and respond to complaints about private schools. Interactions with private schools rarely extend beyond this, although there is some variation between departments. Private schools are accredited, supervised, and coordinated by the central MINED’s Institutional Accreditation Office. They do not necessarily receive MINED pedagogical or management support, and there are no clear guidelines on the department-level relationship with the private sector.

The Constitution designates that the state has responsibility for education provision but allows caregivers to choose the type of education they desire for their children. Consequently, a variety of education modalities beyond strictly MINED-provided formal schools have proliferated, in both the formal and non-formal sectors.

Section A describes the universe of non-state education providers within the formal education system. Section B describes other relevant non-state actors that collaborate with formal public schools or operate in the non-formal education sector.

**SECTION A: AFFORDABLE NON-STATE SCHOOLS**

Over the last decade, the formal education system has seen a continual decline in total enrollment, as demonstrated in Figure 6. Much of this decline can be attributed to demographic trends, as the country’s fertility rate has steadily fallen from 4.0 in 1990 to 2.1 in 2015 (World Bank, 2017). Since 2014, the proportion of enrollment in private schools has seen only marginal growth (Table 6).
FIGURE 6: TOTAL ENROLLMENT BY LEVEL, ALL SECTORS 2009–2016

Source: MINED, 2015a; MINED, 2015b; MINED, 2016b

TABLE 6: TOTAL ENROLLMENT BY SECTOR

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Public</td>
<td>1,586,448</td>
<td>1,611,094</td>
<td>1,583,737</td>
<td>1,551,691</td>
<td>1,516,311</td>
<td>1,395,585</td>
<td>1,249,242</td>
<td>1,184,661</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(%)</td>
<td>82.8%</td>
<td>83.4%</td>
<td>82.6%</td>
<td>81.7%</td>
<td>81.1%</td>
<td>84.7%</td>
<td>80.2%</td>
<td>79.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CECE</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>68,429</td>
<td>76,396</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(%)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>4.4%</td>
<td>5.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Private</td>
<td>328,972</td>
<td>321,512</td>
<td>333,969</td>
<td>346,573</td>
<td>354,319</td>
<td>251,798</td>
<td>239,039</td>
<td>234,495</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(%)</td>
<td>17.2%</td>
<td>16.6%</td>
<td>17.4%</td>
<td>18.3%</td>
<td>18.9%</td>
<td>15.3%</td>
<td>15.4%</td>
<td>15.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>1,915,420</td>
<td>1,932,606</td>
<td>1,917,706</td>
<td>1,898,264</td>
<td>1,870,630</td>
<td>1,647,383</td>
<td>1,556,710</td>
<td>1,495,552</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: MINED, 2015a; MINED, 2015b; MINED, 2016b

* Prior to 2015, school census data did not disaggregate CECE from purely public schools. Consequently, enrollment figures from 2009 to 2015 include CECE in public totals.
Aggregated statistics obscure underlying trends, however. Specifically examining changes in enrollment in non-state schools in the 10 highest-priority PESS municipalities, all of which are severely violence-affected, indicates that non-state enrollment is not only much higher in these municipalities, but that it is growing. In 8 of the 10 municipalities, the proportion of enrollment in non-state schools in 2016 ranged from 28.4 percent to 61.2 percent, which was one-and-a-half to three times the national average. In 8 of the 10 municipalities, the proportion of enrollment in non-state schools increased between 2015 and 2016—in two cases, by roughly 4 percent. Nine of the 10 municipalities saw a decrease in total public enrollment—consistent with national trends—but 6 municipalities saw an increase in the total number of students enrolled in non-state schools, suggesting a transfer between public and non-state, with gang violence being a potential driver.

An overview of the three main groups of formal-sector education providers is displayed in Table 7, following which private and CECE schools are described in greater detail.

### Table 7: Overview of Formal-Sector School Providers

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ownership</th>
<th>CDE</th>
<th>CECE</th>
<th>PRIVATE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>MINED</td>
<td>Catholic church (parish, diocese, or congregation)</td>
<td>Individual, association, business, faith-based organization</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Funding</th>
<th>CDE</th>
<th>CECE</th>
<th>PRIVATE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>MINED</td>
<td>Partly MINED (teacher pay, per-student subsidy), partly school fees and donations</td>
<td>School fees; some receive donations</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Household cost</th>
<th>CDE</th>
<th>CECE</th>
<th>PRIVATE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>No registration or monthly fees, but schools occasionally request contributions. Uniforms, shoes, books, and some food are provided. Students must pay for transportation.</td>
<td>Generally requires registration and monthly fees, but lower than most private schools. Uniforms, shoes, books, and some food are provided by MINED. Students must pay for transportation.</td>
<td>Registration and monthly fees. Students must purchase uniforms, shoes, books, food, and pay for transportation.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Teacher pay</th>
<th>CDE</th>
<th>CECE</th>
<th>PRIVATE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Monthly salary ranges from $652 to $1,173, depending on degree and years of experience. Benefits provided. Permanent contracts.</td>
<td>Roughly half receive MINED salary and benefits. Non-MINED teachers receive salaries ranging from below minimum wage ($300) to being comparable to MINED.</td>
<td>Salaries are generally at or below minimum wage and may not include benefits.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Management</th>
<th>CDE</th>
<th>CECE</th>
<th>PRIVATE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>School leadership councils, made up of principal, teachers, parents, and students.</td>
<td>School leadership councils as a consulting body, under the direction of a Catholic priest, bishop, or congregation.</td>
<td>Leadership varies by owner.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Regulation and oversight</th>
<th>CDE</th>
<th>CECE</th>
<th>PRIVATE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>MINED, through directives from the central office via departmental offices. Technical-pedagogical advisers make periodic visits.</td>
<td>Accredited by MINED, guidance from Episcopal Conference, with decentralized management. Technical-pedagogical advisers make periodic visits.</td>
<td>MINED accredits every 2 to 5 years, but other contact with MINED is minimal.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Authors’ interviews

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22 See Annex 1 for a breakdown of 2015-2016 enrollment by municipality.
Private Schools

According to the 2016 El Salvador school census (MINED, 2017b), 897 private schools operate in El Salvador, equivalent to 14.9 percent of all schools operating in the formal sector. These schools collectively enroll 234,495 students, equivalent to 15.7 percent of all formal-sector enrollment. The number of private schools in operation has fallen steadily since 2009 (Table 8), with the exception of a jump in private school numbers between 2013 and 2014.23 Interviews conducted through this study indicated that closure of private schools was driven by financial insolvency or threats by gangs, and that the up-front cost and bureaucratic difficulty of opening a new school limited the number of new schools each year to two or three, a rate well below replacement.

### TABLE 8: NUMBER OF SCHOOLS BY TYPE

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
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<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Public</td>
<td>5,008</td>
<td>4,998</td>
<td>5,003</td>
<td>5,185</td>
<td>4,990</td>
<td>4,956</td>
<td>4,977</td>
<td>4,969</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CECE</td>
<td>171</td>
<td>180</td>
<td>169</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>182</td>
<td>181</td>
<td>157</td>
<td>167</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Private</td>
<td>983</td>
<td>951</td>
<td>923</td>
<td>898</td>
<td>890</td>
<td>925</td>
<td>915</td>
<td>897</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>6,162</td>
<td>6,129</td>
<td>6,095</td>
<td>6,083</td>
<td>6,062</td>
<td>6,062</td>
<td>6,049</td>
<td>6,033</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: MINED, 2015a; MINED, 2015b; MINED, 2016d

### FIGURE 7: NUMBER OF PRIVATE SCHOOLS BY ENROLLMENT, 2016

Source: MINED, 2017b

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23 Representatives of the Institutional Accreditation Office theorize that this jump may have been precipitated by the publication of new regulations in 2012, which clarified rules and may have made more schools willing to open, or may represent a backlog in new school openings pending the publication of the regulations. The true cause of this jump is unknown.

24 MINED did not disaggregate schools by administrating organization in 2012. It is consequently unclear how many of the 5,185 public schools were actually CECE, given that CECE schools were aggregated into the public total.

25 It is likely that some CECE schools were erroneously coded as public in 2015, making the 2015 count of CECE schools artificially low.
MINED classifies private schools as small (fewer than 250 students), medium (250–599 students), or large (600 students or more). As of 2017, 603 private schools are small, 202 are medium, and 92 are large (MINED, 2017b).

The vast majority of private schools are located in urban areas. In 2014, 34.4 percent of all schools in El Salvador were urban. However, 90.2 percent of private schools operate in urban areas. Most of El Salvador’s private schools (51 percent) are located in the department of San Salvador, with another 17 percent in La Libertad (MINED, 2017a).

Ownership

The majority of private schools are owned by individuals, small associations, or businesses and are not part of chains or networks. Commonly, smaller schools will be established by an individual or small group of teachers seeking to create schools that address problems seen in the public sector and targeting students living in the neighborhood. While these schools are not necessarily affiliated with a church or congregation, they often incorporate some sort of religious instruction. Many congregations or faith-based organizations also own and operate their own private schools, which vary in size, fee level, and target population. In general, these schools admit any student who is willing to abide by the school’s code of conduct, irrespective of religion.

Several school groups or networks do exist, most of which are associated with churches. The largest such group, affiliated with the Assemblies of God church, is the Liceos Cristiano Reverendo Juan Bueno, which operates 37 schools. The Seventh Day Adventist church operates approximately 24 schools using a model similar to that of Liceo Cristiano Reverendo (LCR) Juan Bueno. Several other school networks or chains are in operation, although they are not necessarily low-fee. These include at least 22 schools run by Baptist churches, several Salesian and Marist congregations, and the Oasis bilingual school chain.

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26 However, roughly half of all students are enrolled in urban areas (50.4 percent in 2016; MINED, 2017a). A multitude of small schools operate in rural areas, hundreds of which have only one or two teachers. Urban schools, by contrast, are generally larger.
Box 7: Liceo Cristiano Reverendo Juan Bueno

The LCR Juan Bueno network of schools was established in 1963, and by 2003, the number schools had grown to 37. Each school is attached to a congregation of the Assemblies of God church, but the schools are both administrated and financed centrally. The school network has a charitable orientation, maintaining its vision of helping the poor by employing a cross-subsidization model.

LCR Juan Bueno schools fall into three general categories:

1. Four to five schools charge higher fees, serve a more affluent population, and offer a higher quality of education. These schools generate a profit, which is used to subsidize schools serving lower-income populations.

2. Roughly 15 schools are self-funding, or come close to it.

3. Seventeen schools serve lower-income populations and receive subsidization. In addition to being funded through profits from schools with higher fees, between 3,000 and 4,000 low-income students have their education subsidized by domestic or international sponsors. Students attending subsidized schools are charged a symbolic fee of $1 to $2 per month.

Roughly 15,000 students are enrolled across the network’s 37 schools, which have a total of about 900 employees, including 540 teachers and 60 staff in central offices.

CECE Schools

CECE schools are owned and operated by Catholic parishes and are members of the Catholic Education School Council. They enjoy a unique collaboration with MINED. In 1964, the Catholic church in El Salvador began establishing parish schools with the purpose of expanding access to education. In 1966, these schools received official government recognition, and since 1976, MINED has paid the salaries of a portion of the teachers in CECE schools. Currently, MINED assigns a specific number of teaching positions to CECE schools collectively, and these are apportioned to individual CECE schools at the archdiocese level. Individual CECE schools are then responsible for hiring teachers for each of the MINED positions. Teachers in those positions are paid by MINED rather than by the CECE school and receive MINED salaries. CECE schools receive a per-student subsidy, and students attending these schools are granted the same food, uniforms, books, and shoes as students who attend government schools. CECE schools are the only private schools to receive this kind of government support and subsidization. CECE schools maintain their original social mission of providing education with a religious orientation to low-income populations, and they operate in many of the most violence-affected regions of the country.
In 2016, 76,396 students enrolled in CECE schools, equivalent to roughly 5.1 percent of El Salvador’s total basic and secondary enrollment. These students were distributed across 167 schools in 2016. The number of schools pertaining to CECE fluctuates year to year, as Catholic schools independently elect to participate or withdraw from the association. CECE schools are on average larger than fully public or fully private schools—their average enrollment is 457, compared to 238 in public schools and 261 in private schools.

**FIGURE 8: NUMBER OF CECE SCHOOLS BY ENROLLMENT, 2016**

![Graph showing the number of CECE schools by enrollment in 2016.](source: MINED, 2017b)

*Ownership and Administration*

CECE schools are organized on a parish, diocese, or congregational level and are run by a priest, bishop, or religious congregation, respectively. Usually, the church owns the infrastructure and is managed with a model similar to public CDE schools, per MINED requirement. This form of management includes mechanisms for parent, teacher, and student participation in decisionmaking. Nevertheless, the church hierarchy has decision-making power to place and remove both principals and teachers and to decide how MINED teacher positions are distributed to the CECE schools. A central structure exists across CECE schools to give guidance, but not funds. MINED officially classifies CECE schools as public, although they are in reality a PPP.
SECTION B: OTHER NON-STATE ACTORS

Government, donor, and NGO support of formal schools in the private sector is rare or nonexistent. However, a multitude of models of PPPs exist in the education system, primarily through donor, NGO, and private-sector support for public schools, but also through government partnership with private actors for the provision of alternative models of education. Examples of these partnerships are presented below. Note that these examples are illustrative rather than comprehensive.

Donors and NGOs

Many bi- and multilateral donor organizations, both large and small, provide support directly to public schools or support the MINED with technical or financial assistance. Both GIZ (Germany) and AECID (Spain) provide support to violence prevention and employability activities within public schools. The Millennium Challenge Corporation has invested heavily in education infrastructure and provides support for teacher training, learning assessment, vocational training, and education quality. UNICEF’s work focuses primarily on technical assistance to MINED and support to early childhood development. Finally, USAID supports MINED’s expansion of full-time inclusive schools, gang prevention activities in schools, and centers for out-of-school youth. In 2014, 25.6 percent of public schools reported receiving support from donor organizations (MINED, 2015c). In 2016 (MINED, 2016a), 41.1 percent of public schools reported receiving donations from individuals or institutions. NGOs provide interventions at all levels of the educational cycle in the formal sector. Types of interventions include teacher training, support for holistic child development, violence prevention, life skills training, and technical and vocational training. Examples of NGOs that support public schools include FUSALMO, Glasswing, Fundación Educo, Servicio Social Pasionista, FUNPRES, Pestalozzi Children’s Foundation, CIDE, and Compassion International.

Box 8: Fe y Alegría in El Salvador

Fe y Alegría has been the subject of extensive study throughout Latin America for its ability to provide quality education to low-income populations at a low cost. Fe y Alegría’s activities have not been studied in El Salvador, nor through a conflict lens.

In El Salvador, Fe y Alegría operates two formal schools, which form part of the CECE network, as well as four vocational training centers. In addition, Fe y Alegría has made individual arrangements with 14 government schools to provide support through a collective leadership model, teacher training, violence prevention and community strengthening programs, and pedagogical support.

One Fe y Alegría school was visited as a part of this study. The school is quite large, enrolling over 1,600 students. Its fees range from $6 to $13 per month, depending on the grade. While much of the school’s enrollment is drawn from lower-income households, many of which subsist below the minimum wage, the school is seen as offering a very high quality of education.

While this school is located in an area under gang control, it is respected by gang leaders and members, partially because many gang leaders attended the school as students. Because of this respected status, students and teachers are not threatened by gangs within or near the school.
Private Sector

Public schools also receive support from private-sector actors, primarily through matching programs, complementary education, and scholarships. Examples of matching programs include Adopt a School, which focuses on improving infrastructure, providing teaching and learning materials, and financing teachers or school psychologists, and FESA (the Salvadorian Education Foundation), which offers physical education and sports programs. Additionally, complementary education programs, such as Supérate (managed by Fundación Sagrera Palomo) and Oportunidades (managed by Fundación Kreite), identify high-achieving public-school students from marginalized communities and provide supplemental education in English, computer skills, and life skills. These programs have linkages to the labor market and are designed to help students prepare for employment in fields that require use of technology and a knowledge of English. Finally, NGOs and businesses provide scholarships to high-achieving public-school students. These efforts are often linked to violence prevention (MINED, 2015c).

EDUCAME

One of the most extensive examples of public-private collaboration in education is MINED's EDUCAME program. EDUCAME is a free accelerated or alternative education program offering six modalities to adults and youth over the age of 15 who did not finish secondary education or the third cycle of basic education. Three of these modalities are provided through PPPs:

1. Accelerated education, in which students can complete the third cycle of basic education in 18 months, or lower secondary education in 12 months, rather than the normal three or two years, respectively. Accelerated courses use a condensed curriculum, providing instruction five days a week with eight-hour school days.

2. Semi-present education, in which students must attend eight hours of class per week, adapted to the student's schedule. Often, this takes the form of night classes. This modality is designed to accommodate youth or adults who participate in the labor market. Under this modality, third cycle basic or secondary education could be completed in two years.

3. Virtual education, in which upper secondary education can be completed online.

The three additional modalities are provided directly by MINED and include traditional distance education with weekend classes, night school, and a sufficiency test. MINED implements each of these three modalities and certifies student achievement. The private providers hire and supervise teachers and identify sites for instruction, including churches, community centers, or public or private schools. In 2016, a total of 50,203 students were enrolled in EDUCAME modalities, with their distribution across programs presented in Table 9.
FINDINGS

The findings that emerged from interviews, focus groups, and document review are presented in the following four categories, which were developed through this study’s conceptual framework. These categories represent four traditional domains of analysis of non-state schools: (1) accountability and social cohesion; (2) access and inclusion; (3) quality, security, and student well-being; and (4) education financing and sustainability.

ACCOUNTABILITY AND SOCIAL COHESION

1. Government actors, NGOs, and donors are largely unaware of the low-fee private school sector and have widely assumed that private schools are profitable, profit-driven, and cater to the elite and middle class. As a consequence, private schools do not access government services and are ignored by donors and NGOs.

The opinion that all private schools are profit-driven is present among high-level education ministers as well as in regional education offices. Government actors were surprised to hear that a significant number of private schools charge fees below $15 per month. Outside of the Accreditation Department, current or former MINED officials did not believe that private schools should receive government support, as these schools were perceived to have sufficient resources generated by high fees. Apart from CECE schools, all other private schools receive no systematic support from MINED and little support from other government departments. While the policy arrangement for supporting CECE schools has survived over time, it was criticized by some government actors, who see it as unnecessary or excessive based upon the perception of private school profitability and elite status. One expert stated that MINED sees the private sector as an island, separate and disconnected from the offering of public education.

Representatives from donor organizations espouse similar views. While some donors, such as USAID, support alternative or non-formal education activities, no donor provides targeted support to formal private schools. The Spanish Agency for International Development Cooperation (AECID) provides

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MODALITY</th>
<th>ENROLLMENT</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Accelerated</td>
<td>888</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Distance education</td>
<td>15,645</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Semi-present education</td>
<td>5,650</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Night school</td>
<td>23,606</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sufficiency test</td>
<td>3,951</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Virtual education</td>
<td>463</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>50,203</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Source: MINED, 2017e
some support to Fe y Alegría through Spanish NGOs, but this support is not substantive. Most donors see their role as directly supporting the MINED, the MINED’s priorities, and public schools. One representative from a donor organization saw the relationship between public and private as zero-sum—supporting private schools would draw away enrollment from public schools and weaken the public offering. It is notable that a recent education sector assessment by USAID did not include the private sector (Gavin, Kellum, Ochoa, & Pozas, 2017).

Similarly, NGOs rarely interact with the private sector. CECE school directors stated that NGOs see CECE schools as private and are consequently not interested in working with them. Broadly, NGOs see public schools as having a greater need and wish to focus their investments in the most vulnerable schools. Representatives from NGOs expressed that they have constrained resources and want to invest where the greatest results will be seen. They also note their desire to focus on public schools because these schools enroll the vast majority of students. Finally, they see private schools as having more resources and consequently lesser need. The few NGOs that engage with private schools charge those schools for their services, meaning that NGO services may be out of reach for low-resource schools.

External support to schools is even less likely in gang-controlled areas. One CECE school hosted a nearby university’s psychology student teachers, who provided valuable services to students. When gang conflict in the area intensified, the student teachers were unable to safely travel to the school. This phenomenon is not necessarily unique to non-state schools, however.

2. The demanding infrastructure requirements and the safety, health, and sanitation certifications necessary to establish a private school make the cost of opening a new school prohibitive. These stringent initial requirements are at odds with permissive re-accreditation requirements.

In order to operate legally, private schools must be accredited by the Department of Institutional Accreditation, which sits within the National Directorate of School Management. Accreditation involves, first, receiving proper legal and operational recognition in the form of certifications from the mayor and the fire department, as well as health and sanitation certifications; second, certifying that the school director meets certain requirements; and third, receiving accreditation from MINED’s Institutional Accreditation Office. The accreditation process involves an evaluation on a 10-point scale that assesses each school in terms of its complementary educational services, institutional planning and organization, curricular development, evaluation of learning, infrastructure and resources, and teacher workforce (MINED, 2010). Schools applying for re-accreditation are evaluated on the same criteria as those applying for initial accreditation.

The accreditation process has three possible outcomes:

1. Schools that reach the minimum standards in each evaluation category receive a five-year accreditation.

2. Schools that fall below the minimum requirements in some categories are considered “accredited with observations,” and they must be reviewed again in three years.

3. Schools whose evaluation yields a score below the minimum standards are not considered accredited and may not operate if applying for initial accreditation. If the school already exists, they
are granted a two-year period in which to make improvements before passing through the accreditation process.

All existing schools that do not receive the full five-year accreditation must submit school improvement plans detailing the reforms that will take place prior to the next accreditation cycle. Officially, schools that do not make the necessary improvements in this period will be closed by MINED, but this does not seem to occur in practice. A common complaint by representatives of private schools is that public schools are not required to meet, and do not meet in practice, the same high standards set for private schools.

While these regulations understandably serve to ensure a minimum quality of education in the private sector, they also vastly decrease the ability of the sector to respond to changes in gang territory, which can happen frequently. Ideally, if changes in gang territory make travel dangerous from a neighborhood to the nearest public school, a private school would open to serve the emergent need for education. The demanding requirements make it difficult to establish small, local, low-fee schools and instead favor well-resourced entrepreneurs who establish large schools and charge higher fees to recoup the sizeable initial investment. The total number of private schools in El Salvador has fallen by nearly 100 in the last eight years. The high rate of school closure, driven at least in part by financial insolvency and threats of violence, far outstrips the number of new schools established each year, which is usually around two or three.

The exigent initial requirements for starting a school are at odds with the flexible re-accreditation practices. Rather than close schools that repeatedly fall short of MINED standards, the Accreditation Department takes a flexible approach, taking into account the school’s context and suggesting reasonable improvements given the resources available. For example, schools are required to have a school psychologist. For small, low-resource schools, hiring an additional trained professional is unrealistic. The accreditation department may instead recommend that the school partners with a group of other schools to receive part-time services of a psychologist.

Many older schools that have been grandfathered into the system would not be permitted to operate if they were seeking initial accreditation. This situation is paradoxical and has consequences for existing schools. For example, the director of a small, family-owned private school wished to financially reconstitute the organization as a nonprofit to improve its financial sustainability. However, she was unable to do so because it would involve registering as a new school. The school would not qualify for accreditation, even though it has not had difficulty in obtaining re-accreditation.

3. **The difficulty of the process of registering as a not-for-profit organization pushes many schools that would qualify as nonprofits to instead register as for-profit organizations. Restrictions on for-profit schools encumber private school responsiveness and sustainability.**

At the time of their establishment, schools must register as either a for-profit or not-for-profit legal entity. Not-for-profit schools must be owned and operated by a church, a foundation, an NGO, or an association with not-for-profit designation. Not-for-profit designation, which must be obtained from the Interior Ministry, allows schools to be tax-exempt, receive donations, and freely adjust school fees without parental approval. However, obtaining this designation can be a difficult and lengthy process. Alternatively, schools may register as for-profit legal entities, a process that is both faster and simpler.
Consequently, individuals who establish schools that could possibly be registered as not-for-profit opt for registering the school as a for-profit entity. Currently, roughly 20 percent of schools are registered as not-for-profit, with the remainder registered as for-profit. Legal designation does not necessarily correlate with purpose, fee levels, or financial status. Many for-profit schools are mission-driven, are not profitable, and have very high or very low fees.

The MINED mandates that for-profit private schools (approximately 80 percent of private schools) may only increase fees at most once every two years. To raise fees, schools must convene over half of the parents of students who attend the school, and 75 percent of the parents in this group must agree to the fee increase. This fee increase must then be approved by the MINED. This process is time-sensitive and bureaucratically difficult, meaning schools are often unable to increase fees. This policy serves the understandable purpose of protecting families from large, rapid, or exploitative price hikes in private schools. However, one sampled private school had not been able to raise fees in over eight years, even as other expenses have increased. This limitation prevents schools from responding to changing economic conditions through price increases and instead forces them to cut costs in other areas. At the same time, many schools are hesitant to increase fees, as that could mean losing revenue from students whose families are unwilling or unable to pay higher fees.

4. **MINED data on many small private schools is not up to date, suggesting infrequent contact and minimal interaction.**

In the process of contacting schools, the researchers found that many of the small private schools listed in the 2016 school census could not be contacted because the contact information listed on MINED websites was inaccurate or missing. When this information was requested from MINED, officials likewise did not have accurate contact information, suggesting that communication between the MINED and many private schools is irregular or nonexistent and that information is often outdated. One factor that may contribute to this inaccuracy is that ministry officials are sometimes unwilling or unable to travel to violence-affected areas and rely on second-hand information given by other private schools. Additionally, schools may frequently change telephone numbers and not answer emails from unknown senders for security reasons.

5. **Non-state schools effectively create a strong sense of community, engendering commitment to safety and quality education from school directors, teachers, and parents.**

Parents, teachers, and school directors across all sampled schools expressed a high degree of commitment to their schools and an appreciation for the community that the schools created. Several schools offer additional programming for parents and families on the weekends, which helped promote the school as a community center. While most sampled schools faced moderate or severe resource shortages, parents frequently made additional contributions to the schools, such as their time, carrying out fundraising activities, and material donations. Parents sometimes took it upon themselves to make repairs or infrastructure improvements.

It was not uncommon for teachers to be teaching at the same school they attended as children. In one school, teachers said that their school feels like a family. Teachers express a high level of commitment to students’ needs and work to build friendship and trust with their students. In some schools, students continue to engage with their school after graduation, for example through volunteering with the school.
band. This sense of community extends to gang members. Gang leaders who attended one school as children send their own children to that school. They maintain respect for the school and wish to see it protected.

ACCESS AND INCLUSION

6. Entry requirements in some non-state schools create exclusive student bodies, favoring students who are higher-performing and disciplined and have committed parents.

While public schools are legally required to accept all students who wish to enroll, private schools have no such obligation. Private schools employ a range of entry requirements consistent with their missions and with the goal of developing a specific school environment.

First, some schools require students to achieve a minimum score on an entry exam or maintain at least a minimum grade throughout the school year. If enrolled students do not maintain a certain grade level, they are unable to re-enroll the following year. While public schools have MINED-established standards for minimum passing grades, several schools included in this study had higher minimum grade standards than public schools.

Second, students are required to submit an application to attend private schools. These applications sometimes require a recommendation from former teachers and community members, for example from a pastor. Schools may interview the student’s parents and require students to take psychological tests or evaluations. These requirements have the effect of filtering out students who do not meet the desired student profile. Screening of student background and home environment is not necessarily only initial. Some schools continually stay aware of a student’s family situation. Sometimes this is done to address any needs or challenges that may arise. However, other actors reference that they wish to know if a student changes residence, because occupancy in a different neighborhood could introduce the student and, by association the school, to gang-related threats. In such cases, a school may deny the student enrollment in subsequent years.

Third, all schools included in the sample enforced strict behavior and dress norms. Students are required to behave respectfully, uphold certain values, and wear the school’s uniform. Some schools also referenced prohibitions on certain haircuts and items of clothing or coming to school wearing heavy makeup.

Many of the schools included in the study were operated by faith-based organizations. Independently operated private schools also often espouse Christian values and incorporate religious instruction (which is not necessarily denominational). The sampled private schools that were aligned with particular denominations openly accepted students of other faiths and did not, for example, require participation in Catholic mass.

27 The minimum being a 5.0 on a scale of 1 to 10 in primary schools.
7. Sampled non-state schools did not experience problems with gang members within schools. Some schools effectively excluded gang members from enrollment. In schools where gang members remained, they were disciplined and not problematic.

School directors in sampled schools allege that they would be willing to admit any student willing to work hard and abide by the school’s standards. However, in some cases background checks may exclude students affiliated with gangs. Private and public schools have allegedly refused to admit students living in certain areas under heavy gang influence, regardless of student involvement in gang activities, although this was not observed in the selected schools.

Two sampled schools previously had large numbers of students with gang affiliations, but in both cases their numbers were reduced or eliminated. One school participated in the Gang Resistance Education and Training (GREAT) program, and an increased police presence drove gang-affiliated students away. In the other case, the school deliberately eliminated the two grades where gang members were concentrated and reintroduced the grades as students from lower grades advanced.

Other schools readily acknowledged that gang-affiliated students were enrolled, or that gang members or leaders sent their children to the private schools in question. In all cases, school directors and teachers asserted that these children were respectful and did not present internal threats to the school. In one case, a director spoke of one student who earned poor grades and sometimes behaved badly, but upon joining a gang, he improved his behavior and school performance. The gang wished him to attend college and become a lawyer for the gang, demonstrating that the gang was professionalizing and disputing the stereotype that gang members are low-achieving and badly behaved. Teachers or directors in several schools stated that, at the behest of gangs, gang-affiliated students are some of the best-behaved children because they do not want to draw attention to themselves.

QUALITY, SECURITY, AND STUDENT WELL-BEING

8. Enrollment in affordable non-state schools is primarily driven by security. Parents are also strongly attracted to the values education, additional education programming, sense of community, and perceived teacher quality offered by non-state schools.

Almost universally, parents who send their children to the sampled non-state schools assert that their primary motivation for doing so is security. Teachers, school directors, and other system-level actors share the belief that demand for non-state schooling is driven by a concern for student safety. Parents assert that the school environment in non-state schools is more controlled due to both infrastructure and school management. Parents claim that anyone can walk into a public school, whereas non-state schools have gates and often guards. Public schools are also required to enroll anyone who wishes to study, while non-state schools are more selective or, in the words of one parent, “exclusive.” Parents see controls on enrollment as creating a safer school environment and ensuring that threats do not enter the school. In
some cases, parents send their children to non-state schools because they are the only school they can attend without crossing gang lines.

After listing security, parents frequently list additional course work or complementary programming offered by the school as a reason for sending their children to non-state schools. These additional offerings include English classes, computer classes, and extracurricular activities such as band, dance, folklore, and bread making. Parents are attracted to the “values education” offered by non-state schools, which includes religious instruction and an emphasis in discipline and responsibility, which are not present or are not perceived to be present in the public system. Parents feel that teachers in non-state schools are more dedicated to education, spend more time on task, and treat students better.

The dynamic nature of the demand for non-state education requires further study. There is some evidence that security was not the driving force behind enrollment in non-state schools prior to around 2012, as gang lines were less defined and threats to individual security were less severe in this period. Notably, in aggregate terms, the proportion of total enrollment in non-state schools was higher in 2011 than in 2016, even as private enrollment has increased in the most conflict-affected municipalities in recent years. It is therefore unclear to what degree worsening national security has led to changes in non-state school enrollment, rather than an adjustment in the priorities of parents who already send children to private schools.

9. While non-state schools are perceived as higher quality than public schools, education outcomes are not measured beyond the secondary school exit exam. School choice is not driven by outcome data.

The only standardized measure of quality in the Salvadorian education system is the secondary exit exam, the PAES. Only one school director mentioned the school’s average PAES score when describing its quality. Parents generally define quality of education using school inputs or other proximate measures rather than educational outcomes.

A general perception among representatives from MINED, NGOs, and donor organizations is that non-state schools are generally of a higher quality than government schools. Many actors referenced heterogeneity in both sectors—there are many high-quality public schools, and similarly, there are many low-quality non-state schools. This perception of higher quality is sometimes given as a reason for not seeing the need to support non-state schools. For most of the actors who do not directly work with ANSS, it was unclear how much of their perception of quality stemmed from the smaller lower-fee schools rather than the large elite private schools.

The last standardized tests conducted at basic levels in El Salvador show slightly higher results in the religious private sector followed by the lay private sector, over CECE schools and public schools, respectively (MINED, 2009a).²⁸ On the high school exit exam (PAES), private institutions consistently score higher than public schools, although when elite private schools are eliminated from the sample, there is not a significant difference between public and private schools’ performance (MINED, 2009b). Results in non-state institutions may also be influenced by selection processes in which only high-performing students are accepted. Many non-state schools have a higher minimum passing grade than public schools, ensuring that lower-performing students are unable to enroll or maintain their

²⁸ Results from the 2008 PAESito test, conducted at third, sixth and ninth grades on a national level.
enrollment, in the process raising the average level of performance of the student body. It is not clear to what degree these aggregate differences in performance are attributable to school pedagogy rather than student background.

10. Non-state schools located within gang territories take measures to protect students and teachers from violence and insecurity. These measures effectively create a secure environment. A school’s religious alignment or affiliation further insulates students and teachers from the threat of violence.

All sampled schools were located in municipalities with a strong gang presence and a high incidence of violence. All individuals in each sampled school were conscious of gangs and were in some way affected by them. Schools whose catchment areas were entirely within one gang territory were much less affected by gang conflict than those located at or near the intersection of two or more gangs.

Non-state schools employ various strategies to promote security within their grounds. Schools may invest in physical security by building walls and gates to control entry, employing armed guards, or installing security cameras. Conversely, one school deliberately chose not to employ armed guards, both as a show of deference to the local gang in power and in recognition that the guard could be attacked and killed in an attempt to steal their gun. One school’s increased security was attributed to its small space—close proximity in a small, enclosed area made threats easier to control. Another sampled school was located close to a police department. This school also requested to participate in the GREAT program, and police conducted sporting activities at the school. Both the police department’s proximity and its involvement with the school strongly discouraged gang interference at this school.

As with students, teachers expressed gratitude for the security offered in private schools. Sampled teachers mention that teachers in government schools are sometimes subject to threats from students who belong to gangs. They assert that they have not experienced similar problems in the non-state schools where they work. Whereas in public schools, teachers often face discipline issues and sometimes feel that they are unable to discipline students for fear of reprisals, teachers in sampled schools felt confident and in control of their classes. One referenced the ability to cover topics related to gangs in class, even when they knew students belonging to gangs were present. Particularly in religious schools, gang members hold respect for teachers, who reference being able to greet gang members in the street and assert that they are always treated respectfully.

Teachers also express gratitude for security measures employed by non-state schools. In one case, a school director proactively presents new teachers to gang leaders in the area to ensure that the gangs do not threaten the previously unknown individual entering gang territory.

Schools associated with religious organizations enjoyed an added measure of respect and legitimacy in the eyes of gangs. Salvadorian gangs maintain a general reverence for religious institutions, and this respect is applied to educational establishments, affording religious non-state schools greater protection than their public counterparts.

Various levels of contact were observed between schools and nearby gangs. In one case, a small family-owned private school paid a monthly extortion to a gang, and in exchange, they were not bothered. In one CECE school, gangs have a high level of trust and respect for the school—neither the school nor the students are bothered, to the extent that students may arrive from other gang
territories without the local gang threatening the arriving students. In the school located near to a police department, there was virtually no contact between gangs and the school.

Three types of relationships between non-state schools and gangs were either observed or described:

- **Gangs develop a respect for the school and do not bother or threaten it out of an understanding of its positive mission.** Most of the sampled schools had this sort of relationship with gangs.

- **Gangs may see the school as resources to be cultivated and so maintain good relationships as a means of fostering future economic rents.**

- **Gangs may see schools as a threat and respond by extorting the school or threatening teachers or leadership.**

III. Teachers in non-state schools are generally paid less than their public-school counterparts. Notwithstanding, they are perceived as being more dedicated, responsible, and hard-working, which is at least in part attributable to the differences in incentive structures between public and non-state schools.

Teacher salaries in the public sector are based on education level and years of service. A first-year public school teacher would begin at $652.23 per month, and then after more than 35 years of service and a five-year university degree, the top salary would be $1,173.08 per month (Cuéllar-Marchelli, 2015). As a comparison, in 2010 unskilled workers earned an average monthly wage of $157; office employees, $333; other professionals, $711; and management-level employees, $970 (Pacheco, 2013).

Teachers in APS are paid much lower salaries than public school teachers. In some cases, teachers earn less than the minimum wage. An oversupply of teachers in the economy and a shortage of higher-paying government teaching positions enable private schools to hire teachers at or below the minimum wage of $300 per month and without providing benefits. CECE schools represent an exception to this principle, as roughly half of their teachers receive official MINED salaries. Internal policies dictate that CECE schools are supposed to pay non-MINED teachers the same as their MINED teachers, but this is not the case in practice. At one sampled CECE school, teachers did not receive benefits, and their salaries were as low as those in other private schools. In the other sampled CECE schools, non-MINED teachers received benefits and were paid more than other private-school teachers, but not as much as MINED teachers.
Teachers in private schools are on average younger and less experienced than those in public schools (Table 10). This is a result of the shortage of higher-paying MINED teaching positions and the requirement that teachers be granted MINED positions in order of graduation date. Teachers often work at private schools until a position at a government school becomes available. Nevertheless, some surveyed teachers in non-state schools had taught in the non-state sector for 15 to 20 years and were exceptions to this trend.

In spite of their lower pay and lack of experience, teachers in non-state schools are perceived as working harder and being more dedicated than teachers in public schools. In one CECE school, teachers are expected to carry out supplemental projects and work longer hours than in public schools. New teachers sometimes quit after a short time because they dislike the demanding schedule. Many teachers interviewed expressed pride in their work, saw their school as a close-knit community of which they were a part, and felt a great deal of commitment to their institution and the students they taught. The nature of teacher contracts in private schools also promotes accountability. Public school teachers, who have high salaries and are difficult to fire, are seen as complacent and lazy. Parents allege that they often miss class or do not teach while in class. Private school teachers risk losing their jobs if they miss class or do not perform adequately.

**EDUCATION FINANCING AND SUSTAINABILITY**

12. The household costs of education in private schools are greater than those in public schools. Private schools are not affordable or accessible to all who might wish to attend.

The household cost of education in private schools is universally higher than in public schools. Private schools generally charge an annual registration fee, as well as a monthly attendance fee. These fees have been formally eliminated in public schools. Students attending public schools are also provided with a limited food ration, as well as a uniform, school supplies, and shoes. Students in private schools must provide these inputs for themselves. All students must pay for their own transportation.
Private schools operate under a wide range of monthly fees. Some charge less than five dollars per month, while many elite schools charge hundreds of dollars per month. Schools toward the higher end of the fee spectrum are considered elite schools and were not included in this study.29

The graph in Figure 9 shows the distribution of average monthly fees for a selection of 688 private schools that charge less than $100 per month and for which data were available.

**FIGURE 9: NUMBER OF PRIVATE SCHOOLS BY MONTHLY FEE**

![Histogram showing the distribution of average monthly fees for private schools.](image)

Source: Authors’ analysis of MINED, 2017f

High-fee private schools are not representative of the average Salvadorian private school. In fact, 57 percent of schools have monthly fees that fall below $30 per month (Figure 9). While only roughly 11 percent of private schools fall below the $15 threshold of affordability for a family living below the poverty line ($15 per month), another 17 percent of schools fall within $5 of this threshold.

Although these schools are seen as a safer, higher-quality option to public schools, they are not accessible to all. And while many schools offer fees that are affordable to households subsisting at or below minimum wage, these schools are not present in all neighborhoods. Non-state schools are concentrated in urban areas, meaning rural households can rarely access them. Many private schools have elevated minimum grade standards, meaning that only high-achieving students can enroll. Private schools may also filter out students affiliated with gangs or even those living in areas controlled by gangs.

The greatest concentration of private schools have monthly fees ranging from $20 to $30, which are unaffordable to many low-income families, especially those with multiple school-aged children. Access to private schools is therefore far from universal. At the same time, government schools are not without financial costs. Students must pay for public transportation, and parents are sometimes asked for additional contributions. One parent found that it would cost just as much to pay for daily transportation to a public school as to pay the small monthly fee at the nearby private school.

29 Elite, bilingual, or international schools operate on a separate academic calendar, are required to establish associations with schools in other countries, guarantee mastery of a foreign language, and have international curricula. These schools cater to the wealthy and are generally inaccessible to marginalized groups.

30 Histogram shows schools within all municipalities and with monthly fees below $100, excluding 41 schools with higher fees and 168 schools for which cost data was not available. The monthly fee for each school was calculated using the average monthly fee for all grades offered at the school, excluding pre-school (pre-maternal, maternal 2 & 3, parvularia 4 & 5) and technical grades (bachillerato vocacional 1–3).
These equity considerations should certainly be taken into account by actors exploring the possibility of collaborating with non-state schools, but they should also be tempered by the understanding that many parents see private schools as being the best, if not the only, option for providing their children with education in a safe environment.

13. **MINED subsidization of CECE schools enables them to offer lower fees than comparable private schools while providing greater access to resources. However, this subsidization gives them a market-distorting competitive edge over other private schools.**

Similar to government schools, CECE schools receive a per-student subsidy of $8 per student from MINED (compared to $13 in government schools). Roughly half of the CECE teachers have their salaries paid by MINED. Students in CECE schools also receive the same food, uniforms, books, and shoes granted to public students. Beyond MINED contributions, CECE schools have decentralized financing and are expected to be entirely self-supporting. Central funds do exist to help schools that run deficits, but these are seldom used. Instead, schools charge enrollment and monthly fees to generate additional revenue. Some schools also receive additional funding through donations from congregations or other sources. The main financial difficulty faced by CECE schools is maintaining school infrastructure. MINED funds cannot be used for repairs, as school buildings are the property of churches or religious congregations.

Because of MINED's subsidization, fees at CECE schools remain universally low. At most, these fees reach $25 per month but frequently stay below $15 per month. In one sampled school, secondary education had no monthly fee and only required an annual $50 registration fee. While some private schools have comparably low fees, families attending those schools also must pay for school inputs such as uniforms and books, decreasing the affordability of the private option. As a consequence of the low fees and government provision of household education inputs, education in most CECE schools is affordable to all but the most destitute families. Many students attending the sampled CECE schools come from families with incomes below $150 per month and have parents who work in the informal sector or in maquilas.

Because of the subsidies they receive from MINED, CECE schools are better-resourced and offer lower fees than other non-state schools targeting lower-income families. This unique advantage granted to CECE schools in effect represents MINED picking a winning model. Schools that are operationally comparable can only compete by cutting costs in other areas such as teacher salaries. A common request among other non-state school operators is that the same subsidies extended to CECE schools be conditionally offered to all private schools. Conversely, it is important to note that some Catholic schools leave the CECE association, subsequently losing the accompanying MINED subsidization, in order to have greater freedom and management over financial operations, enrollment, and religious instruction.

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31 While CECE schools are generally seen as being high quality, schools exist along a continuum. Some CECE schools are very well resourced and have surplus funds that are invested in school infrastructure. Other schools face serious financial shortages, which lead to dilapidation and underpaying of teachers.
14. Affordable private schools are generally not profit-driven and are often not particularly profitable. Financial sustainability is jeopardized by low and variable revenue flows and a lack of business management training or experience. Non-state schools respond to constrained finances by minimizing expenses, which adversely impacts quality.

While roughly 80 percent of private schools have a for-profit legal designation, this is not an indication of their actual profitability nor of the motivations of their directors or owners. Many schools would qualify as nonprofit organizations, but the difficult registration process pushes applicants to the simpler for-profit designation. It is also very time-consuming and costly to switch from a for-profit to a not-for-profit legal organization after the school has been established—only two or three schools have made this transition in recent years.

Many private schools are established by teachers, charitable individuals, or religious groups. The driving motivation for many of these individuals is providing a quality education. While system-level data on school profitability are not available, school directors included in this study stated that their schools are not profitable and that they are perpetually short on funds. Sometimes they delay payment of their teachers because of resource shortages. Consequently, schools are much more likely to shut down because of financial insolvency; they are rarely closed because of quality issues.

Many small private schools are established or directed by former teachers, who often have little or no training in financial or organizational management. They are therefore ill-equipped to sustainably run a small business that depends on irregular financial flows and exists in a precarious financial space. Schools must maintain low fees in order to attract and maintain sufficient enrollment among primarily lower-income individuals. School fees are the primary source of school revenue, and teacher salaries and all other expenses depend on their regular receipt. Schools may be flexible when families are temporarily unable to pay school fees out of a desire to not lose students and a hope that fees will eventually be paid. Missed fees translate into decreased financial liquidity. School sustainability depends on minimizing other costs, including infrastructure investment, staff numbers, and teacher pay. At such low fee levels, schools are vulnerable to financial shocks and are unable to make investments that may allow for or attract additional enrollment.

15. The context of violence imposes additional costs to schools and households.

The context of violence makes education more expensive for both non-state schools and households. Schools invest in security infrastructure or personnel, such as security cameras and private security guards. Some schools are subject to extortion from gang members. All of these costs either filter down to school fees or take the place of investments in school quality. Families specifically elect to pay for non-state schools out of a concern for safety, when otherwise they might have sent children to public schools at a much lower cost. Families often also invest in private transportation to ensure that their children reach school safety. Some parents accompany their children on public transportation to and from school to promote their safety, which doubles the cost of transportation and involves an additional time investment on the part of a parent.
VI. KADUNA STATE, NIGERIA

Kaduna State was selected as the second case study by USAID for several reasons. First, as a state that has shown strong commitment to engaging with Islamic non-state schools, Kaduna provides an invaluable case study for exploring the lessons of government attempts to partner with the non-state sector in conflict-affected contexts. Second, Kaduna state has been subject to various forms of violent conflict, including religious, communal, gender, tribal, and ethnic-based violence (Coinco, 2014). Education in Kaduna takes place within this complex state of conflict and as a representation of the cultural profile of the community, schools are at the center—or caught in the crossfire—of conflict. Third, the lessons from Kaduna can be compared with the experiences of other conflict-affected countries that have a strong and rich history of Islamic education, such as Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Somalia. Like Kaduna State, these countries have large Islamic ANSS systems that have considerable influence on the access to and quality of basic education.

While there have been studies that investigated the quality, equity, and affordability of Islamic non-state schools, very little is known specifically about how these schools are affected by and respond to conflict. This study contributes to the literature on how Islamic schools affect education outcomes in conflict and crisis contexts. It has two main objectives: (1) to map the non-state education sector and (2) to investigate how affordable non-state schools (ANSS) contribute to education outcomes related to accountability, access and inclusion, quality, safety and well-being, and finance and sustainability.

METHODOLOGY

To achieve the objectives of the case study, primary data were collected through school visits and key informant interviews. Academic, policy, government, and donor reports were collected as secondary data. Data on the education system, including the public and private sectors, were also collected. Details on the school selection criteria, structure of the focus group discussions, and limitations of our methodology are presented in the subsections below.

ANSS SELECTION

Like in El Salvador, a purposive sampling strategy was applied based on three guiding principles: affordability, location, and diversity in provider type.

We adopted a school fee threshold based on methods proposed by Barakat et al. (2012) to identify affordable schools. Using Barakat et al.’s (2012) assumption that a family can affordably spend 4 percent of its household income to educate one child without making significant sacrifices in other areas, we found that a family at the poverty line (earning $1.90 a day) could reasonably afford a monthly fee of $9.24 per child. We used this threshold to identify non-state schools in our sample. Six of the nine sampled schools had monthly fees below or at the $9.24 term threshold. The three schools with fees slightly above this threshold were included to provide variance in our sample. Elite and high-fee schools were not included.

Because Kaduna had no incidence of specific conflict or violence data, the research team relied on local knowledge to sample schools from three different Local Government Areas (LGA) that had been affected by violence, skirmishes, or conflict. Zaria, for example, has a history of political and religious violence (SBM Intelligence, 2017). In 2015, the Human Rights Watch reported that at least 300 people
were killed in clashes between the Nigerian Army and the Shiite group (Human Rights Watch, 2015). According to the BBC, the deaths were in retaliation for the Shia minority group the Islamic Movement of Nigeria’s (IMN’s) attempt to assassinate army chief Gen Tukur Buratai (BBC, 2016). The IMN is backed by Shia-dominated Iran and has a history of clashes with government security forces. Also, the last three decades has seen the Southern LGA of Jemma’a, a predominantly Christian area, riven by conflict between the Muslim, primarily the Hausa-speaking Fulani cattle drivers, and the mainly Christian farmers.

Finally, schools were sampled from the three provider types that are most widespread in Kaduna. Only schools that had an explicit focus on serving low-income or marginalized populations were sampled. Table 11 describes the selected schools after using the above criteria.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TABLE 11: DESCRIPTION OF SAMPLED SCHOOLS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>OWNERSHIP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 Integrated Islamiyyah</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 Integrated Islamiyyah</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 Integrated Islamiyyah</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 Non-integrated Tsangaya</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 Integrated Tsangaya</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 Integrated Tsangaya</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7 Integrated Tsangaya</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8 Christian</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9 Christian</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Authors’ analysis

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32 Integrated Islamiyyah schools teach basic education and Islamic curriculums and are described in greater detail in section V.

33 Tsangayas are non-formal schools that only teach the memorization of the Qur’an. They are described in greater detail in section V.
INTERVIEWS

Each school visit consisted of an interview with the school head teacher, a focus group of four to eight teachers, and a focus group of five to eight parents. The school head teacher selected parent and teacher participants, meaning that the selection was non-random and potentially not representative. A total of 159 individuals participated in interviews or focus groups held during school visits over the course of the study. General school conditions were also observed during the school visits.

Interviews were also held with individuals from a wide variety of organizations that work directly or indirectly with non-state schools or with the education sector in general. In total, 18 informants from government, donor agencies, and civil society organizations were included in individual or group interviews.

LIMITATIONS

The following limitations should be taken into account when considering this study’s findings.

The lack of conflict-prevalence data prevented the team from sampling schools from areas that are the most conflict-affected. Instead, the team used a purposeful sampling strategy based on local knowledge to select schools from areas known to be conflict-affected. Therefore, selected schools are not fully representative of all ANSS in Kaduna State, nor are they representative of all schools affected by conflict.

The selection of teachers and parents for focus groups was not random as participants were chosen by the school head teacher. These groups, therefore, are not representative and are biased. Parents who do not send their children to private schools were not included in the sample. Data therefore are not available regarding the perceptions of caregivers outside of private schools.

Because of budget and time constraints, comparable public schools were not visited as part of the study. Any comparison between private and public schools is based on existing literature, perceptions of participants, or views of experts.

Finally, it is important to note that the scope of this study focuses on basic education (primary to lower secondary). Findings from this study may not be applicable to early childhood, pre-primary, upper secondary, or tertiary education.

CONTEXT

Kaduna State, located in the northwest geopolitical zone of Nigeria, has a mix of ethnic groups, including Hausas, Fulani, Jaba, Kataf, and Bajju among others (Akuto, 2009). Islam and Christianity are the predominant religions of the region. Kaduna has a population of 8 million, of which 57 percent are under the age of 19 (Kaduna State Bureau of Statistics, 2015).

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34 Interview protocols used in school visits are available upon request.
Despite its rich culture, history, and potential for economic growth, human development indicators in Kaduna are low. Life expectancy is at 44 years. The infant mortality rate is 89 per 1,000 live births and the maternal mortality rate is 576 per 100,000 births. Fifty-eight percent of children under five are underweight, and only 52.4 percent of households have access to an improved water source. Only 26.6 percent of the population have access to improved sanitation (Kaduna State Ministry of Budget and Planning, 2016).

Kaduna State remains poor, particularly in rural areas. The Kaduna State Bureau of Statistics (Kaduna State General Household Report, 2015) estimates that 61 percent of the population live in absolute poverty. Households with total monthly incomes below the cost of a BBG are considered to be in absolute poverty. A second measurement of poverty is defined by reference to the living standards of the majority in a given society. Households with expenditures lower than the total household per capita expenditure are considered relatively poor. Table 12 presents the proportion of households living below the absolute and relative poverty lines for Kaduna, as well as the relevant geo-political zones for comparison.

**TABLE 12: POVERTY IN NIGERIA**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>KADUNA</th>
<th>NORTH EAST</th>
<th>NORTH WEST</th>
<th>NORTH CENTRAL</th>
<th>SOUTH WEST</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>% living in absolute poverty</td>
<td>61.5</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>59.5</td>
<td>49.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% living in relative poverty</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>76.3</td>
<td>77.7</td>
<td>40.5</td>
<td>50.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: *Nigeria Poverty Profile 2010 Report*

The following sections outline the context in which non-state schools operate, including the education system, the context of conflict in Kaduna, and the way in which violence and insecurity adversely affect the education system.

**EDUCATION SYSTEM**

The formal education system of Kaduna is regulated by the State Ministry of Education, Science and Technology (SMoE). Various aspects of education delivery and implementation are devolved to government agencies. Of these, the State Universal Basic Education Board (SUBEB) plays a key role in supporting primary schools and implementing the Universal Basic Education (UBE) and Education for All (EFA) programs. The formal education system has five levels: early childhood, preschool, elementary, secondary, and higher education. Public and private providers exist for all of these levels. Table 13 describes the characteristics of each level of formal education.
Over the past years, Kaduna has made impressive strides in improving enrollment at the primary level. The gross enrollment rate has increased from 79 percent in 2011 to 104 percent in 2015. However, only 57 percent of students manage to complete primary schooling—a completion rate much lower than the nation average of 73 percent (Kaduna State Bureau of Statistics, 2016). The completion rate for junior secondary is even lower at 41 percent. By age 15, the official exit age for junior secondary school, 33 percent of children are unable to read a sentence and almost a third cannot perform subtraction (Kaduna State Planning and Budget Commission, 2016). This suggests that students are not learning basic literacy and numeracy skills in school, or they lose those skills as they grow up or drop out.

### Table 13: Description of Formal Education Levels

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Levels</th>
<th>Normative Attendance Age</th>
<th>Grades</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Early Childhood</td>
<td>0–3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pre-primary</td>
<td>3–5</td>
<td>Three years of pre-primary</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Primary</td>
<td>6–11</td>
<td>First to sixth grades</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Junior secondary</td>
<td>12–14</td>
<td>Seventh to ninth grades</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Senior secondary</td>
<td>15–17</td>
<td>Ninth to 12th grades</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tertiary</td>
<td>18 and above</td>
<td>Bachelor’s and masters’ degrees</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: Kaduna State Commissioner for Education, 2009–2020*

*Education Finance*

The Kaduna State education budget has increased over the past few years, from $66 million in 2011 to $84 million in 2013 to $124 million for 2017 (Kaduna State Government, 2014; Kaduna State Government, 2016a). In 2014, the state government allocated 37 percent of spending on personnel. Nineteen percent of the total state budget went to education, of which 50 percent was allocated to primary education.

The education sector receives funding from the federal, state, and local government allocations (World Bank, 2014). Local government sources are used to fund primary school teachers and non-teaching staff salaries. The funds are deducted directly from the state joint account and transferred to the SUBEB for forward payment to teachers. State sources are used to fund the staff salaries and running costs of the various education departments and agencies, sector capital projects across the state, and teachers’ salaries (except for the primary schools). This funding source is known to have problems with timely access and release of funds, which has affected sector performance (World Bank, 2014).
According to the Kaduna State 2014 Education Sector Performance Report, the average pupil-teacher ratio (PTR) at the primary level improved slightly from 33:1 in 2012 to 32:1 in 2013. In junior secondary schools, the PTR improved from 33:1 in 2012 to 28:1 in 2013. There are a total of 59,503 teachers in basic education, 34,004 of which work in primary public schools and 5,851 in junior secondary schools. An additional 19,652 teachers work in non-state schools (Kaduna State Government, 2014).

Many teachers in this workforce, however, were found to be unqualified. An audit and assessment of public school teachers in Kaduna State found that of a total of 43,696 teachers surveyed, 27 percent (of which 25 percent were primary school teachers and 2 percent were secondary school teachers) did not possess the minimum required qualification of the Nigeria Certificate in Education (NCE; Kaduna State Government, 2015). More recently, the state government said that thousands of primary school teachers are to be fired after failing the exams set at the fourth-grade level. Governor Nasir El-Rufai said 21,780 teachers out of 33,000 (66 percent) had failed to score 75 percent or higher on assessments given to pupils (BBC News, 2017). In response, teacher unions and the Nigeria Labour Congress have promised to fight the governor’s decision. The governor’s plan to fire the teachers has already sparked violent street protests, which will further intensify if the government implements the governor’s decision (Ishiekwene, 2017).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TABLE 14: KEY EDUCATION INDICATORS, 2015</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>KEY EDUCATION INDICATOR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gross enrollment rate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Net enrollment rate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Net intake ratio</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Completion rate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender parity index</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TABLE 15: KADUNA STATE BUDGET (IN MILLIONS OF NAIRA)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>RESOURCE MOBILIZATION</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total education budget from state (million $US)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personnel budget (% of total)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Overhead budget (% of total)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Capital budget (% of total)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education share of total state budget (%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Kaduna State Government, 2014

**Teacher Workforce**

According to the Kaduna State 2014 Education Sector Performance Report, the average pupil-teacher ratio (PTR) at the primary level improved slightly from 33:1 in 2012 to 32:1 in 2013. In junior secondary schools, the PTR improved from 33:1 in 2012 to 28:1 in 2013. There are a total of 59,503 teachers in basic education, 34,004 of which work in primary public schools and 5,851 in junior secondary schools. An additional 19,652 teachers work in non-state schools (Kaduna State Government, 2014).

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Gidan Waya College of Education is the official state teacher training institution and has prime responsibility for producing teachers for Kaduna. Other institutions, both federal and state, also train teachers who are then employed within the state (ESSPIN, 2009), including the National Teachers’ Institute, the Institute of Education at Ahmadu Bello University in Zaria, and the Jama’at College. All of these teacher training institutions offer the NCE.

CONFLICT

The nature of conflict and violence in Kaduna state is complex and multifaceted. The state has been subject to various types of conflict, including election-related conflict as well as religious, communal, gender, tribal, and ethnic violence (Coinco, 2014). There is a complex interplay between these forms of violence that often overlap and are easily triggered due to long-standing, deeply rooted mistrust (ESSPIN, 2014a). As a result, conflict and violence in Kaduna is seen to be in a chronic and latent state. Analysis conducted by the Education Sector Support Programme in Nigeria (ESSPIN), a large multi-year engagement program sponsored by DFID, found that inadequately addressed legacies of violence in Kaduna have resulted in an ethno-religious divide in the state, where people are quick to retreat for safety and protection.

Ethno-religious communal violence in Kaduna can be traced to access to power, resources, land, and livelihood. Political violence ignites long-standing religious and communal conflicts, which leads to violent conflicts. For example, after the presidential election in 2011, riots that started in Kafanchan and Zaria rapidly deteriorated from political conflict to a widespread, violent religious conflict resulting in casualties, deaths, and the destruction and loss of houses and businesses (Coinco, 2014).

In Kafanchan, field reports indicated that the occurrence of “silent killings” between Christians and Muslims have created deep divisions in the community. Kaduna is also enmeshed in deadly violence between herdsman and farming communities. Attacks by Fulani herdsmen (mainly Muslim) on farming communities (mainly Christian) and their subsequent reprisals have ravaged Southern Kaduna. The conflict has escalated as more cattle herders move south, oftentimes entering farming land. Farmers accuse the Fulani herdsmen of allowing their cattle to trample and eat their crops. Fulani cattle herdsmen accuse the farmers of killing their cattle (SBM Intelligence, 2017). It is important to note that this herder-farmer conflict pervades Northern Nigeria and is not exclusive to Kaduna (DFID, 2016).

Religious violence in Kaduna is not only between Muslims and Christians. A recent clash between the military and the Shiite Islamic group in Zaria, Kaduna resulted in the death of the three sons of a Shiite leader. This event has brought fear of revenge attacks and uncertainty in the community. (Coinco, 2014)

EFFECTS OF CONFLICT ON EDUCATION

The backdrop of violence and insecurity has contributed to an environment of fear and distrust, fueled by religious conflict. Insecurity and displacement affect households’ access to education and trust in state and community actors and the willingness of parents to send children to school. These dynamics are further complicated by the fact that non-state education in Kaduna is principally religious in nature.

35 Silent killings are said to occur in the evenings where groups of armed men enter homes and kill people in their sleep (Coinco, 2014).
Education—and specifically religious education—can have an important impact in mitigating the effects of conflict and violence. However, education is inherently non-neutral, which is even more true for religious education. It can exacerbate strained religious, ethnic, and community relationships and propagate exclusionary or non-tolerant ideologies. The combination of Kaduna’s expansive, and principally religious, non-state education sector and the historic legacies of conflict has made education not only a victim of conflict but also a driver of conflict.

According to an in-depth study of conflict dynamics in Kaunda, Coinco (2014) found that the high prices for basic commodities such as school fees and unemployment create a sense of marginalization, frustration, and powerlessness for many—sentiments that can easily be channeled into violence. Government officials and donor partners also fear that radical Ma’alams (teachers of non-formal Islamic schools called Tsangayas) may turn students into agents of violence. Teacher strikes against government policies and delays in salary disbursements have caused violence (Coinco, 2014).

Education in Kaduna has been targeted for various reasons, including opposition to an education system perceived to be imposed by “outsiders” and one that promotes foreign values, and as a tactic to spread fear and submission (Coinco, 2014). The immediate impact of violence and conflict in Kaduna includes school closures, destruction or damage to school infrastructures and materials, and decreases in school supervision and inspections. Schools in Kaduna State have also been used to accommodate IDPs who have fled violence in neighboring Bauchi and Plateau states. The same Coinco (2014) study found that the longer-term impact of violence and conflict to children’s education is the migration of pupils and teachers to safer communities, the increased number of dropouts, and the associated lower learning outcomes.

**MAPPING**

Several organizations are responsible for delivering education in Kaduna State, including the State Ministry of Education, Science and Technology (SMoE), the Local Government Area (LGA) Councils, and a variety of agencies and parastatals. These organizations share responsibilities, making planning, implementation, and accountability complicated. School inspection is performed at all levels but with overlapping responsibilities.

The SMoE is supplemented by four agencies: the SUBEB, the Agency for Mass Literacy, the Private Schools Board, and the Bureau of Religious Affairs. These corporate bodies are charged either with a statewide education sub-sector or sub function or with the management of a particular institution. They have considerable overlap regarding the responsibilities of the non-state schools and enjoy a certain level of autonomy.
1. **The Kaduna State Universal Basic Education Board (SUBEB)** – SUBEB’s core mandate is the management of primary and junior secondary schools in Kaduna State. The key functions of SUBEB are the recruitment and management of staff; disbursement of funds to schools; maintenance; rehabilitation of classrooms, schools, and other infrastructure; and purchase and distribution of infrastructure materials.

2. **State Agency for Mass Literacy (SAME)** – SAME is responsible for the eradication of illiteracy among population groups that have not benefited from primary education. It is mandated to provide avenues for vocational and adult literacy programs to those outside the formal school system. One of its key functions is to plan, implement, control, and monitor adult and non-formal education activities. As a result, SAME has areas of overlap with the Kaduna State Private Sector Board.

3. **Kaduna State Private Sector Board (PSB)** – The stipulated functions of PSB are to (1) monitor and regulate activities of private schools, (2) process applications for establishing private schools, and (3) register private institutions. The PSB’s key function includes keeping statistical records on all private schools, regulating fee levels of all private schools in the state, and registering private schools according to categories (e.g., nursery, basic, primary, and junior secondary).

4. **Bureau of Religious Affairs, Office of Executive Governor** – The Bureau of Religious Affairs primary mandates are to promote religious understanding and harmony and to coordinate Muslim pilgrimage matters in Kaduna State. Part of the bureau’s key function is to monitor religious bodies, including Islamic schools. As a result, the bureau registers non-integrated Islamic schools and believes that it should be screening teachers of Islamic religious studies. The constitution designates that the state has responsibility for education provision, but it allows parents to choose the type of education they desire for their children. Consequently, a variety of education modalities beyond strictly SUBEB-provided formal schools has proliferated in both the formal and non-formal sectors.
AFFORDABLE NON-STATE SCHOOLS

Based on the mapping exercise, non-state schools in Kaduna fall into three broad categories:

1. Non-Islamic (usually Christian)
2. Islamic
3. Integrated Islamic schools

It is important to note that there is variation in the typologies used by government and donors to describe non-state schools. This study found that traditional low-fee private schools, which are common in Lagos and other parts of South Nigeria, are mostly absent in Kaduna. Instead, ANSS are predominantly religiously affiliated in Kaduna. The PSB does not have a clear typology for non-state schools. Their registry of private schools includes elite schools, Christian/missionary schools, and integrated Islamiyyah schools. Non-integrated Islamic schools are not considered private and are defined as religious. The result is a lack of understanding of the exact prevalence of non-state schools.

Consequently, there are various estimates of the size of the non-state sector. According to Kaduna State government officials, there are 2,240 registered private schools in Kaduna State. Officials estimate that an additional 2,000 unregistered non-state schools operate in complete isolation of the government. However, this figure does not include non-formal Tsangaya schools, which government officials estimate at more than 6,000 in Kaduna. Of the 6,000 Tsangaya schools, only one-tenth of these schools are accounted for by the Bureau of Religious Affairs. Kaduna State’s Annual School Census Report 2015/16 estimates that there are 925 private schools at the primary level, representing 15 percent of the total schools in Kaduna. The General Household Survey shows that in Kaduna State, nearly 18 percent of students are enrolled in non-state schools. These figures should be interpreted with caution, however, as they are drawn from estimates and various definitions of what is considered a non-state school. The following sections describe the three types of non-state schools in detail.

Non-Islamic Schools

Non-Islamic schools can be secular or Christian. Missionary schools provided much of the first formal education available in Nigeria during the colonization period. While it spread throughout southern Nigeria, northern Nigeria resisted most of the Christian-based missionary schools. In Kaduna, however, Christian schools were able to develop a foothold in the non-state sector as a schooling option for the 20 to 50 percent of the Kaduna population that was Christian (from information based on interviews with government officials). Through interviews, key informants have confirmed the prevalence of Christian and missionary schools in Kaduna. However, there are almost no official statistics on the pervasiveness of Christian schools and no data on enrollment, attendance, or quality. It should be noted that most of the Christian schools are often considered private schools rather than religious schools in government data.

Islamic Schools

The concept of education in northern Nigeria has historically been associated with the teaching of the Qur’an (Hiskett, 1975). When British colonization introduced formal schools, such initiatives came to be associated with proselytization and were resisted in the north, creating systemic differences in education in the north and the south, where the British-based structure was never fully embraced (Antoninis, 2014). Rejection of public education can explain the resurgence in community-based Islamic schools in Kaduna.
the 1980s and 1990s, as state schools became “foreign islands—inaccessible and out of reach—to rural poor, migrant or nomadic children” (Antoninis, 2014). The widely held view is that the quality of education in public schools has deteriorated. As a result, parents in the north have switched back to a type of education “tailored to special needs of those with limited engagement with the state” (Baba, 2011). For many parents, the benefits of Islamic religious schools include proximity, informal organization, and community involvement.

In Kaduna, there are three broad types of Islamic schools: Ilimi/Zaure, Islamiyyah, and Qur’anic. These types of schools are also called IQTE (Islamiyyah, Qur’anic, and Tsangaya) schools. Descriptions of each of these three types of schools are provided below.

**Ilimi/Zaure**

Ilimi/Zaure are non-formal schools that provide an advanced track for specialized training in diverse fields of Islam. Unlike modern formal schools, Ilimi schools operate with an open-ended structure that allows each student to pursue an individual course of study. Ilimi schools teach through advanced discussions of the various meanings and implications of the Qur’an. Typically, the teacher will be seated on a mat surrounded by his students, who will take turns reading from their individual Arabic texts while the teacher gives interpretation and commentary in Hausa or Fulfulde. According to a study conducted by Umar (2003), “the core subjects in the curriculum of Ilimi schools comprise Qur’an exegesis (tafsir), Traditions of Prophet Muhammad (hadith and sira), Principles and Rules of Islamic Jurisprudence (fiqh and usul al-fiq), Theology (Ilm al-tawhid), Mysticism (tasawwuf), Arabic Language and Literature (al-luggha and al-adab), Mathematics (al-hisab), Medicine (tibb), and History (tarikh).” Ilimi schools cater to older students aged 15 years and above who seek specialization in Islamic studies.

**Tsangaya or Qur’anic**

The archetype of traditional Islamic education, Tsangaya schools are non-formal, mobile education institutions that revolve around the Ma’alam, a spiritual teacher who travels from place to place with a few students. These schools are sparse and resource-lean environments where children gather for lessons at the house of the Ma’alam, a mosque, under a tree, or in a community space. At these schools, children are taught to memorize the Qur’an through a combination of recitation and copying activities. Secular subjects are not taught. The typical school consists of students of varying ages, mostly males from about 7 to 20 years old. There are no formal tests in these schools. Students are free to attend or drop out, depending on their family’s need for help with work around the home.

Tsangaya schools are popular in Kaduna for several reasons. These schools have flexible schedules, which are more appropriate for rural societies that rely solely on subsistence farming. According to Solomon (2015), “because these schools have multiple entry points—children can enroll in the schools at any time of the year provided they are in session—parents can schedule their child’s school attendance around seasonal agricultural activities.” This flexibility also allows students to progress at their own pace. In contrast, state schools have a single-entry point at the beginning of each academic year and a complex admission process that sometimes hinders enrollment (Solomon, 2015). Tsangaya schools’ egalitarian outlook and affordability (schools do not charge fees or require payment for uniforms, texts, notebooks, meals, or transportation) are also extremely attractive to parents (Solomon, 2015).
Most of the children who attend Qur’anic and Tsangaya schools are Almajiri, children sent away from their homes by parents to learn the Qur’an. The Almajiri, when not memorizing the Qur’an, are sometimes told by their Ma’alam to roam the street and beg for food or money. These children constitute much of the official out-of-school population in Nigeria.

These poorly accommodated and under-funded schools have concerned the government. While still popular, skeptics view Qur’anic schools as no more than a breeding ground for street-beggars or for propagating extremist behavior. They argue that these under-regulated schools have increasingly failed to fulfill their traditional educational mission and generally do not give their pupils skills and knowledge necessary for functioning effectively in society. Aware of the problem, the federal government has invested heavily in building over 100 integrated Qur’anic/Tsangaya schools in the northern states. These schools will have a more modern curriculum so that students can get a traditional Qur’anic education alongside Western-style classes in reading, math, science, and vocational training (The Economist, 2014).

**Islamiyyah**

A significant number of Qur’anic schools in Nigeria have transformed into Islamiyyah schools by providing more than just basic memorization of the Qur’an. Islamiyyah schools were introduced in the 1950s, inspired by the approach taken by other Muslim countries in response to the challenge of secular schooling. Unlike Ilimi and Tsangaya schools, Islamiyyah schools follow a formal structure in terms of time schedules and approaches to teaching. Many have abandoned the old pedagogical techniques (improvised and offhand teaching) in favor of more formal, structured, and age-bracketed classes.

Islamiyyah schools are private, owned by individuals, communities or societies. They may be integrated or non-integrated. Non-integrated Islamiyyah schools do not offer secular subjects whereas integrated Islamiyyah schools do.

**Integrated Islamic Schools**

In Kaduna, the process of integrating Qur’anic, Tsangaya, and Islamiyyah schools into the Universal Basic Education (UBE) program was put in place in 2006 by the UBE Commission, the national agency responsible for providing quality universal basic education to all Nigerian children. After baseline surveys and a series of consultations with local and religious leaders, Kaduna began the formal process of integrating Islamic schools into the UBE program with support from ESSPIN. The strategy was implemented by the SUBEB.

The state integration strategy can be described as having five main intervention types. Table 16 summarizes the different integration strategies based on intervention and school management.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>INTERVENTION TYPE</th>
<th>SCHOOL MANAGEMENT</th>
<th>DESCRIPTION</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| Boarding          | Government        | • These schools are currently in Birnin Gwari, Sabon Gari, and Kudan LGAs.  
                   |                   | • Schools are managed by the government through a memorandum of understanding between the state and federal governments.  
                   |                   | • The government provides support by constructing classrooms, hostels, toilets, kitchens, and staff quarters.  
                   |                   | • School feeding and school maintenance are handled by SUBEB.  
                   |                   | • Teaching, learning, and other support materials are provided by the government.  
                   |                   | • Teachers are recruited and posted by government.  
                   |                   | • Schools run two sections (basic education headed by a head teacher and the Tsangayya headed by Ma’alams).  
                   |                   | • Teacher salaries and allowances are paid by the government.  
                   |                   | • Curriculum is split between secular and Qur’anic subjects.  
                   |                   | • Ma’alams are not housed in the boarding school.  
                   |                   | • Boarding school students are Almajiris drawn from 23 LGAs. |
| Day               | Government        | • These schools are presently in two LGAs (Gakarko and Makarfi).  
                   |                   | • The schools target hard-to-reach children who are not in boarding or semi-boarding schools.  
                   |                   | • Schools are owned and managed by the government.  
                   |                   | • Schools are run every day of the week, covering basic education and Islamic subjects.  
                   |                   | • Government provides support by constructing classrooms, toilets, headmaster’s offices, and a community recitation hall.  
                   |                   | • These schools have no boarding facilities.  
                   |                   | • Teachers are recruited by government.  
                   |                   | • Salaries are paid to the government-recruited teachers but not to Ma’alams.  
                   |                   | • Curriculum is split between secular and Qur’anic subjects. |
| Semi-Boarding     | Ma’alam           | • These schools are currently in five LGAs (Jemaa’a, Igabi, Soba, Lere, and Kubau)  
                   |                   | • Government provides support by constructing classrooms, hostels, and toilets.  
                   |                   | • Schools have no teacher staff quarters.  
                   |                   | • Schools have no Ma’alams quarters and kitchen.  
                   |                   | • Teaching, learning, and other support materials are provided by the government.  
                   |                   | • Teachers are recruited and posted by the government.  
                   |                   | • Schools run two sections (basic education headed by a head teacher and the Tsangayya headed by Ma’alams).  
                   |                   | • Teacher salaries and allowances are paid by the government, except for the Ma’alams.  
                   |                   | • Curriculum is split between secular and Qur’anic subjects. |
At the core of all five types of integration models is the introduction of SUBEB-recruited teachers to teach basic education subjects. Almost all of the teachers for the basic education subjects are recruited from LGA schools and paid by SUBEB.

### Pilot Ma’alam
- These schools are currently in the 23 LGAs of Kaduna State and were carefully selected for the pilot.
- Management of the schools by Ma’alams fully supported by the government.
- Teaching and learning materials and other support materials provided by the government.
- Teachers are recruited and posted by government.
- Schools run two sections (basic education headed by a head teacher and the Tsangayya headed by Ma’alams).
- Salaries for the teachers and head teachers and allowance for Ma’alams.
- Curriculum is split between secular and Qur’anic subjects.
- The schools are located with the Ma’alams.
- Students are Almajiris, but they are largely orphans and other vulnerable groups.
- No government support for the infrastructure or materials.

### ESSPIN Ma’alam
- Teachers are recruited by Ma’alam from community.
- Volunteers teachers were mobilized, screened, and selected from the schools’ community and trained by ESSPIN.
- Monthly allowances are provided to the volunteers by ESSPIN.
- Curriculum is split between secular and Qur’anic subjects.
- Instructional and support materials are provided and distributed by ESSPIN.
- Ma’alams were supported with a farming scheme program by ESSPIN.
- Some of the Ma’alams that did not buy in to the farming scheme were provided with monthly allowance by ESSPIN.
- Toward the end of the ESSPIN program to date, the government is providing instructional and support materials to the schools.
FINDINGS

The findings that emerged from key informant interviews, focus group discussions, and document review are grouped into four categories: (1) accountability; (2) access and inclusion; (3) quality, safety, and holistic well-being; and (4) finance and sustainability.

ACCOUNTABILITY

1. State authorities recognize the complementary role of non-state schools but are largely unaware of the specific needs and conditions of non-state schools, and they have not ensured that sufficient, good data are collected on non-state schools.

Government actors broadly agree that non-state schools play a significant gap-filling role in education. State actors were honest about the shortfalls of public education citing overcrowded classes, lack of space, and a general lack of accessibility to public schools. One government actor confessed, “parents go to non-state schools because there aren’t enough public schools. For some parents the nearest public schools aren’t close to their homes.”

Despite this recognition, government officials are largely unaware of the precise needs and conditions of non-state schools. This is due partly to the lack of robust data available on non-state schools. The Private School Board, which is in charge of registration, monitoring, and evaluation, have 34 field staff responsible for the inspection of 2,240 registered schools, a ratio of 1 staff member per 65 registered schools. The lack of funding and operational motorbikes for field staff to make school visits were cited as reasons for irregular data collection and incomplete data.

Moreover, government officials are only able to monitor registered schools. Government officials estimate that there are an additional 2,000 unregistered non-state schools in Kaduna that operate in complete isolation of the government. As mentioned, this figure does not include non-formal Tsangaya schools, which are estimated at more than 6,000 in Kaduna. Of the estimated 6,000 Tsangaya schools, only one-tenth of schools are accounted for by the Bureau of Religious Affairs.

2. State policies on registration, accreditation, and taxation of non-state schools are unclear and burdensome. The lack of a suitable regulatory environment discourages non-state schools from registering.

The registration and accreditation process in Kaduna has multiple phases and criteria that are unclear and time consuming for most non-state schools (Box 9). Of the nine sampled non-state schools, only three were registered with the Private Schools Board (PSB).
All three registered schools stated that the multiple government taxes were a heavy burden on their finances. The largest of these fees is the annual re-accreditation fee, which can range from $97 to over $556. The fee is dependent on the school’s categorization, such that class A schools are taxed higher than class E schools. In addition to the annual re-accreditation fee, schools are subject to various fees that are not consistently applied by the government and are not clearly understood by all schools. Head teachers and school directors gave inconsistent statements as to the types of fees they were charged. These included a local government tax, land rental fees, commerce, industry, and appropriate signage fees.

Officials from the PSB acknowledged that multiple government taxation was hurting non-state schools. State officials also revealed that the long accreditation process and the subsequent taxation policies

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36 Non-state schools are categorized by level of income and standard of infrastructure. There are five levels of classification. Class A schools are deemed to have the highest income and better infrastructure standards than Class E schools.
discourage non-state schools from registering. For some schools, it is better to operate independently and forgo paying taxes even though school accreditation is highly valued by parents.

Head teachers suggested that government taxes codes should be waived for low-income schools, which would give schools more money for teacher salaries, investments in infrastructure, or scholarships. When asked what services or support they received from the government in return, school representatives universally responded that they had received no support.

Non-integrated Islamiyyah and Tsangaya schools can also opt to register with the Bureau of Religious Affairs, the government parastatal mandated, among other things, to coordinate and regulate Islamic religious education institutions. Non-integrated Tsangayas are not considered formal schools and are not registered by the PSB.

It is important to note that environments where policies are unclear can lead to corruption. Although the research team did not find evidence of corruption, one headmaster implied a common malpractice by revealing that he keeps all tax receipts “because government officials always come back looking to charge yet another fee.”

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DESCRIPTION</th>
<th>GUIDELINE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Land with certificate of occupancy</td>
<td>4 hectares</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dimensions of classrooms</td>
<td>9 m x 6.6 m</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Class size at inception</td>
<td>Maximum of 49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Administrative block</td>
<td>1 block</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Library</td>
<td>1 functional library</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Basic health scheme</td>
<td>First-aid room</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Toilet facilities</td>
<td>1 with toilet bowl/urinal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Games field</td>
<td>1 football field</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Afemikhe Omo-Egbekuse, & Imobekhai, 2009
**TABLE 18: HUMAN RESOURCES MINIMUM GUIDELINES:**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DESCRIPTION</th>
<th>GUIDELINE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Qualification of head teacher</td>
<td>NCE primary education</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Teacher qualification</td>
<td>TC II, NCE primary education</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minimum number of teachers</td>
<td>1 teacher to 20 students, minimum ratio</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Afemikhe et al., 2009

3. **Non-state schools are deeply rooted in their local communities. As a result, parents, teachers, and headmasters are extensively involved in ensuring the well-being of the school.**

Islamic schools, whether Islamiyyah or Tsangaya, are deeply rooted in their local communities. Parents describe non-state schools as family, where relationships between teachers, parents, and headmasters extend beyond school walls. As a result, non-state schools are often managed by the community or have an active parent-teacher association (PTA) involved in school operations and decisionmaking (such as raising school fees). Major decisions are only made if there is agreement between parents and the school. “Whatever we do, we do it in consultation with the parents,” explained one school’s head teacher. Non-state schools are also supported and consulted by traditional and religious local leaders.

Beyond school management, schools receive in-kind or financial support from the local communities. Parents provide material goods, such as mats, chalk, and teaching materials; give monetary donations; or offer services, such as volunteer support for school feeding. Wealthy community members provide donations as part of the Islamic practice of Waqf. For Islamic schools, these donations are a crucial source of revenue without which they would struggle to stay afloat. Of all non-state school types, Tsangayas are the most dependent on community support for subsistence farming, school feeding, and monetary or material donations.

The two Christian schools are also anchored to the local communities with large Christian populations. The Anglican Church School is located in the city center, which attracts businesses and traders from South Kaduna. The Christian school in Jemma’a is in a predominantly Christian area. Unlike Islamic schools, Christian schools are often affiliated with a church that can financially support the school. Therefore, there is less need for Christian schools to actively engage with communities to seek donations or do fund raising.
4. **Tsangayas are willing to partner with the state authorities and to integrate basic education in their curricula. However, they are disappointed by the lack of commitment shown by the state government in engaging meaningfully with the non-state sector.**

Kaduna State has benefitted from two pilots to integrate basic education into religious non-state schools. The federal government integration scheme, which started in 2006, sought to build integrated Tsangaya schools around the country to address the growing Almajiri and out-of-school populations. However, this government integration program is widely seen as a “white-elephant” project.

The second pilot was part of the Education Sector Support Programme in Nigeria (ESSPIN), a large multi-year engagement program sponsored by DFID. Following its success at Kano State, ESSPIN moved into Kaduna to replicate the Islamiyyah, Qur’anic, and Tsangaya education (IQTE) integration program. The program’s success was built on sensitizing communities on the merits of basic education and explaining that integrating a basic education curriculum into an Islamic school did not mean removing the religious component of the school.

Due to these pilots and various other efforts, Ma’alams and communities have come to accept and acknowledge the importance of basic education. However, the end of ESSPIN and the government’s failure to sustain the pilot integration programs have frustrated Ma’alams and communities that had embraced the concept of integration. As a result, an opportunity may have been missed to build on the momentum generated by past efforts. Communities may be disillusioned by future attempts to integrate schools and may associate their disillusionment to the concept of integration rather than to the government and donor failure to sustain the integration programs.
ACCESS AND INCLUSION

5. Reflecting the localized and faith-based nature of non-state schools, their student bodies are largely of the same religion or tribe.

Although non-state schools do not actively set entry requirements for children from different ethnic or religious backgrounds, the self-selection bias of parents can cause exclusive rather than inclusive student bodies. For example, Islamiyyah schools rarely had Christian students. “There are no Christians here, but we would welcome them,” said one headmaster of an integrated Islamiyyah school. Another proprietor was more outright in their assessments, “This is the nature of our society. Only Muslim parents would choose to send their child to this school, even though we welcome Christians.” As one donor described it, “religious education divides across religious lines, which undermines community resilience.”

State inspectors of non-state schools find that most private schools are established on tribe, religion, or ethnicity and cater specifically to students of the same tribe, ethnic, or religious background. Government officials expressed some grievance about segregation in non-state schools, stating that education needs to be accessible to all children and cannot be divided along religious or tribal affiliations.

We found that the integration of a basic education curriculum in faith-based schools helped to overcome the perception that religious schools only cater to students from the same religion or tribe. Integrated Islamiyyah schools actively sought non-Muslims. “All children are welcome here” and “we are open to all, regardless of tribe” were mentioned by teachers and headmasters. Muslim parents are more likely to send their children to a Christian or missionary school that provides basic education than are Christian parents to send their children to Islamic schools. The two Christian schools in our sample had the most diverse student bodies. The inclusion of basic education curriculum helps parents understand that providing a quality education is often the main goal of non-state schools, not proselyting.
6. Enrollment in affordable non-state schools is driven not only by religion but also by the perceived quality of a “values” education and by school location.

Non-states schools, whether affordable or not, are almost universally preferred to secular state schools. All parents who send their children to Islamic non-state schools disclosed that their primary motivation for doing so was because the school provides an Islamic education. State schools, which are secular and fee-free, do not teach Islam or any other religion. Cultural affiliations of communities to specific religious schools motivate parents to keep their children in such schools even if they must pay higher fees. This affiliation to religious teaching is closely linked to the desire for a values education, where children are taught discipline and respect for elders and are given lessons on proper ethics. The importance of learning the Qur’an is particularly important to parents of children attending Tsangaya schools.

Formal non-state schools are perceived to be of better quality than state schools. Parents unanimously assert that teaching standards are better in private schools than state schools. Teachers pay closer attention to students, rarely miss classes, and are better supervised by the headmaster. Parents emphasize that public school teachers are neither punctual nor committed. We were told that public school teachers would often leave the school by 2 p.m., whereas private school teachers would stay until the end of the school session. It is a common perception that students from state schools are rowdy and not disciplined.

School location is an additional factor linked to school choice. Parents prefer schools located close to their homes. This demand is linked closely to safety. Unlike public schools, formal non-state schools are preferred because they are fenced and usually have a security guard.

Finally, it is important to note that for all parents, even those sending their children to non-integrated schools, an integrated approach to education is very appealing. Parents recognize the benefit of basic education and see the integrated approach as an education model that provides them with the best of both worlds: a modern education necessary for a skills-driven economy with an accompanying curriculum that instills religious principles.

QUALITY, SECURITY, AND STUDENT WELL-BEING

7. Conflict and violence affect non-state schools in a variety of diverse ways, including the suspension of classes and the loss of infrastructure. Enrollment and attendance rates decrease as parents relocate away from violence-torn locations.

Not all sample schools were affected by conflict. Those that experienced violence or civil unrest were affected in a variety of ways. Civil unrest and incidences of violence forced schools to suspend classes. The amount of time schools suspended classes ranged from a few days to four weeks. School closures were sometimes enforced by government curfew. Even when classes resumed, some parents chose to keep their children at home for a few extra days. According to teachers, the performance of students drops as a result of missing school. Other anecdotes include the destruction of infrastructure and incidences of school vandalism.

In the medium to long term, attendance and enrollment rates decrease. Parents relocate out of fear of being targeted for their religion, ethnicity, or tribe. The migration of families adds to the growing homogenization of student bodies. Religious, tribal, or ethnic-based civil unrest or violence exacerbates
the already segregated nature of non-state schools. According to one respondent, “Parents with different beliefs don’t want children to attend other school with different perceptions.” A bomb blast near Christ Church school, where the population is predominantly Muslim, triggered many Christians to relocate to South Kaduna. As a result, the school lost 400 students. When asked what were some of the reasons behind drop-out rates, teachers included conflict as a reason. Teachers from an integrated Islamiyyah said that “for every ten students, four transfer to other schools because of conflict.”

8. **Non-state schools can respond proactively to conflict or imminent violence because they are rooted in their community network.**

Non-state schools are not immune to conflict. However, Islamic non-state schools that are endorsed by local religious leaders enjoy an added level of respect and legitimacy that can protect them from violence. Parents and teachers believe that non-state schools provide a safer environment than public schools. Religious and local leaders are able to warn schools of imminent conflict, which enables schools to plan and prepare. As opposed to public schools, formal non-state schools are also fenced or walled, which significantly improves safety. Some schools hire security guards to improve safety.

Donors held the same belief that state schools were more vulnerable to conflict than non-state schools. Studies conducted by donors working in the northeast geo-political zone of Nigeria found that because non-state schools were so deeply rooted within the communities, they were less prone to direct violent attacks, unlike public schools. One donor explained that a major grievance in northeastern Nigeria is the perceived correlation between secular “Western” education and corruption, exclusion, and class division. Because non-state schools exhibit less of these traits and predominantly focus on Islamic values, they are better insulated from violent attack than state schools.

This link between community and resilience is not clearly understood by government and other state actors working in education. Community vigilance helps protect schools from violence. Donors also agreed that school fencing, absent from public schools, improved security. Although the incidence did not take place in Kaduna, the kidnapping of the Chibok girls by Boko Harm, was presented by an NGO stakeholder as an example of how public schools without fencing were vulnerable to attack.

9. **Religious non-state schools have a platform to incorporate peacebuilding and civic engagement in school curriculums, but there is also fear within the government that unregulated schools can influence violent or extremist behavior.**

Only a few schools reported that they provide counseling or psychosocial support to students. These schools provide counselling to married girls dealing with marital issues as well as moderate support to children who are grieving the loss of a parent. Beyond this, the concept of psychosocial support for children affected by conflict or violence was not understood. Teachers were aware, however, of certain students who displayed signs of distress, such as wetting themselves and jerking in response to loud noises. These teachers also said they were unsure of how to counsel these students.

Religious non-state schools, however, were found to teach good citizenship, respect for others, and morality—subjects closely linked with teachings from the Qur’an and other religious scripts. This provides a clear platform to further incorporate peace-building and peace education courses into school curriculum.

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37 It is important to note that the Chibok girls were Christian and Muslim and were kidnapped from a government secondary boarding school.
curricula. Integrated non-state schools also teach civic engagement and social studies, subjects that are part of the national basic education curriculum.

On the other hand, there is the perception among certain government officials that Tsangaya schools can influence violent or extremist behavior. One government official expressed sadness and fear for the Almajiri by saying “most of these children lack parental care and charity. As a result, they later transform into criminals or agents of violence in society.” The potential “radicalization” of Almajiri is blamed on fundamentalist Ma’alams and the poor quality of education in non-integrated Tsangayas.

It is important to note that we did not find ethnic-religious tension or conflict between ANSS and government schools or inside ANSS. Further, this study did not encounter evidence to suggest the potential radicalization of Almajiri in Tsangayas. There seems to be less resistance from Ma’alams on introducing “Western education” in Tsangaya schools than previously thought. All respondents accepted that children need to learn basic skills.

10. Non-state schools struggle financially to provide meals to students, which is an important consideration of school choice for parents.

All sampled schools sought government, donor, or community support to start or sustain feeding programs. School feeding programs are often expensive to sustain, requiring support from PTAs to help provide resources or support in cooking. According to one head teacher, the school feeding program accounts for the largest operational expense of the school aside from salaries. Feeding programs are more difficult to operate in times of conflict when students are more likely to come to school hungry.

For Tsangaya schools, the task of feeding children is linked to begging. The Almajiri, when not in class, have a reputation for hawking. To quell street begging, Kaduna has implemented a new policy banning the practice. In return, Ma’alams receive vocational training and farming assistance. Frustrated Ma’alams, however, noted that although the begging policy was implemented, the government had failed to provide them with the promised assistance.

In Kaduna where food security is an issue, schools that have feeding programs are viewed favorably by parents. Although we did not find clear evidence of attribution, headmasters from our sampled schools believe the decreasing enrollment and attendance rates in non-state schools have been partially influenced by public-school feeding programs. Parents have found the Kaduna state government feeding program in public schools, introduced at the beginning of this year, enticing. It is important to note that donors view the public school-feeding program as a disaster as it was not planned in conjunction with the Ministry of Education or local governments. The program is expected to face serious financial constraints with the State government and have already requested financial support from donors.
EDUCATION FINANCING AND SUSTAINABILITY

11. The cost to households of sending children to non-state schools varies according to school type.

There are few data sources on the household costs of education in Kaduna State. Among these few is the General Household Survey Panel (GHSP) 2012-2013, a nationally representative survey that provides broad insights on the household cost of education in Nigeria, including Kaduna. Analysis by the World Bank revealed that religious non-state schools in Nigeria tend to be more accessible than secular private schools, having overall lower unit costs, which at times are even lower than public school unit cost. Enrollment in the religious schools tends to be slightly higher among children from poor families. Likewise, enrollment in public schools tends to accommodate children from poorer families at the basic education level. Poor families tend to be associated with larger family sizes, increasing the share of children from the poorer families using public services. Religious schools and public schools are important providers for the poor.

The analysis from the World Bank reveals that “children from the poorest households and from northern states face a significant resource shortage compared with children from affluent families and from southern states regardless of the type of school they attend (public, private and religious).” It is important to note that the GHSP defines religious providers as Islamic schools that are either Qur’anic, Islamiyyah, or Tsangaya. Private schools include Christian schools, elite schools, and the low-fee private schools commonly found in Southern Nigeria.

Although system-level data on school affordability are not available, qualitative data suggest that Christian schools may not be affordable to the lowest-income families and that Tsangaya schools are essentially the most affordable of schools but have the lowest levels of quality.

12. Affordable non-state schools are generally not profit-driven and are not profitable. Non-state schools depend on monetary or in-kind donations from the community for financial sustainability.

Many private schools are established by teachers, charitable individuals, or religious groups. All sampled schools were established with a social, not-for-profit mission. The driving motivation for many of these schools is to provide a quality education that is associated with religious values and traditions. While system-level data on school profitability are not available, school directors included in this study stated that their schools were not profitable and that they were perpetually short on funds. Head teachers of Islamiyyah schools described how their schools would shut down if it were not for donations received by wealthy individuals during the Jummat, Sallat, and other religious services. Sometimes they delay paying teacher salaries because of resource shortages. Schools are rarely closed because of quality issues; they are much more likely to shut down because of financial insolvency.

School fees are the primary source of school revenue, and teacher salaries and all other expenses depend on their regular receipt. Schools may be flexible, out of a sense of communal goodwill, when families are temporarily unable to pay school fees; however, missed fees translate into decreased financial liquidity. School sustainability depends on minimizing other costs, including infrastructure investment, staff numbers, and teacher pay. At such low fee levels, schools are vulnerable to financial
shocks and are unable to make investments that may allow for or attract additional enrollment. Head teachers stated that any attempt to increase school fees would be obstructed by parents.

School proprietors are cognizant of the resource constraints faced by low-income families and have to “accept that some parents won’t pay in time.” Headmasters also offer flexible payment schemes by allowing parents to pay school fees in installments rather than at the beginning of each term. However, the inconsistent revenue flows affect teacher salary payments, which get delayed as a result.

Of all samples schools, Tsangayas operate in the most precarious financial circumstances. Tsangayas charge zero or minimal fees and rely heavily on subsistence farming, community support, and informal business services. Tsangayas often farm on public land for food that is shared with teachers and students. For example, Ma’alams interviewed explained that they offered tailoring or shoe polishing services in order to generate income. Ma’alams at Tsangayas are not paid.
VII. CROSS-CUTTING FINDINGS

The findings presented below represent a synthesis of the information collected as part of the El Salvador and Kaduna State case studies. These case studies encompass distinct economic, political, and conflict contexts, although in both cases the government is functional and can reliably provide public education. These findings therefore should not be seen as representative of all conflict and crisis scenarios, but as principles emerging from two cases that serve as a starting point for future research. Caution should be taken in applying these findings to countries or regions with starkly different political economies, for example, where governments are not fully functional or where the non-state sector is dominated by for-profit school chains. With these caveats in mind, these findings represent a significant contribution to the literature on affordable non-state schools (ANSS) in conflict and crisis scenarios.

1. ANSS play an important role in education provision in conflict and crisis contexts.

Although non-state schools, and particularly ANSS, do not occupy an important place in sector plans in El Salvador and Kaduna, they play a key role in education provision in conflict-affected environments.

ANSS account for a significant proportion of enrollment in conflict-affected areas. While non-state schools account for roughly 21 percent of enrollment in El Salvador, this figure rises to between 30 and 60 percent in the most conflict-affected municipalities. In Kaduna State, non-state schools account for nearly 18 percent of enrollment. In addition, roughly four-fifths of children officially considered as being out of school receive instruction in Tsangaya or other Islamic schools (Antoninis, 2014), and ANSS have a large presence in urban areas, including those affected by conflict.

Furthermore, ANSS provide education and other services to many marginalized students, including students who are not being served by government schools. Most ANSS are mission-driven or motivated by a sense of social responsibility, which leads many to target low-income or marginalized students. In El Salvador, some students do not have government schools they can reach without crossing gang lines, and the only option for safe schooling is an affordable non-state school. In Kaduna state, integrated Islamiyyah schools are particularly attractive for girls because parents are more comfortable sending girls to schools built around a values-based Islamic curriculum.

In short, although there are differing views about the role of the state and donors in supporting non-state education in conflict and crisis settings, they currently occupy a critical role within the education sector in these settings.

2. ANSS are frequently religious in nature, which may mitigate or exacerbate the impact of conflict on education.

All of the schools sampled in Kaduna and El Salvador as part of this study were either religious in nature or included religious instruction or values in the curricula. Some schools were owned, managed, or officially associated with a particular congregation or religious group, while others were operated by religiously aligned individuals. All school chains or networks identified as part of the mapping were also associated with faith-based organizations. While there are undoubtedly secular ANSS in both contexts, the size of their presence is unclear. In any case, affordable non-state education in both contexts is predominantly religious.
The religious affiliation of schools has an important interaction with conflict and insecurity. In general, if the school is religiously aligned with the aggressor or violent group, the school will be somewhat insulated from violence. In El Salvador, gangs maintain a respect and reverence for religious institutions. Consequently, they are much less likely to harass or extort schools operated by churches or the affiliated students or teachers. In Kaduna State, religious leaders have warned schools of upcoming attacks by violent groups. However, if the school is not religiously aligned with the aggressor, it may face a greater risk of attack. For example, Boko Haram violently targets non-Islamic schools that offer a basic education curriculum deemed “Western.”

3. Governments have limited awareness of the ANSS sector.

In El Salvador, few representatives from the Ministry of Education, donor organizations, and NGOs were aware of the existence of non-state schools offering low fees and targeting low-income households. In Kaduna, Ministry officials had a greater awareness of the contributions of the ANSS sector but little insight into the status and needs of ANSS. This is partly due to a lack of quality data. The Private Schools Board in Kaduna has an understaffed team of 34 members charged with monitoring and collecting data on more than 2,000 registered non-state schools. In both cases, misperceptions and a lack of high-quality data result in restrictive regulation and a lack of support for ANSS from NGOs, donors, and the government.

In conflict settings, data collection is challenging, which in turn exacerbates misconceptions. For example, MINED representatives in El Salvador are unwilling or unable to enter certain neighborhoods because of the threat posed by gangs.

4. Caregivers choose ANSS over government schools out of a concern for safety, as well as an interest in values, culture, religion, and proximity.

Caregivers elect to send children to ANSS for a variety of reasons. Importantly, in conflict settings, non-state schools are perceived to be safer than government schools. In El Salvador, school directors, teachers, and caregivers universally indicated that enrollment decisions are driven by a concern for safety. Safety in Salvadorian ANSS is driven by the creation of a more controlled environment, investments in security infrastructure and personnel, closer community connections, and school affiliation with churches. These factors are absent or less pronounced in government schools. Similarly, parents are drawn to Nigerian ANSS because they are perceived to be safer. Safety in ANSS in Kaduna is promoted by the close relationships that ANSS have with the communities. Local leaders can warn schools of imminent conflict, which allows schools to proactively plan and prepare.

Caregivers in both contexts also have an intense interest in the religious and values-oriented education provided by ANSS. Caregivers want their children to receive an education that is consistent with their beliefs or that furthers religious knowledge. Furthermore, many caregivers stated that government schools do not effectively teach positive values, such as respect and responsibility, whereas ANSS instill these values in their students. Caregivers feel that ANSS more effectively create a sense of community; foster a sense of belonging for students; and build relationships between households, teachers, and the school, which contribute to a superior school environment. Finally, schools offer additional programming or modified instruction not provided by government schools, which is valued by caregivers. Such programming includes music, dance, computer, English, and vocational education classes in El Salvador and dedicated classes on Islamic values and Quranic studies in Kaduna.
5. ANSS are motivated by service rather than profit.

While the general perception of non-state schools in El Salvador is that they are profitable, profit-seeking, and serve middle- and upper-class individuals, the schools sampled as part of the study did not fit this characterization.

While it is possible that profit-seeking schools exist in El Salvador and Kaduna, evidence of their operation was not found by the study. Given household-level financial constraints and the risks of entering a market operating under conflict and crisis, it is unclear whether a for-profit model would be viable to profit-seeking enterprises. Instead, sampled ANSS were primarily driven by social missions. Schools may be operated by faith-based organizations with the purpose of promoting their religion and serving marginalized and low-income populations. Schools also may be established by former teachers seeking to provide students in low-income neighborhoods with higher-quality education than is available in the public system. Similarly, in Kaduna, sampled ANSS were established with a religious or social mission and were generally aimed at serving low-income populations. For-profit schools were likewise not apparent. The non-state school sector is dominated by religious school in Kaduna State.

In neither context were schools found to be profit-seeking or profitable. Instead, schools were frequently beset by financial shortages. While most sampled ANSS charged fees, the fees served to cover operational expenses and were often insufficient to cover costs. Teachers were consistently paid very low wages, and payments were sometimes missed because of a shortage of funds. In some schools, such as Juan Bueno schools in El Salvador, external financing is received or cross-subsidization is used so that schooling may be provided to low-income individuals at a low, even nominal, cost.

6. Fees charged by ANSS often do not cover school costs. Sustainability in the absence of additional financing from alternate sources is a challenge for schools.

Schools sampled for this study operated in a resource-poor environment. Virtually all schools charged some sort of enrollment fee to students. Schools that relied exclusively on user fees generally face chronic financial shortages. Such schools remain solvent by forgoing necessary infrastructure improvements, paying teachers at or below minimum wages, absorbing losses, or relying on in-kind contributions from caregivers and community members.

Schools that receive external financial support are both better resourced and have fewer concerns for sustainability. In El Salvador, CECE schools receive significant financial support from MINED, which allows for additional investment in human resources and teaching and learning materials while enabling the school to lower fees. Juan Bueno schools use a cross-subsidization model, likewise allowing schools that serve low-income populations to charge minimal fees while ensuring regular financial flows and allowing for improvements in infrastructure and resources, both physical and human.

In both contexts, schools are supported through contributions from communities and student caregivers, in-kind contributions or investments of time. Many Islamic schools in Kaduna depend on financial donations from wealthy community members as part of the Islamic practice of Waqf. These contributions are a crucial source of revenue, without which Islamic schools would struggle to stay afloat. Infrastructure improvements are often completed with assistance from caregivers, who contribute raw materials and labor. Caregivers also frequently volunteer in various capacities at schools.
7. **ANSS may exclude certain students or communities, which may promote inequality and contribute to societal divides.**

Government schools in El Salvador and Kaduna State have a mandate to serve all students, irrespective of religion, ethnicity, class, gender, or income. While this responsibility is sometimes imperfectly executed, it creates, in effect, heterogeneous student bodies. Non-state schools do not share the same mandate. Some schools institute entry requirements, ensuring that only higher-achieving students enroll or that students who may pose a threat to the student body are excluded. Enrollment fees, however small, may also prevent the lowest-income students from enrolling.

Furthermore, some ANSS cater to specific populations, usually along religious lines. While there was no evidence that schools prohibited enrollment of students who did not pertain to the religion associated with the school, students self-selected into schools affiliated with their religious beliefs. Although this did not seem problematic in El Salvador, religious segregation threatened to exacerbate social cleavages in Kaduna. As a principle, Muslim students attended Islamic schools, and Christian schools are predominantly attended by Christian students, forming homogenous and insular educational communities. State schools, which integrate religions, may be more likely to promote mutual understanding between religious groups. Schools segregated along religious lines have the potential to radicalize students or foment suspicion of outside groups, while doing nothing to promote inter-religious dialogue.

8. **Conflict has a mixed impact on school sustainability. Conflict imposes additional costs on ANSS and may lead to displacement, which lowers enrollment. However, conflict may increase demand for ANSS.**

Conflict undeniably presents a challenge to ANSS sustainability in Kaduna State and El Salvador. Some schools are directly threatened by insecurity, whether by direct attacks at or near the schools or by threats or extortions directed at school leadership. Existing financial shortages may be exacerbated by payments of extortion or the necessity of investment in security infrastructure or security personnel. Students' inability to pay fees may be worsened by conflict, thereby worsening liquidity challenges.

In both contexts, demand for schooling in ANSS was partially driven by the perception that ANSS provide a safer environment for education than government schools. In the absence of conflict, this factor would certainly not play such a significant role. There is tentative evidence that enrollment in ANSS is, at least in part, being fueled by security concerns. Conflict therefore promotes demand for education in ANSS and helps improve sustainability. At the same time, conflict may be disruptive to the student body of ANSS. In Kaduna and El Salvador, security threats to households have led to significant internal displacement and international migration. Enrollment in some schools has fallen precipitously. In schools that depend on user fees for financial solvency, a decline in enrollment can endanger sustainability.
VIII. RECOMMENDATIONS

Based on the findings above, we present eight recommendations for how governments and donors might productively engage with affordable non-state schools (ANSS) in contexts of crisis and conflict. It should be noted that these recommendations assume that Ministries possess a baseline level of operational capacity as well as an openness to engaging with non-state actors. This is clearly not the case in many crisis and conflict settings. The two locations where the case studies took place—El Salvador and Kaduna State—may be well-placed to adopt several of the following recommendations, which may not be the case in contexts such as Somalia or South Sudan.

Ministries of Education should:

1. **Map and define the variety of non-state actors and their target groups.**

   It is clear from the available literature that there is a diverse set of non-state schools, including religious, community-run, and low-fee private schools. Each of these school types has not only differing institutional arrangements but also differing student bodies which they target. As a first step toward better understanding the breadth of non-state actor in a country, governments would be wise to map this set of actors, including where schools are located, what types of schools exist, what fees are charged, and how many students are served. This mapping may confer recognition upon non-state actors and serve as a catalyst for brokering dialogue.

2. **Conduct regular surveys and assessments of non-state schools to inform evidence-based decisionmaking.**

   While a robust mapping of non-state schools will serve as a starting point for Ministries to develop evidence-based policies, it is critical that data on the size and performance of the non-state sector be collected on an ongoing basis. To allow for this, planned surveys should be funded and needs assessments must be conducted to help identify the bottlenecks that non-state schools face. These surveys, which might probe dimensions of quality, student achievement, background of students, financial sustainability of schools, and barriers posed by crisis and conflict, could collect critical information that may influence sector policies and resource allocation.

   While conducting such research requires investment and some level of capacity on the part of Ministries of Education, it is indeed possible in crisis and conflict settings. For example, school inaccessibility or threats of violence can be partially mitigated through advanced outreach to schools and sensitization about forthcoming data collection among community leaders. While there may be some accompanying diminution of data in such settings, with the appropriate adjustments, useful evidence can still be collected to shape policy.

3. **Integrate the private sector into sector documents and plans.**

   Given their prevalence in many contexts, and the consequent significant role they play in education provision, non-state schools should be considered and included in sectoral planning processes. For example, Ministries of Education and Finance are forced to make difficult decisions about where to allocate scarce resources. Absent an understanding of the extent to which non-state schools are providing access to affordable, high-quality education, such resources may not be targeted to the areas of highest need, such as those with a shortage of schools, whether public or non-state. Sector plans
should acknowledge the potential for non-state schools to contribute to sector goals and should outline principles for coordination and collaboration at centralized or decentralized levels.

4. **Ensure that the processes for registering, accrediting, and regulating non-state schools are clear and streamlined.**

While regulation can play an important role in ensuring quality standards, the registration criteria for new schools should be designed so as to not unduly restrict the entry of new institutions or create disincentives to register and ultimately provide additional schooling options. Instead, the accreditation process should be streamlined and based on clear criteria. Regulation of non-state schools should be systematic; quality indicators should be objective and measurable so as to minimize discretion and limit the potential for corruption.

Regulations and accreditation requirements should take conflict and crisis scenarios into consideration. As these scenarios may cause shortages in government school provision, as well as be detrimental to infrastructure and disruptive to financing, regulations that are appropriate during peacetime may be excessively restrictive under the constraints imposed by conflict and crisis. Governments could consider relaxing regulations, such as strict infrastructure requirements, in order to allow for greater flexibility, responsiveness, and scale of provision in crisis and conflict-affected contexts. Such policies also reflect the reality that governments which struggle to maintain oversight over state-run schools are likely not capable of providing stringent oversight for non-state institutions.

5. **Assess the feasibility of targeted subsidies.**

In contexts of crisis and conflict, achieving goals around education for all can be particularly challenging. For education ministries weak in capacity, partnering with non-state schools can accelerate progress toward achieving these goals. While most governments do not have the resources to directly subsidize non-state schools or school chains, there may be opportunities for targeted collaborations or subsidies, for example, by allowing private school teachers no-cost access to in-service trainings at national teacher colleges or by offering modest financial incentives for teachers to serve in areas affected by crisis and conflict. Governments could also buy seats in private schools to accommodate displaced populations where state schools do not have the capacity to respond to a population influx.

Donors should:

6. **Map the opportunities and risks associated with engaging with non-state actors.**

Given the prevalence of non-state schools in many countries, any education sector strategy that does not acknowledge their role is incomplete. For some donors, engagement with non-state schools may enhance the likelihood of meeting strategic goals around access, learning, building resilience and peace, or supporting marginalized communities. At the same time, it is also critical that donors analyze the risks of associating with non-state actors. These risks range from politics—that is, support of non-state actors in some way reflects a de-prioritization of government-run schools—to the possibility that supporting these schools can induce harm, as some schools may exacerbate societal divisions or promote radicalization. The ultimate means of engagement will vary according to donor priorities and the
risk-benefit calculus; however, donors would be wise to conduct an intentional process that systematically takes into account political and political economy considerations, including restrictions on supporting religious organizations, or the political ramifications of supporting non-state schools, which may aggravate teachers’ unions.

7. **Invest in efforts to improve data collection practices.**

Donors should investigate the potential benefits of system-strengthening initiatives that would assist both the government and non-state sectors, thereby serving as public goods. One potential area for such support is the collection and use of better data. Donors can partner with state agencies in the design, implementation, analysis, and funding of surveys and censuses, which can be resource intensive. Such assistance could improve accountability of non-state schools and enhance the ability of the Ministry of Education to target schools with the greatest need for assistance, or with the greatest potential for investment. They might also provide an empirical basis upon which to assess the contributions of non-state schools to goals around universal learning and safety in conflict and crisis settings.

8. **Consider supporting policies that lower the financial burden for certain not-for-profit ANSS.**

Given the typically weak financing from conflict-affected states for education and the important role ANSS play in ensuring education continues in these contexts, donors may consider supporting financing strategies and activities for certain, registered, not-for-profit ANSS. Examples of such support include advocating for and helping develop tax relief policies and providing governments with technical assistance to define and set up special funds for ANSS that face extreme financial constraints. Before leveraging any financing strategy, donors should carefully consider the potential market shaping implications, externalities, and tradeoffs with public education spending.

9. **Support government champions where political will is present.**

In settings with widespread antagonistic or agnostic attitudes toward non-state schools, considerable political will may be necessary to shepherd the development of a meaningful, coherent strategy toward non-state providers, or to initiate PPPs. Critically, the process must be driven by domestic governmental actors—often at the ministerial level. However, a coalition of stakeholders, including donor partners, can support domestic champions by, for example, contributing to dialogue about the role non-state schools may play, building acknowledgement of the role non-state actors play into sectoral strategies, or providing financial support.
# TABLE 17: SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATIONS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>STAKEHOLDER</th>
<th>RECOMMENDATION</th>
<th>FINANCIAL COST</th>
<th>NECESSARY CAPACITY</th>
<th>NECESSARY POLITICAL WILL</th>
<th>KEY CONSIDERATIONS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ministries Of Education</td>
<td>Map and define the variety of non-state actors and their target groups</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>In some contexts (e.g., El Salvador) a preliminary mapping already exists. The process of mapping can confer recognition upon the non-state sector. Mapping provides visibility into the range of schooling options available in areas particularly affected by crisis and conflict. Mapping can be incorporated within rapid needs assessments for education and can be conducted in partnership with NGOs and donor partners.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Systematize data collection</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td></td>
<td>Data collection may need to be streamlined and coordinated among service providers in crisis and conflict settings. Good practices for collecting data in crisis and conflict exist (USAID ECCN, 2017).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Integrate the non-state sector planning processes</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>High</td>
<td></td>
<td>Such integration may lead to greater allocative efficiency. This does not imply specific policies for the non-state sector but is rather an acknowledgement that all education providers can contribute to sector goals.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Streamline regulatory practices</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td></td>
<td>This is particularly important in crisis and conflict settings where options for schooling may be lower. Policies should be balanced so that non-state schools remain flexible but still adhere to minimum standards. Streamlining regulatory practices could prevent rent seeking and other opportunistic behavior. The development of policies should be conducted through participatory processes.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assess the feasibility of targeted subsidies</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>High</td>
<td></td>
<td>Subsidies are highly politicized and require considerable political capital to implement. Before adopting any subsidy, government must consider the potential effects of market distortion and other externalities.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>STAKEHOLDER</td>
<td>RECOMMENDATION</td>
<td>FINANCIAL COST</td>
<td>NECESSARY CAPACITY</td>
<td>NECESSARY POLITICAL WILL</td>
<td>KEY CONSIDERATIONS</td>
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<tr>
<td>Donors</td>
<td>Map the benefits and risks of engaging with non-state sectors</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Mapping can serve as a first step in formulating sector strategies. Some donors are restricted from supporting certain types of non-state schools. For example, the Establishment Clause limits USAID’s ability to support religious schools. Donors must consider how engaging with non-state actors can delegitimize government authority. Donor engagement with the non-state sector must be endorsed and supported by the government.</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Consider supporting policies that lower the financial burden for certain ANSS</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>This can be divisive and seen as support for “privatization” of education. Financial strategies that support non-state schools can lead to adverse market-shaping implications and externalities.</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Support better data collection processes</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>Higher-quality data can be used to assess, with greater accuracy, the contributions of non-state schools to achieve the goal of education for all and safer learning. Supporting improved processes can build capacity among government officials.</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Support government champions</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Ranges from low to high</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>It can be risky to spend large amounts of political capacity supporting a single champion, given the frequent turnover at high levels of government. Donors should consider the background, ideology, and implications of supporting individual champions, particularly in contexts of conflict and crisis.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
IX. REFERENCES


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### X. ANNEX I: EL SALVADOR

**INFORMANTS INCLUDED IN STUDY**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>INFORMANT GROUP</th>
<th>INFORMANTS</th>
</tr>
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<tr>
<td>Donors</td>
<td>AECID</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>GIZ</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Inter-American Development Bank</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Millennium Challenge Corporation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>UN Population Fund</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>UNDP</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>UNICEF</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>USAID</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MINED</td>
<td>Department of Institutional Accreditation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Department of Education – San Salvador</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>MINED, National Directorship of Youth and Adult Education</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NGO/CSO</td>
<td>Fundación para la Educación Integral Salvadoreña (FEDISAL)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Asociación de Colegios Privados El Salvador (ACPES)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Glasswing International</td>
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<tr>
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<td>Fe y Alegría</td>
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<td>Fundación Educo</td>
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<td>Fundación Pro Educación El Salvador (FUNPRES)</td>
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<td>CIDE</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Compassion International</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Fundación Salvador del Mundo (FUSALMO)</td>
</tr>
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<td></td>
<td>Fundación para la Educación Superior (FES)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Episcopal Conference</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sindicato de Maestras y Maestros de la Educación Pública de El Salvador (SIMEDUCO)</td>
</tr>
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### ENROLLMENT TRENDS IN PESS MUNICIPALITIES

#### TABLE 18: ENROLLMENT IN PUBLIC AND NON-STATE SCHOOLS IN PESS MUNICIPALITIES, 2015–2016

<table>
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<td></td>
<td>Public</td>
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<td>11,391</td>
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<td>2,565</td>
<td>2,710</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>% Non-state</td>
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<td>36.3%</td>
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<td></td>
<td>% Non-state</td>
<td>34.24%</td>
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<td>% Non-state</td>
<td>24.1%</td>
<td>28.4%</td>
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<td>33.3%</td>
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<td>14,351</td>
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<td>27,928</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Non-state</td>
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<td>Soyapango</td>
<td>Non-state</td>
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<td></td>
<td>CECE</td>
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<td>248</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Private</td>
<td>82</td>
<td>74</td>
<td></td>
<td>Private</td>
<td>21,789</td>
<td>20,811</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>% Non-state</td>
<td>2.13%</td>
<td>2.44%</td>
<td></td>
<td>% Non-state</td>
<td>48.6%</td>
<td>49.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mejicanos</td>
<td>Public</td>
<td>15,591</td>
<td>14,520</td>
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<td>CECE</td>
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<td>1,354</td>
<td></td>
<td>CECE</td>
<td>631</td>
<td>641</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Private</td>
<td>7,737</td>
<td>7,900</td>
<td></td>
<td>Private</td>
<td>1,671</td>
<td>1,636</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>% Non-state</td>
<td>37.01%</td>
<td>38.92%</td>
<td></td>
<td>% Non-state</td>
<td>11.00%</td>
<td>11.42%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: MINED 2016a; MINED 2017b

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38 Note that some year-to-year changes in CECE and private school enrollment totals are caused by Catholic schools joining or exiting the CECE association. This could explain the dramatic change in CECE enrollment in Colón between 2015 and 2016, for example. This does not affect overall non-state sector enrollment trends, as Catholic schools are counted as non-state regardless of whether they are part of CECE or not.
RECOMMENDATIONS

This study represents the first examination of any depth into non-state schools in El Salvador and disputes many commonly held notions about the accessibility, role, and spread of non-state schools in the Salvadorian education system. In closing, we present recommendations for actions that various system actors could take to support the Salvadorian education system at large through interactions with the non-state sector. These recommendations have at their foundation an understanding that a large proportion of non-state schools serve low-income and violence-affected populations, and the private and public sectors are inexorably related, face the same challenges, and would profit from closer collaboration.

There are many common-sense reforms and interventions that could result in improving the quality of education offered by non-state schools without necessarily diverting resources from public schools to private. Additionally, there are modalities through which investment in non-state schools could augment resilience to violence and access to education. Recommendations are presented by actor type.

Ministry of Education:

1. **The Ministry of Education as a whole should adopt a greater recognition of the size, role, and needs of the non-state sector.** Currently the only ministry department with meaningful interaction with an awareness of the private sector is the Department of Accreditation. As a result, MINED actors miss potentially productive engagements and private schools are stigmatized. Furthermore, this lack of recognition diminishes MINED quality control over ANSS, undermines coordination between state and non-state schools, and prevents students that attend private schools from receiving support.

2. **MINED should integrate the private sector into sector documents and plans,** such as PESS and Plan El Salvador Educado. Private schools should be seen as occupying an important role in the education sector, rather than existing as a separate entity. Including private schools in sector plans would better enable private schools to support MINED goals and support future collaboration between public and private actors. Particularly in the case of PESS, the government should recognize that families respond to insecurity through private school enrollment and incorporate this understanding into official analyses, policy, and planning.

3. **Provide private school teachers no-cost access to in-service training.** Teachers in some APS do not have access to in-service training, largely because their institution is unable to afford its cost. While admitting non-state teachers to these training would incur a marginal cost to the state, it could be seen as investing in future public-sector teachers, given that many teachers pass from the private to the public sector.
4. **Harmonize initial accreditation requirements with re-accreditation requirements.** Because of the cost and bureaucratic difficulty of opening a new school, very few new private schools are able to open. As a consequence, private schools are unable to respond to the demand for private education in violence-affected areas, and schools that do open must do so at elevated costs. However, many schools—both public and private—are in operation that do not meet these initial accreditation requirements. MINED should investigate areas in which accreditation requirements can be relaxed to facilitate school establishment while still ensuring student safety and minimum school quality.

5. **Facilitate the process of registering as a not-for-profit organization.** Private schools opt for registering as for-profit organizations because of the difficulty of registering as not-for-profit organizations, even when they would qualify for that categorization. Simplifying the registration process and providing assistance to schools looking to register would enable more schools to appropriately benefit from the not-for-profit status.

6. **Improve data on school performance.** Beyond the PAES test, there is no standardized evaluation of education outcomes at the primary level in private schools. Developing non-invasive formative assessments and disseminating results would help MINED gauge levels of quality in private schools and learn about best practices, as well as provide families a valuable input for school selection. This would also create an additional incentive for schools to promote performance, help direct attention toward underperforming students and schools, and provide an important tool for researchers.

Additionally, MINED could consider investigating an additional recommendation requiring investment in the private sector:

7. **Investigate expanding the subsidies offered to CECE schools to other socially motivated, not-for-profit private schools.** Some or all of the subsidies provided to CECE schools could be expanded to other private schools in order to make private schooling more accessible to low-income students. For example, the same food, uniforms, books, and shoes currently provided to public and CECE schools could be expanded to more or all students, regardless of the type of schools they attend, as an affirmation of the right to education. MINED could investigate the benefits and costs of expanding per-student subsidization or payment for teacher positions to other schools serving low-income populations or those operating in violence-affected areas. Subsidization could therefore be based on student need and a school’s social mission and quality, rather than its religious affiliation.

Donors:

8. **Sector engagement strategies should incorporate, or at least consider, non-state schools.** Over 20 percent of formal-sector enrollment is in non-state schools. This figure is one-and-a-half to three times as high in urban, violence-affected municipalities. Any strategy that does not acknowledge this reality is incomplete. Donor activities should explore engagements with non-state schools as a means of building resilience and peace and supporting marginalized communities. Any sector-level research should also incorporate non-state schools, as these schools form an important part of the education sector.
9. Consider providing technical assistance to MINED to support the reform of accreditation requirements, support the collaboration with non-state schools, improve data collection practices, and develop standardized testing. Donors should investigate the potential benefits of providing system-strengthening assistance to MINED. Such assistance could benefit the public and non-state sectors, improve accountability of non-state schools, and improve the ability of the MINED to target schools with the greatest need of assistance or with the greatest potential for investment.

ANSS advocates:

10. ANSS advocates should dedicate efforts to changing the popular perception that all private schools are well-resourced, have high fees, and target high- and middle-income populations. One major barrier to government, donor, and NGO collaboration with ANSS is a perception that private schools are elite, rent-seeking, and not in need of assistance. Correcting this stigmatization could result in greater inter-sectoral cooperation.

11. Private school associations should participate more vocally in the National Education Council (CONED), using the platform to sensitize other council members to the status and needs of non-state schools. While the El Salvador Private School Association (Asociación de Colegios Privados de El Salvador, or ACPES) is already a member of CONED, CECE schools should also be represented independently in the council. Private school associations should use this space to suggest additional areas for cooperation with the public sector.

Researchers:

12. To date, researchers have not devoted their attention to private schools. Researchers should expand on the findings of this report by exploring various topics, including the following:

• **Violence as a driver for enrollment in non-state schools.** Researchers should conduct quantitatively rigorous research to determine to what degree violence and gang activity have affected enrollment trends in non-state schools and compare these trends with enrollment in public schools.

• **Private school financial models.** Researchers should perform analyses of private school revenues and expenditures to understand school sustainability and cost-effectiveness.

• **Non-state pedagogy and educational outcomes.** While non-state schools are perceived to have superior educational outcomes, actual outcomes have not been comparatively studied. Researchers should rigorously study the differences in education outcomes between public and private schools, accounting for student income and level of communal violence. They should also conduct comparative classroom observations to understand differences in pedagogy and instructional methods and their effects on learning.

Schools:

13. **ANSS should seek out engagements with government services and NGOs.** While NGOs and representatives of government services show initial hesitancy toward working with private schools, this study found that these perceptions often change when actors understand that many
private schools are low-resource, operate in violent areas, and serve low-income populations at affordable fees. Expressing this sentiment to service providers could increase the probability of non-state schools accessing NGO or government services and funding. Organizing and advocacy groups such as ACPES could assist in systemic outreach efforts as a service to their member schools.

**AFFORDABILITY OF NON-STATE SCHOOLS**

To ensure that the study includes schools that could be considered affordable to low-income families, it was first necessary to develop a definition of affordability based on an understanding of what a family living in poverty could reasonably expect to pay for education. In El Salvador, a person is considered to be living in extreme poverty if their monthly income is lower than the cost of purchasing a predetermined basket of basic goods. A person is considered to be living in relative poverty if their income is lower than two times the cost of the same basket of basic goods, referred to as the expanded basket of goods. El Salvador has defined a national average cost of this basket, along with baskets for rural and urban areas. These baskets correspond with per capita extreme and relative poverty lines (ODHAC, 2015).

In 2016, the average household size in El Salvador was 3.6. For such a household in urban areas, the cost of the basket of basic goods was $189.85 per month, and for rural areas, it was $128.78 (Calderón & Belloso, 2017). The cost of the expanded basket of goods was therefore $379.70 for urban and $257.56 for rural areas. These figures correspond to the extreme and relative poverty lines for average-sized households in 2016.³⁹

Various scholars have offered definitions for what could be considered affordable or low-fee. Barakat et al. (2012) consider schooling affordable if all school fees for one child are below 4 percent of a family’s income, whereas Tooley (2013) argues that the total of education expenses for all children is affordable if it accounts for less than 10 percent of a family’s income. Regardless of the threshold used, there is consensus that affordability depends on the individual household’s situation, including income level and the number of school-aged children (Psacharopoulos et al., 1997). Fees that are affordable for one family will not necessarily be affordable for another.

Because affordability is dependent on the individual situation, we recognize the limitations of creating a universal threshold or definition for affordability. For the sake of simplicity, we propose to use the Barakat et al. (2012) threshold for affordability (4 percent of household income per child) as a definition of low-fee.⁴⁰ We applied this threshold to urban and rural relative poverty lines to derive what we consider to be affordable monthly school fees. This would be $15.20 per month for urban areas and $10.32 per month for rural areas.

Applying these thresholds to a list of all private schools within the 10 priority municipalities yields 19 schools that could be categorized as affordable. However, the greatest concentration of private schools falls within the range of $15 to $30 per month. This distribution suggests that the lowest-fee schools, while most likely to be affordable, may not be representative of all lower-fee private schools.

³⁹ In 2015, 9.1% of El Salvador’s population was living in extreme poverty; 25.7% was living in relative poverty; and the remaining 65.2% were living above the relative poverty line (ODHAC, 2015).

⁴⁰ We feel that the Tooley definition (10% of income allocated to education between all children) would also result in a threshold close to 4% per child. Given that the average household size in El Salvador is 3.6 (suggesting between 2 and 3 children per household), the per-child expenditure on education under the Tooley definition would be between 3.33% and 5%.
XI. ANNEX 2: KADUNA STATE, NIGERIA

INFORMANTS INCLUDED IN STUDY

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>INFORMANT GROUP</th>
<th>INFORMANTS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Kaduna State Ministry of Education, State Universal Basic Education Board (SUBEB), Private Schools Board (PSB), Implementation Committee on IQTE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NGO/CSO</td>
<td>State Chapter of Qur’anic Ma’alams, Millennium Hope Tsangaya School, Civil Society Action Coalition Education for All (CSACEFA), Federation of Muslim Women in Nigeria (FOMWAN)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
RECOMMENDATIONS

A number of common-sense reforms and interventions could improve the quality of education offered by non-state schools without necessarily diverting resources from public to private schools. Additionally, there are modalities through which investment in non-state schools could augment resilience to violence and access to education. Based on the full set of findings from this study, we present several recommendations for action that government and donors could take to support the Kaduna State education system. These recommendations have at their foundation an understanding that a large proportion of non-state schools serve low-income populations, and private and public sectors are inexorably interrelated, face similar challenges, and would benefit from closer collaboration. Recommendations are presented by actor type.

Kaduna State Ministry of Education, Science and Technology:

1. **Conduct regular surveys and needs assessments of non-state schools.** The state government is generally unaware of the status of non-state schools and is unclear of their exact needs and challenges. This handicaps the Ministry in developing evidence-based policies and causes stigmatization of private schools. To strengthen the capacity for evidence-based decisionmaking, data quality needs to be drastically improved, planned surveys need to be funded, and needs assessments need to be conducted to help identify the bottlenecks that non-state schools face, particularly in contexts of conflict.

2. **Introduce clear and streamlined criteria and processes for registering, accrediting, and regulating non-state schools.** The registration criteria for new schools should be designed so that they do not unduly restrict the entry of new institutions or create disincentives to register. The accreditation process should be streamlined and based on clear criteria. Regulation of non-state schools should be systematic; quality indicators should be objective and measurable so as to minimize discretion and limit the scope for corruption.

3. **Reduce the tax burden on non-state schools.** All accredited non-state schools are subject to multiple taxes that exacerbate financial fragility and stifle growth. Tax exemptions could be granted for non-state schools under a certain size, income level, or during the start-up phase. Taxes on ANSS need to be harmonized, simplified, or removed altogether. Government goals for educating children would be better served by collecting revenue from other sources, not schools.

4. **Commit to the integration of Islamic non-state schools.** This study found no evidence to suggest Islamic non-state schools are opposed to the integration of a basic education curriculum. The government, therefore, has an opportunity to build on this sensitization by sustaining integration programs initiated by donors and paying the salaries of state teachers currently integrated into non-state schools.

5. **Provide incentives and subsidies for non-state schools.** All sampled schools expressed interest and willingness to partner with the government to improve school quality, financial standing, and accessibility. In turn, the government could support non-state schools by (1) allowing private schools teachers no-cost access to in-service trainings at national teacher colleges, (2) expanding the government school feeding program mandate to non-state schools, (3) providing government standard textbooks and other teaching and learning materials, and (4) paying for teacher positions in schools serving low-income populations or those operating in violence-affected areas.
Donors:

6. **Adjust their sector engagement strategies to pay more attention to non-state schools or at least to recognize the vital role that they play.** Given the prevalence of non-state schools, any strategy that does not acknowledge that reality is incomplete. Donor activities should explore engagements with non-state schools as a means of building resilience and peace and supporting marginalized communities. Engagements could include providing state teachers to non-state schools to teach the basic education curriculum. Research on state education should also take into account non-state schools, as these schools form an important part of the sector.

7. **Assist the Kaduna State government in clarifying their policies toward non-state schools.** Successful design and implementation of policies toward the non-state sector needs to ensure that the government agency responsible for regulating the private sector has both the information and skills required to create, develop, and manage functions, such as institutional accreditation/registration, quality assurance processes, and monitoring. Donors can play an important complementary role in supporting government to develop data-driven policies toward non-state schools and help create enabling and balanced regulatory frameworks.

8. **Support the government to fund surveys and censuses on non-state schools.** Surveys and censuses can be costly projects for governments to conduct independently. Donors can partner with state agencies in the design, implementation, analysis, and funding of surveys, censuses, and other research projects.